On the principles and presuppositions of atheism and agnosticism in Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche by Ray, Matthew Alun
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2475
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
On the Principles and Presuppositions of Atheism and 
Agnosticism in Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche 
by 
Matthew Alun Ray 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy 
June 2001 
CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... 
3 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 
5 
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................... 
6 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 
9 
I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE PRESENT STUnY ..................... ... _ ... _ ............. 
10 
II STRUCTURE of THE PRESENT STUDY 
................................................................................... 
16 
2. GOD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: `THE SUPPLEMENT OF OUR OWN 
IMPOTENCE' ......................................................................................................................... 21 
I INTRODUCTION 
................................................................................................................. 
21 
II CA. RTESUAN BEGINNINGS. . ................................................................................................... 
22 
III KANTIAN MORAL DEISM: THE UNSACRIFICABLE 
............................................................... 
39 
IV TM-7 MORAL PROOF OF THE BEING OF GOD ........................................................................ 
48 
I 
......................................................................................................................................... 
54 
11 ....................................................................................................................................... 61 V CONCLUSION 
...................................................................................................................... 
65 
3. SCHOPENHAUER I: THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF SCHOPENHAUERIAN 
ATHEISM ............................................................................................................................... 68 
I INTRODUCTION 
.................................................................................................................... 
68 
II THE, PRESENTATION OF SCHOPENHAUERIAN ATI-IFISM 
......................................................... 
70 
III ATHEISM AND IDEALISM .................................................................................................... 
76 
IV BEYOND TIC LIMITS OF EXPERIENCE 
................................................................................. 
86 
V PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SELF .......................................................................................... 
91 
VI ANALOGY AS A METHOD 
................................................................................................... 
98 
VII SOME POINTS OF CRITICISM 
........................................................................................... 
104 
I 
....................................................................................................................................... 105 
II 
..................................................................................................................................... 111 
VI iI CONCLUSION 
................................................................................................................ 114 
4. SCHOPENHAUER II: QUESTIONABLE FEATURES OF LIFE AND IMAGINARY 
BENEFITS OF DEATH ........................................................................................................ 116 
I INTRODUCTION 
.................................................................................................................. 
116 
II TILE RIGHT TO REMAIN COMPASSIONATE (PI-IENOMENOLOGY OF TIE PASSIONS) 
................ 
118 
III ETHICS RECONSTRUCTED 
................................................................................................ 124 
IV VIRTUE OR RELIGION9 
....................................... ....................................................... 
1I1 
V THE `ASCETIC IJ WAL' (AESTHETICS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EXISTENCE) 
............................... 
140 
VI TI ll WORT1-I OF TRAGEDY 
.............................. 
ll CONCLU SIc >N 
............................ ..... 150 
5. NIETZSCHE (1): AN EXPERIMENT IN STRENGTH .................................................. 
152 
I INTRODUCTION 
................................................................................................................ 
152 
11 PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION ....................................................................... .............. 
154 
III `TRULY, TOO EARLY DIED THAT HEBREW' [Z 98] ............................................................. 
1 59 
IV CHRISTIANITY AS ESCAPE ................................................................................................ 
161 
V CHRItiTIAN'ITY AS RESSENTIMENT.................................................. . ................................... 
174 
VI THE SLAVE REVOLT IN MORALS: PERFORMANCE NOT DESCRIPTION ................................ 
179 
........................................... ............ 
VII A SOCRATIC OBJECTION 
......................................... 
192 
VIII CONCLUSION 
................................................................................................................ 
198 
6. NIETZSCHE (2): RESSENTIMENT, TRUTH AND THE NATURE OF REALITY... 202 
I VICTORY WITHOUT ARGUMENT? 
............................................................................... ...... 
202 
II PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RESSENTIMENT 
............................................................................. 
206 
III WILL THE TRum SET Us FREE? 
............................................................................... ....... 
214 
IV AGAINST RESSENTIMENT, AGAINST NIHILISM 
......................................................... 
21-3) 
V SECULARISATION, HISTORY, INEXORABILITY 
.................................................................... 
229 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 235 
I: CONCLUDING REMARKS ON KANT AND SCHOPENHAUER.. 
. .................. ..... ... . ........... 
235 
II: CONCLUDING REMARKS ON NIETZSCHE 
........................................................................... 
239 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 245 
3 
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I would like to acknowledge Dr. P. Poellner's help as my supervisor. I am 
also grateful to those friends and colleagues who encouraged this project in 
various ways: Devorah Baum, Kaupo Kand and Antonio Gomez all in some way 
helped contribute to what I wanted to say, as did Birna Birnadottir, who in 
addition translated some of my work on Nietzsche into Icelandic in a manner I 
knew was completely trustworthy. I should also like to acknowledge the support 
of Beth Perry and Louis Gasparro and to say a heartfelt diolch to Adrian Wyn 
Vaughn Williams, Dr. Henry Morriss, Craig Holden, Ifans Mawr and of course 
Tad a Mam. 
Declaration 
I would like to acknowledge that this thesis is all my own work and has not been 
submitted for a degree at any other university. 
I would also like to acknowledge that parts of my first chapter on Nietzsche were 
recently published in the Icelandic journal of philosophy, Hugur: Timarit On 
Heint. speki (1998-1999) under the title: -Tilraun um styrk: Trüin i 
tulkunarsälarfraedi Nietzsches' pp. 50-65 ['An Experiment in Strength: An 
Outline of Nietzsche's Religious Metapsychology', in Mind: A Journal of 
Philosophy (1998-1999) pp. 50-65]. 
4 
Also, I used the quote from Freud's From the History of an Infantile Neurosis urosis to 
make a similar point about atheism and psychoanalysis in my M. A. thesis, On 
the Principles and Presuppositions of Atheism and Agnosticism in Modern 
Continental Philosophy, Warwick University, 1996, although I have rewritten 
the surrounding paragraphs for this thesis. 
Finally, I should like to remark that some of my observations, located in the 
introduction, upon a book by Gordon E. Michalson, Kant and The Problem of 
God, also found a home in a book review by me published in the journal 
Philosophical Books (forthcoming). 
Abstract 
This thesis will be asking questions about the underlying structure of Kant, 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's thoughts on atheism and agnosticism. It will 
begin with the work of the mature Kant, explaining how his epistemology, as 
articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason, treated the question of the sense 
experience of God and then how his theory of biblical hermeneutics treated the 
question of divine revelation through scripture, before examining Kant's moral 
proof of God, finding it not to be successful. 
I next move to a consideration of the atheistic philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's chief argument against God will be seen to be an 
argument from exclusion, although significant difficulties will be seen to beset 
Schopenhauer's endeavour. He will also be seen to shape a moral philosophy 
which he then turns against God. This argument will be examined in some detail 
and it too, despite appearances, will be seen to be essentially metaphysical. Since 
Schopenhauer's moral philosophy is intrinsically metaphysical in this way, his 
moral objection to God has to be construed as relying upon the prior introduction 
of an element of his atheistic metaphysics and to that extent is to be considered 
an expression of, rather than an argument for, atheism. 
Nietzsche elaborates a metapsychological and physiological analysis of the 
type of person inclined towards believing in the claims of the monotheistic 
tradition, demonstrating how theism is connected with the yearning for escape 
and for the moralisation of the socially unaccountable. After investigating the 
Nietzschean approach to religion and atheism, I will however, conclude that 
Nietzsche only achieves some of his aims; and further, that those of his aims 
which are achieved themselves rely on certain specific empirical assumptions 
which are in any case problematic. 
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I. Introduction 
Man shows remarkable powers of mind and reason in the satisfaction of his 
aims, even though they may be unnecessary, or even dangerous and harmful; 
and those powers are evidence of the blessings he enjoys in his natural powers 
which enable him to discover, to learn, and to practice those arts. Think of the 
wonderful inventions of clothing and building, the astounding achievements of 
human industry! Think of'man's progress in agriculture and navigation; of the 
variety, in conception and accomplishment, man has shown in pottery, in 
sculpture, in painting; the marvels in theatrical spectacles [... ]Finally, the wit 
shown by philosophers and heretics in defending their very errors and 
falsehoods is something which beggars imagination! It must be remembered that 
we are now speaking of' the natural abilities of the human mind, the chief 
ornament of this mortal life 
St. Augustine, City of God 
Thus the lord indulges his slaves and even enjoys their insolence 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
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I Historical Background and Scope of the Present Study 
Generations of humanists, historical materialists, psychoanalysts, feminists 
and (more recently) sociobiologists have all seemingly immeasurably cheapened 
the concerns of religion in modem times. Inspired, it appears, to free us from the 
supposed constraints of dogma, their results have more often than not never 
really engaged with religious concerns themselves, only their political or social 
effects; liberating us to enter a politically charged world only to discover it now 
framed within an existentially incomprehensible universe. It is certainly arguable 
that, in the terms of the history of modern philosophy, the birth of this tendency 
has been most obviously observable in the influence - though not necessarily the 
substance - of Immanuel Kant's thought. 
Kant's construal of the relationship between humanity and divinity is more 
complex and less assured than that to be found in the work of most of those of 
his major modern predecessors concerned with the same kind of questions in 
philosophy. Take Rene Descartes, for instance: although he at least seemed to 
break with the medieval scholastic tradition in the Meditations when he 
consciously detached philosophy from theological postulates and from a 
scriptural base (preferring instead the autonomy of reason as authenticated by 
methodological doubt), the theistic conclusion of the initially sceptical 
Akc: 'thtations reached by means of an ontological argument for God and also a 
very specific kind of causal argument, turned out not only to be a venerable 
ontological conclusion largely in keeping with the previous scholastic framework 
but also an epistemological guarantee of truth; a divine guarantee that made God 
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central to philosophy and left the atheist - at least on one particular construal of 
Descartes' escape from doubt - knowing little or nothing'. Or, take the 
subsequent example of George Berkeley. Berkeley, whilst denying that anything 
material exists independently of our perception, nevertheless defused any overtly 
solipsistic or sceptical implications by arguing that the ideas that we perceive 
must be caused by a spirit capable of producing far more vivid and coherent 
ideas than we as humans are able to produce in our dreams, imaginings and 
reveries: the infinite spirit, God'. The culmination of Berkeley's philosophic 
I R. Descartes, Discourse on Method and The Meditations (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 59: 
`If we did not know that all that is in us which is real and true comes from a perfect and infinite 
being, we would have no reason which would assure us that, however clear and distinct our ideas 
might be, they had the perfection of being true'. This position seems to involve a certain 
methodological circularity however: it is from the premise that whatever I perceive clearly and 
distinctly is true (such as the cogito) that God's existence is eventually derived - but it is then the 
nature of this very existence (i. e. the fact that God is no deceiver) that then vouchsafes our 
reliance on clear and distinct ideas. Some Cartesian commentators still attracted to this 
foundationalist project have accordingly sought to present clear and distinct ideas as self-validating 
- which would leave the atheist at least knowing something. 
2 G. Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, in Works (London: Dove, 1890), 
163-4. Moreover, Berkeley also argued that, since objects exist only when perceived, `As sure 
therefore, as the sensible world exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains 
and supports it', ibid. 160; see also 183-4. In other words, since sensible ideas - which, according 
to Berkeley, constitute the physical world as such - have, or so he seems to suppose, a continued 
existence even in the absence of their perception by human minds, there must be another mind to 
perceive them and therefore God must exist. In point of fact, however, I should mention that some 
recent Berkeley scholars have questioned whether Berkeley did actually subscribe to such an 
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vision might thus be said to be a picture of us as spirits in a divinely ordered 
intersubjective perceptual network. It can be seen that Kant moved way beyond 
both Descartes and Berkeley by arguing that there could be absolutely no 
theological backing for epistemology (since God was himself unknowable') or 
for ontology (since God was also theoretically unprovable)4. In this advance 
beyond what Kant - long before Feuerbach and Heidegger - called `onto- 
theology' is laid the immediate roots of an overall project of marginalising the 
role of monotheistic religion within epistemology, metaphysics and 
philosophical ethics that then took a dramatic turn in the writings of Arthur 
Schopenhauer and the classical philologist turned ethical philosopher, Fredrich 
Nietzsche. 
Of course, Kantian religious thought did not give birth to just one subsequent 
tradition: Kant's philosophical legacy is diverse as it is profound. Nevertheless, 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's singular development of Kantian thought seems 
to me to be notable among post-Kantian philosophies for its self-conscious 
antagonism toward the Semitic monotheistic religions from the very outset. 
argument, cf. D. Berman, George Berkeley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 47-48. Nevertheless, 
it is in this manner that Berkeley is customarily interpreted. 
One of the consequences of which is that in the `Refutation of Idealism' section, which is partly 
directed against the `problematic idealism of Descartes, which holds that there is only one 
empirical assertion that is indubitably certain, namely, that `I am" [CPR B274], Descartes' own 
appeal to God as a route away from solipsism is simply ignored by Kant. 
Of course, choosing the sceptical thought of David Hume instead of, or alongside, that of 
Descartes and Berkeley would deform this picture of modern philosophy considerably but the 
controversial issue of how uncompromising - or, if you prefer, of how enlightened - Hume's 
scepticism in relation to religion was cannot be adequately entered into here. 
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Other immediately post-Kantian thinkers, such as G. W. F. Hegel and F. W. J. 
Schelling, for example, were overtly concerned to square their philosophy with 
the revelations of the Christian religion (albeit with questionable success). And 
phenomenology, whether in its Husserlian or Heideggerean variety, effectively 
presents no sophistication of the fundamentally agnostic Kantian response to the 
question of God. This, of course, was only to be expected: a return to the basic 
experience of the world can be of no help in determining answers to questions of 
a determinately other-worldly nature. Much the same agnosticism can be found 
both in recent Anglo-American analytic philosophy and in the very different 
movement that flourished at around the same time on the continent, 
existentialism; especially since this latter movement's emphasis on the absolute 
freedom of human choice gave it the requisite conceptual tools for a relapse into 
the (Kierkegaardian) fideism from whence it was, in any case, partly derived. 
Similarly, so-called `ordinary language philosophy' as practised by J. L. Austin 
and the mature Wittgenstein can be seen to leave atheism without any effective 
conceptual tools with which to attack religion. Those heavily influenced by the 
work of the later Wittgenstein, for example, often argue that religious discourse, 
like all (non-philosophic) discourse, belongs to a form of life that is effectively 
uncriticisable and needs to be understood only `from the inside', as it were. 
According to some authors, this Wittgensteinian standpoint renders atheism an 
impossible position to hold, since the atheist can only be regarded as someone 
who has failed to understand the way certain concepts are used within a given 
form of life (i. e. within a certain religion)5. 
R. Trigg, Ratioflalily and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 3 1.1 do not, however, wish to 
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It would be asinine however, to deny that there are significant post-Kantian 
atheists outside of phenomenology, existentialism, ordinary language and 
analytic philosophy, the most influential probably being Ludwig Feuerbach, Max 
Stirrer and Karl Marx in an important neo-Hegelian tradition of rigorously 
atheistic thinking. But even though Feuerbach, Stirrer and Marx seem to me to 
be important modern atheistic thinkers that I have disfavoured - but not entirely 
neglected (see, in particular, chapter six) - in my study of post-Kantian atheistic 
philosophy, in mitigation of this shortcoming it may fairly be said, firstly, that 
these specific thinkers seemed to have been mediated through the philosophy of 
Hegel rather than directly belonging to the immediately post-Kantian generation 
and so do not illustrate so clearly the important atheistic possibilities intrinsic to 
Kantianism itself; and secondly, that Feuerbach's attempt to discredit Christian 
theism whilst remaining true to its moral involvements and Stirrer's 
immoralising response to Feuerbach's (and indeed to the whole of European 
modernity's) attachment to ethics and to the value of truth in itself without God 
are in any case strikingly, if only partially, paralleled in the atheisms of 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, respectively. It is a Stirrer-Nietzsche parallelism 
that seems most open to elaboration (and only partly because Schopenhauer's 
pessimism is profoundly alien to the tone and substance of Feuerbach's 
writings). In particular, one would be able to point out that Stirner's attacks on 
the ideal of truth for its own sake, his attacks on an unquestioning attachment to 
the morals of one's own age, and his endorsement of an assertive - and even 
criminal - individualism all find strong parallels in Nietzsche's thought (and I 
suggest that Trigg espouses the view here under discussion. 
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shall be taking up the threads of this in my second chapter on Nietzsche). Further 
mitigation might also be thought to be provided by the fact that fairly recent 
books on the history of modern philosophical atheism such as P. Masterton's 
Atheism and Alienation and, by G. E. Michalson, Kant and The Problem of 'God, 
cover pretty much this neo-Hegelian ground that I have disregarded6. According 
to the argument of Atheism and Alienation, modern philosophical atheism stems 
from the character of modern philosophy itself as initiated by Descartes, wherein 
a pervasive attention to subjectivity (and to the autonomy of reason) replaces the 
former interest in divinely formed being. Masterton follows the course of 
philosophical atheism from Descartes through Kant to Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx 
and beyond. Michalson's thesis, on the other hand, begins not with the cogito 
argument but rather with Kant and argues that since Kant's theistic commitment 
is, within the context of the critical philosophy, basically subordinated to human 
autonomy, then its natural legacy is to be found in the atheistic work of 
Feuerbach rather than in the liberal tradition of modern Protestant theology. 
Whilst being both scholarly and provocative, the argument of both books 
however, by either, as in the first case, only cursorily mentioning Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche as forerunners to existentialism or, as in the second instance, by 
failing to even mention the Schopenhauerian, fork of the Kantian legacy in what 
is presented as an explicit attempt to `build historical perspective', omit what 
seems to me to be the most markedly atheistic response to Kantian thought to be 
found in the nineteenth century post-Kantian generation: that of Schopenhauer 
(' G. E. Michalson, Kant and The Problem of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); P. Masterton, 
4 theism and Alienation: .4 Study of the Philosophical Sources of Contemporary A theism (Dublin 
and London: Gill & Macmillan, 1971). 
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and, at one remove, Nietzsche. It is this omission that the present study intends to 
cover. 
It is, then, Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's works that will provide the 
focus of interpretation in the present study of atheism in modern philosophy, 
sometimes supplemented by apposite references to the doctrines of those other 
philosophers that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche have adopted, or are 
attacking, or have influenced in some illuminating way. Most important amongst 
these philosophers are Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Descartes, Berkeley, 
Austin, Heidegger and Maclntyre. 
II Structure of the Present Study 
In the following chapters, we will therefore be asking specific philosophical 
questions about the underlying structure of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's 
thoughts on atheism and agnosticism; thoughts that, as the review above 
suggested, represent one of the most concerted attacks upon monotheistic 
religion in the whole of modern philosophy, and by monotheistic religion I really 
mean to refer mainly to the Christian tradition so, unless express indications are 
given to the contrary, all references to religion in this study should therefore be 
understood to refer to Christianity. (I should perhaps also remark here that I was 
at times tempted to introduce the writings of certain theologians into certain key 
points of this study: Karl Barth in the section on Kant on scripture, for example, 
but that would have turned this into a very different study. ) By means of 
anticipation, I should state that I will find Kant's tentative and quasi-existential 
moral theology largely unsupported; Schopenhauer's metaphysical and ethical 
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atheism flawed in several areas, and Nietzsche's peculiarly naturalistic attack 
upon Christianity only very partially successful. I will, in other words, find the 
question of God's existence characteristically unresolved even in this 
aggressively atheistic fork of post-Kantian philosophy. Nevertheless, this 
irresolution is itself still instructive as it helps focus our attention on the fact that 
atheism should not be taken on trust any more than should theism. Also, it 
arguably shows that the specific nature of these modern approaches to or attacks 
on religion are - for reasons that I do not go into here and which in any case 
seem ambiguous - primarily ethical. Topically speaking, therefore, this study 
will often concentrate on the concerns of moral philosophy, except in the 
opening sections of my Kant chapter and in much of my first chapter on 
Schopenhauer, which will have to take into account some epistemological and 
metaphysical considerations. 
The exact route I intend to take is simply to begin with the work of the mature 
Kant, explaining how his innovative epistemology in the Critique of Pure 
Reason treated the question of the sense experience of God and how his 
exceptionally moral theory of biblical hermeneutics - as articulated in his late 
text Religion Within the Limits of'Reason Alone - treated the question of divine 
revelation through scripture, before examining Karat's so-called moral proof of 
God. We begin with Kant because, although not himself strictly an atheist, he 
nonetheless argued for a restrictive epistemological approach to the question of 
God, which obviously has important implications for thought on questions of 
religion and faith. Moreover, his historical importance for Schopenhauer's and 
Nietzsche's work is beyond question. This is especially true for Schopenhauer: it 
is clear that he regarded Kant as his most important forebear and, with the 
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exception of Plato (and arguably Berkeley), the only philosopher to make a 
positive contribution to Schopenhauer's own philosophy. In a sense, Kant thus 
belongs to the pre-history, or to the backdrop, of that branch of philosophical 
atheism in which I am interested. Nevertheless, examining this backdrop will 
prove to be indispensable. 
After investigating Kant's moral theology, I next move to a consideration of 
the atheistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Sketching the unusual 
presentation of his atheism and the possible explanations for this, I then 
illuminate the methods by which Schopenhauer excludes God from his 
ontological picture. Fundamentally, Schopenhauer's initial argument against God 
will be seen to be an argument from exclusion. Schopenhauer accepted 
transcendental idealism - to the extent that Schopenhauer's atheistic project may 
be said to be prosecuted, as it were, from within a Kantian parenthesis - and then 
protested firstly that Kant's opposition to the objectivity of space and time 
should have lead him to deny any ability to separate creator and creation, and 
secondly that Kant's misidentification of the subject with the thinking mind 
alone forced him to neglect a way to determine the world of the thing in itself in 
a way fundamentally incompatible with the Christian faith. Considerable 
difficulties will be seen to beset Schopenhauer's endeavour however, and I will 
articulate certain of the main ones. Schopenhauer's metaphysical thought will 
not emerge wholly unscathed and we will have to conclude that - irrespective of 
its possible philosophic success in other areas - it is unable to substantiate his 
strong atheistic claims. In my second chapter on Schopenhauer, he will also be 
seen to construct an intentionally unKantian moral philosophy -a moral 
philosophy which in several respects harks back to the methodology of some pre- 
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Kantian British empiricists in ethics - which he then turns against God. This 
moral philosophy will be examined in some detail and will be seen to be 
essentially metaphysical, both on exegetical grounds and because without a 
metaphysical element it would succumb to deep theoretical problems concerning 
ethical disagreement amongst moral agents. Since Schopenhauer's moral 
philosophy is intrinsically metaphysical in this way, his moral objection to God 
has to be construed as relying, I shall argue, upon the prior introduction of an 
element of his atheistic metaphysics and to that extent is an expression of, rather 
than argument for, atheism. We close our discussion of Schopenhauer's atheism 
by briefly answering the question of how far Schopenhauer's emphasis on 
redemption from this world, which forms a highly important part of his 
philosophical system as a whole, allowed him to re-engage with the supposedly 
discredited religious tradition. This part of my study, which aims to introduce the 
Nietzschean notion of the `ascetic ideal' in one of the precise locations where 
Nietzsche first discovered it, will be primarily elucidatory and we shall discover 
that this area of the Schopenhauerian philosophy shares a core commitment with 
the Christian religion, a commitment that is critically, and at times perhaps even 
obsessively, considered at great length in the later writings of Nietzsche. 
Today, many critical responses to and philosophical receptions of Nietzsche's 
thought exist and new work on Nietzsche is constantly emerging, from both the 
Anglo-American and the Continental schools of philosophy. I have taken 
advantage of this congenial atmosphere to devote two chapters to a writer I see 
as one of the foremost atheists of the European literary and philosophical 
tradition. In my detailed and sustained reading of Nietzsche's violently poetic 
and aggressively polemical attack upon theistic religion what will prove to be of 
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surprising importance will be his proto-Austinian theory of language; a theor 
which Nietzsche uses to expose certain of the deleterious effects of religious 
speech in what I shall take to be one his key texts on religion, On the Genealogy 
of Morals. In this and other texts, Nietzsche also elaborates a metapsychological 
and even physiological analysis of the type of person inclined towards believing 
in the monotheistic tradition, famously demonstrating how theism is, in his eyes, 
deeply connected with the yearning for escape and for the moralisation of the 
socially unaccountable. This kind of analysis will be the subject of my first 
chapter on Nietzsche. But Nietzsche also analyses types of atheism in his writing, 
strongly suggesting that some of the pathological motives which lay behind 
theism were also to be found in atheism. This peculiarly Nietzschean typology of 
atheism, along with a consideration of Nietzsche's speculative remarks about 
secularisation, will be the subject of my second and final chapter on that author. I 
will conclude that Nietzsche only achieves some of his aims and further that 
those of his aims that are achieved themselves rely on empirical assumptions 
which are in any case controversial. Essentially, then, the three central claims of 
the present study can provisionally be said to be; first, that at a certain moment 
of the history of post-Kantian philosophy it seemed as though the question of the 
existence of God was definitely resolved; second, that it is demonstrably no 
longer possible to agree with this estimate; and third, that the question of a 
personal religious faith is in principle consequently just as pressing now as it was 
in pre-modern times, even if today that question has largely been forgotten. 
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2. God in the Philosophy of Kant: `The supplement of our own Impotence' 
I Introduction 
I propose in this first chapter to examine the way in which Immanuel Kant sets 
up the conditions for what seemed to be his great spiritual wish: not a tolerated - 
because disguised - atheism but rather a truly rational faith in God consistent 
with the tenets of his critical system. Examining Kant's philosophy of religion in 
this way will both illuminate its own intrinsic tensions and problems, and bring 
to light the manner in which it allowed Schopenhauer to argue for his 
specifically post-Kantian variety of atheism, an atheism which in turn massively 
influenced the philosophy of Nietzsche. The present chapter will be structured as 
follows. First, I will do a little scene setting by means of a brief, and therefore 
necessarily selective, look at the general argument of Kant's major work, the 
Critique of Pure Reason. I will then study Kant's own construal of God as 
existing wholly outside of space and time and his subsequent `falsificationist' 
approach to the study of religious scripture. Since Kant's metaphysical construal 
of God appears to challenge - replace, even - the Judaeo-Christian concept of a 
personal and historical God as revealed through the Bible, I will be maintaining 
that we therefore have some license to consider Kant a `deist' (in a sense that I 
shall specify). In the final section of this chapter I will then turn to examine 
Kant's elaborate `moral argument' for the existence of God. This proof is 
without any doubt the locus of Kant's attempt to construct a positive philosophy 
of religion within the constraints of his `critical' system but it will not prove to 
be ultimately convincing and I will develop two possible ways in which it might 
be seen to fail (one such way will draw upon some pertinent aspects of the moral 
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philosophy of Alisdair Maclntyre). Given the ultimate inadequacy of Kant's 
positive attempt to rationally justify the positing of God within the critical 
system, I will be suggesting in conclusion that it would be sensible of us to 
suspect Kant's deism and accept Kant's own occasional admissions that his 
philosophy allowed rather than compelled a theistic commitment. 
II Cartesian Beginnings 
Before embarking upon my main line of critical argument, I would first like to 
say a few words to place Kant's claims regarding the question of religious faith 
within the framework of the overall argument of his first Critique and also to 
briefly look at a few interesting and relevant problems commonly associated 
with that argument, some such characterisation being a prerequisite for 
understanding Kant's unique approach to religious concerns. Now, Kant's 
project can be roughly characterised as a close attention to our absolutely (as it is 
supposed) invariant perceptual and conceptual faculties and their implications 
for the study of metaphysics. Kant thus might be said to position himself much in 
accordance with the main thrust of specifically modern philosophy from Rene 
Descartes onwards by beginning his enquiry with and from the individual 
epistemological subject and its knowledge. Yet one problem that notoriously 
arises even at this early point in Kant's attempt to establish philosophy on such a 
subjective footing is that, although Kant does not wholly overlook the 
philosophic problem of other minds, he nonetheless - unlike predecessors such 
as Descartes and Berkeley - has disturbingly little to say on this particular aspect 
of alterity. In truth, to establish our knowledge of other subjects, pretty much all 
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Kant has to say is that `If I wish to represent to myself a thinking being, I must 
put myself in his place, and thus substitute, as it were, my own subject for the 
object I am seeking to consider (which does not occur in any other kind of 
investigation)' [CPR A 353-354]. Which, of course, far from solving the 
sceptical problem of other minds, serves only to highlight it. I emphasise this 
problem at the outset because far from being a non-issue it might in fact be 
thought to impinge upon a consequential theological problematic within the 
Kantian philosophy. 
What I mean by this somewhat grandiose claim is simply that to such typically 
modem philosophical endeavours as Kant's, which are anchored so centrally to 
epistemological subjectivity, there belongs, at least in principle, a suspicion 
(which haunts modem phenomenology and is arguably confirmed in Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit) that the subject himself, the beginning of all 
philosophical enquiry, might in fact be a rather special kind of spiritual being; 
after all, although an essentially privileged one, God is nevertheless presumably 
also a subject. In other words, broadly Cartesian philosophies such as Kant's that 
start off from the subject, if they do not successfully defuse scepticisms 
concerning an intersubjective world, might be left with the extravagant idea that 
the subject posits everything, including himself (the philosophy of Fichte has 
sometimes been taken to offer a case in point here'). I am not for one moment 
suggesting that any would now actually believe this to be true. My claim is only 
that this is a possible theoretical impasse - one that could be seized upon by the 
sceptic, for example. And, in this connection, it is noteworthy that the thought 
Although with what justice I cannot say. 
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that the self apparently indicated by self awareness or the cogito might itself be 
God is, in fact, briefly entertained by Descartes in what is conceivably the most 
famous anti-sceptical text in the history of western philosophy, the Meditations 
on First Philosophy. 
The first of Descartes' six Meditations famously inaugurated the modern 
concern with epistemology by calling into doubt all our beliefs. It specifically 
relied on an argument from illusion, the suspicion that we might be continually 
dreaming and the even more radical idea that an evil demon might be deceiving 
us to thereby render all our beliefs collectively suspicious. In the second 
Meditation, Descartes then discovers a single and now well-known truth - or 
perhaps re-discovers an Augustinian truth - on the basis of which he will rebuild 
his knowledge: namely, that his own existence is indubitable: cogito ergo sum (I 
justifiably leave aside the modern issue of whether this cogito argument was an 
inference or performance; a judgement either way on my part here would have to 
remain peremptory, controversial and clearly out of place). In the third 
Meditation, Descartes then investigates other of his ideas and finds that one in 
particular, the idea of God, could not have been generated by himself, since it is 
the idea of infinity and he is a finite creature. This, coupled with the rather more 
basic a -priori assumption that ideas must have adequate causes, leads Descartes 
to suppose that the idea of God has to be innate and implanted in us by the 
creator Himself, thereby saving the Cartesian project from the apotheosis of the 
self. To the modern reader however, Descartes' argument might seem to be 
flawed in either of two ways: either in its assumption that our idea of infinity is 
not just the concept of our own powers with their limitations and imperfections 
removed or by its basic assumption about causality being jeopardised by later 
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worries raised by David Hume. Yet it was neither proto-Humean worries 
concerning causality nor equally empiricist concerns over the idea of infinity that 
most troubled Descartes in the Meditations. Rather, he was most immediately 
concerned with the unlikely possibility that the idea of an infinite God might be 
generated by his own self if that self is God. This potential problem however, is 
recognised and raised by Descartes only to be quickly dispatched with what must 
surely be still considered to be a knock-down argument: namely, by pointing out 
that the subjectivity found by the cogito argument has not always known itself to 
be God and so it therefore demonstrably does not possess omniscience as one of 
its attributes and so it cannot, after all, be God. Descartes writes: 
Perhaps also I am something more than I imagine myself to be and all the perfections I 
attribute to the nature of a God are in some way potentially in me [... ] Still, all these 
excellences do not belong to or approach in any way the idea I have of a Divinity, in 
whom nothing is to be found only potentially but all actually existent. And is it not even 
an infallible argument of the existence of imperfection in my knowledge that it grows 
little by little and increases by degrees? 8 
At this point it might be thought to be still open to the particularly obstinate 
sceptic to desperately suggest that Descartes may be wrong in thinking doubt an 
imperfection. But this last objection is evidently invalid for if Descartes is wrong 
in thinking doubt to be an imperfection then he is still, qua maker of mistakes, an 
imperfect being9. 
R Descartes, Discourse Oll Method and The Aleditations, 125-126. 
9 B. Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1985), 145. 
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Kant too, although he sophisticates self-knowledge by distinguishing between 
the phenomenal self as an object of inner sense and the existence indicated by 
apperception (which is nevertheless decisively not a substance, as it was in 
Descartes) also entertains the thought that the self revealed by self-awareness 
might be God in his Lectures on Philosophical Theology: 
When I think I am conscious that my ego thinks in me, and not in some other thing [... ] I 
exist for myself and am not the predicate of any other thing [... ] Either I must be God 
himself or God is a substance different from me. [LPT 75] 
Kant's answer to this potential puzzle, explicitly in the Lectures and implicitly in 
the first Critique, is essentially the Cartesian one that God does not think in the 
manner that we do but it is coupled with the important Kantian qualification that 
the knowledge that pertains to the divine mind is qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively different: `All his knowledge must be intuition, and not thought, 
which always involves limitations' [CPR B 71]. When Kant suggests that God 
does not think what he means is that God's knowledge is not conceptual, rather it 
is `intellectual intuition' which creates rather than perceives objects. As this 
point may also be put, since human knowledge is always partly discursive, the 
recognition of God's extra-discursive omniscience allows Kant to remain as 
untroubled as Descartes by the solipsistic argument to the effect that our 
subjectivity must be identified with God (and I suppose it also true to say that the 
Refutation of Idealinn section and the first Analogy of Experience of the first 
Critique arguably disprove the idealism of objects - although not of subjects - in 
the external world, further suggesting we are not responsible for everything 
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around us). But the idea of extra-discursive omniscience however, might be 
thought to lead to a problem of its own. 
The problem is this: the fact that, according to Kant, divine `intellectual 
intuition' creates rather than discerns objects seems to have a serious implication 
for another of Kant's own doctrines, that of the purported spontaneity of our own 
human understanding, as it seems to render the reconciliation of our 
understanding's spontaneity with God's productive omniscience problematic. 
The source for my concerns here is a series of remarks by H. E. Allison in his 
Kant 's Transcendental Idealism, a book otherwise not centrally concerned with 
Kantian religious thought. Allison maintains that The difficulty stems from the 
productive, archetypal nature of intellectual intuition. In conceiving of myself as 
known by such a mind, I would be constrained to regard the spontaneity of my 
own thought as the product of something else. This is [... ] a contradiction' 10. 
Allison does not draw any specific conclusion from this contradiction but I 
suspect he means to suggest that we might do well to regard the place for a 
supreme Being in Kantian thought with a measure of scepticism, if not 
downright cynicism. Yet there is a viable alternative: we might do just as well to 
concede Allison's point about the conflict between, on the one hand, 
omniscience construed as intellectual intuition and, on the other hand, our 
understanding's spontaneity but then rise above that very conflict by construing 
divine omniscience as something other than intellectual intuition. Furthermore, I 
do not think that we should feel compelled by Allison or anyone else to state 
I() H. E. Allison, Kant 's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 289- 
290. 
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what exactly this `other omniscience' need be. Admitting our ignorance of what 
God is seems to me to be neither untrue to the measured scepticism of Kants 
own writing nor untrue to the Biblical criticism of idolatry. It also has the 
secondary advantage of granting God the power to represent to himself objects 
not present without actually making them present. 
Returning to the main line of argument in the first Critique, Kant thus embarks 
upon the process of circumscribing the structure and function of the human 
intellectual and sensible capacities. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, which 
opens the main text of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that all our 
experience is not simply passively received from the external world as on the 
empiricist model of perception but is rather subjectively organised, partly by 
what he calls two a priori forms of sensible intuition, which are space and time. 
Space and time according to Kant are therefore not derived from experience and 
do not in fact exist outside our actual or possible experience but rather are the 
sensible ways in which we experience our world. Kant had two arguments to 
demonstrate that space and time are not derived from the external world and a 
further two to show that they are intuitions rather than concepts. I would now 
like to mention the arguments in summary fashion (concentrating on the 
arguments concerned with space: the corresponding ones for time are parallel 
formulations), as a grasp of their structure would seem to be a pre-requisite for 
an understanding of the nature, and the implications, of Kant's concept of God, 
as should be clear from what follows. 
In the first place, Kant argues that space and time are given to us prior to 
sensory experience because any spatial relations we perceive presuppose space 
as a whole. What is presumably being meant here is that we cannot derive the 
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notion of a unified spatial field from noticing space relations between particulars 
or from noticing spatial properties of particulars because any spatial 
characteristics that we might derive from an object already presuppose such a 
unified spatial field, such a field also being presupposed by the distinction 
between objects and the distinction between objects and our own . self in the first 
place. Our knowledge of space must therefore be a priori, in other words, 
absolutely independent of experience. This however, was not Kant's only 
argument for the a -priority of space and time. A second argument Kant used to 
this effect -a particular argument that Schopenhauer considered to be the knock- 
down one [W 11 33, PP 11 44] - is to emphasise the fact that we cannot represent 
to ourselves the absence of space although we can think what Locke called `pure 
space', i. e. space empty of objects [A 23-24=B 38-9]. The fact that we can 
represent to ourselves space empty of objects but not objects devoid of space is 
taken by Kant to suggest that space is an ineliminable part of perception in a way 
that objects are not. Nevertheless, despite Schopenhauer's appreciation, various 
criticisms of Kant's position and arguments could of course be brought to bear 
on the discussion at this point. In opposition to the first argument, for example, 
one could claim, with S. Gardner, that whilst it does show that the outer world 
cannot be represented except as spatial and so space cannot be derived from the 
experience of an external world, it nevertheless leaves open at least the 
possibility that spatiality and the outer world are intuited contemporaneously" 
And in response to the second argument, P. Guyer has pointed out that if even if 
space was an empirical representation it could conceivably become so 
I S. Gardner, Karrt and the Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge: 1999), 83. 
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entrenched that it could not be imagined away, even if any particular object 
could12. Yet I am not going to labour any such criticism of the structure of 
transcendental idealism itself in this study. Rather, I want to provisionally accept 
the framework of transcendental idealism - in both its Kantian and subsequently 
its Schopenhauerian form - so as to examine the implications this idealism may 
have for arguments concerned with theism and atheism. 
Returning, then, to the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant further 
believed not only that space and time are a -priori but also that they are intuitions 
and not concepts. His first argument to show that space is an intuition 
(Anschauung; broadly meaning something looked at) and not a concept is that it 
is a unified individual thing: all particular spaces are just parts of space as a 
whole (in the sense that if we wanted to draw a certain figure, we must also 
already have the space in which to draw it). So all talk of diverse spaces really 
refers to parts of the same space. Particular spaces are therefore not instances of 
a distinct concept but rather parts of a unitary whole which must be something 
immediately sensed (the hidden premise here being that we perceive individual 
things but conceive universals). The second argument to show that space and 
time are intuitions is by common consent more difficult to discern but, at least 
according to Allison's reconstruction of the argument, suggests that space is 
divided by introducing limitations or boundaries and can have an infinite amount 
of parts, which is how an intuition is divided; whereas concepts are divided 
intensionally into other concepts within it as component parts, which are not 
12 P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
J4%. 
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infinitely divisible13. Space therefore, Kant again concludes, must be thought to 
be an intuition - i.. e. something picturable - rather than a concept. It may also be 
pointed out that Kant also has an argument from geometry and an argument from 
`incongruent counterparts' to show that space is an a -priori intuition but 
examining even the outlines of these extra arguments would, it seems to me, take 
us much too far afield at this point (the latter does not even appear in the 
Critique of Pure Reason and, in any case, can prove nothing with regard to the 
status of time). 
The primary conclusion of these four arguments - and it will be with this 
conclusion and the implications that follow from it that I shall often be 
concerned with in parts of this study - is groundbreaking: space and time are 
taken by Kant to exist only in a subjective or even anthropological sense: `We 
deny to time all claim to absolute reality; that is to say we deny that it belongs to 
things [... ] independently of any reference to the form of our sensible intuition' 
[CPR A 35-36=B 52; the same claim is made for space at: A 46=B 63]. Yet it 
should be pointed out that commentators have often made the objection that even 
if Kant has succeeded in establishing space and time as forms of our intuition 
this does not exclude them from a simultaneous objectivity (this is sometimes 
known as the `neglected' or `missing alternative' argument). S. Körner, for 
instance, maintains that `It is always logically possible that what we see under 
the form of space and time is so ordered independently of our perception' 14 
13 Allison, Kant 's Transcendental Idealism, 93, 
14 S. Körner, Kant (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 37-38. Relatedly, Körner has repeatedly 
pointed out that all transcendental arguments fail to be uniqueness proofs, i. e. that they leave open 
the possibility that another set of conditions could allow the experience in question to occur. 
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Adherents of this view would presumably want Kant to recant his strict 
ontological claims about the non-spatio-temporality of the noumenal world, 
which they would see as an unjustified move, and perhaps submit instead to a 
kind of Husserlian transcendental epoche, refraining from comment on the 
spatio-temporal character of the world as it exists in itself Kant himself 
however, allowed space for what Paul Guyer has called `a theological argument 
against the ultimate reality of space and time' 15. What this argument consists of 
is the charge that the conception of space and time as objective forms of objects 
is incompatible with natural theology in as much as God Himself would 
therefore have to be spatio-temporal in this account, which is obviously absurd 
[CPR B 71-72]. However, as Guyer rightly points out, the objective view of 
space and time is not incompatible with natural theology so long as we suppose 
only that space and time are genuine properties of some but not all things in 
themselves. In the light of this admittedly elementary distinction, Kant's 
theological argument against objective spatiality and temporality and therefore 
against Körner's objection must be seen to fail (and it might also be seen to be 
disabled, as S. Gardner points out, by the contentiousness of its implicit premise 
that the concept of God is coherent16). On the other hand, to Körner's objection it 
may be more successfully retorted that whilst it may be true without specific 
reference to the Kantian philosophy, Körner's point cannot be considered to be 
by itself decisive against Kant himself since, in his Antinomies of Pure Reason, 
Kant had attempted to show that irreconcilable contradictions result from taking 
15 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 352. 
16 Gardner, Kaut and the Critique of Pure Reason, 103. 
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space and time to be objective aspects of reality and so, taken as a whole, the 
Criiique of Pure Reason does exclude space and time from being 
transcendentally real, at least if one considers the antinomies section to be 
successful. 
His case for the transcendental ideality of space and time being made, Kant 
goes on to argue - in the Transcendental Analytic - that experience is further 
structured by twelve a priori logical categories (and these are probably the most 
difficult pages of the entire Critique). The categories seem to have been found in 
the so-called `Metaphysical Deduction' by an analysis of all the kinds of 
judgements that there are according to Aristotelian logic. The categories are then 
collectively justified in the `Transcendental Deduction' by an extremely tortuous 
and obscure argument, the spirit of which is that the use of these categories is 
intrinsic to the temporally extended nature of experience as such (and whilst 
commentators such as Strawson argue that the deduction seeks to overcome 
external world scepticism here, others including myself take it that the deduction 
assumes that our experience is of objects and leaves the task of overcoming 
scepticism until later in the Critique). This seems to be because when we 
perceive an object Kant thinks we actually also judge it to be an object, judging 
being a conceptual operation that is temporally extended. Grasping objects as 
objects is taken to be an active affair of the mind in this way because any given 
array of sensations has to be apprehended as - i. e. judged to be - an object in a 
way that experience itself is impotent to carry out. And grasping objects is taken 
to be conceptual because judgement is nothing other than the employment of 
concepts. And given that conceptually judging objects takes place over time, it 
requires an abiding self to synthesise (it could not, in other words, be different 
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selves who brought elements a+b together into one complex representation, it 
must be one unitary self-consciousness, which Kant unfamiliarly terms the 
`transcendental unity of apperception'). Thus it is our perception of the 
synthesised manifold itself that allows us to be sure of an abiding self. As this 
point may also be put, objectivity (a synthesised manifold that we perceive) and 
subjectivity (the abiding self that synthesises in perception) cannot be presented 
without each. other. 
This necessity of the structure of both perceiving and thinking that is built into 
human experience from the outset means that we possess the advantage of being 
able to perform what Kant calls synthetic a -priori judgements, by which he 
means judgements that are about the world we experience rather than merely 
about the meanings of the concepts involved (synthetic) but that are nevertheless 
possible independently of experience (a priori). A paradigm case of such 
judgements is the metaphysical claim that `every event has a cause'. Such a 
judgement of universal causality cannot be rationally derived from or justified by 
experience - as has been evident at least since Hume's Treatise on Hunian 
Nature - but Kant claims that we can nevertheless know it holds true of all 
possible experience because causality is one of the twelve categories found in the 
'Metaphysical Deduction' (and in the Second Analogy a deeper and more 
specific justification of causality as supporting our notion of an objective time- 
series is offered, thereby arguably making good any suspected argumentative 
deficit in the `Metaphysical Deduction'). Our synthetic a -priori judgements were 
therefore only possible independently of experience because they told us about 
the way our mind regulated nature - through its forms of intuition and its 
categories - rather than about nature as it might be thought to be in itself. Human 
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thought could consequently not represent reality as a whole. Kant nevertheless 
believed that we should not subscribe to empirical idealism of the Berkeleian 
sort, and proved this by sophisticating Locke's inadequate and hesitant 
theoretical position regarding material substance by the addition of a rather 
complicated argument (which surfaces both in the First Analogy and in the 
Refutation of Idealism and which I will not rehearse here) concerning the 
awareness of ourselves as extended in time requiring the existence of enduring 
entities in the external world. These enduring entities were themselves, when 
considered outside of space and time, unknowable and Kant referred to this 
unknowable realm beyond representational experience as the intelligible world 
and these unknowable entities (or entity) as the Noumena (or Noumenon). Kant 
also thought that our reason, in spite of being forever divorced from this 
intelligible world, could not but attempt to reach that unknowable reality, and the 
totalising aberrations or illusions of reason, by means of which the mind 
dogmatically posits God (and a soul and a world) were to be regarded as natural 
and unavoidable. For Kant, the idea of God is therefore neither innate, as it was, 
for example, in Descartes' third Meditation, nor is it empirically formed, as 
empiricists such as Locke and Hume thought, by enlarging the ideas of our own 
nature with the idea of infinity and removing our imperfections. Typically, Kant 
creates an ingenious compromise between rationalism and empiricism here: the 
Kantian idea of God is an idea that though not innate is nonetheless inevitably 
created. This tendency toward forming an idea of God, given that it is natural to 
all humans thus means that monotheism is a trend, Kant notes in his first 
Critique, to be found transculturally and transhistorically located: `In all peoples, 
there shine amongst the most benighted polytheism some gleams of monotheism 
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to which they have been led, not by reflection and profound speculation but 
simply by the natural bent of the common understanding' [CPR A 590=B 618 
see also LPT 73, CPrR 168]17. Furthermore, much like the psychopathological 
complexes outlined by Freudian psychoanalysis, the three sophistications of 
reason that Kant postulated and explored do not cease to function even when 
17 This natural dialectic is seen by Kant to take on one of two forms: the idea of a first cause and 
that of an Ens Realissimum. Leaving to one side any attempt to describe these illusions in their 
specificity (a good account can found in A. W. Wood's Kant's Rational Theology (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1978) pp. 25-79), the very notion of an idea of God arriving naturally in the 
human mind is in any case open to various kinds of criticism. One such line of argument is 
historically associated with Schopenhauer: a philosopher who, as we shall see, explicitly tried to 
sophisticate Kant's position but did so only by replacing much of its philosophical methodology. In 
the Schopenhauerian interpretation of Kantianism, the notion of intrinsic illusions is one of the few 
Kantian notions that is wholly abandoned: `The objectionable element to be found in the Kantian 
doctrine [... ] - this element, I say, makes it appear as if our intellect was intentionally designed to 
lead us into error' [W II 286]. Schopenhauer's disapproval is launched from the evolutionary 
premise that our minds would not systematically lead us into error because they are themselves 
products of the organism's need. Yet in the first place we could mention that it is not immediately 
obvious whether the illusions are disadvantageous errors and so it might be counter-objected at 
this stage that illusions could be construed as just side-effects of cognitive evolution and are not 
themselves disadvantageous. Relatedly, we might also counter-object that this epistemological 
objection ignores the (Nietzschean) possibility that reality is so utterly repellent that we falsify it in 
order to function well within it. But even if Schopenhauer's naturalised epistemological objection 
does not therefore conclusively invalidate the notion of Kantian ideas, John Locke suggested with 
some justice in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Everyman, 1991). Book I. 
Ch. IV, Sect. 8 that some civilisations are wholly free from what Kant regarded as a product of an 
inevitable tendency of reason, a point of Locke's that Schopenhauer would reproduce exactly [W I 
484, see also W1 486]. 
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they are detected and have their invalidity clearly revealed to the subject of the 
aberrant thought process [CPR A 339=B 397; A 297=B 353]. 
Next in the first Critique, Kant included a Transcendental Dialectic to 
counteract such natural `illusions'. This study will mention but will not spend 
much time assessing either the general merits of the Dialectic or the particular 
merits of Kant's refutation of speculative theology. Of course, in a monograph 
length study focussing solely on Kant's philosophy of religion it would be proper 
to dwell at some length on these attacks, particularly on Kants objections to the 
ontological argument, as many readers may well feel this to be one of the most 
familiar and arguably most influential aspects of the Kantian approach to 
religion. I have not elected to follow this route however, partly because it has 
been discussed elsewhere by others but also because there is substantially more, I 
feel, to Kant's philosophy of religion than this aspect of transcendental 
idealism's criticism of rationalism. Yet I would now like to provide an overview 
of Kant's attacks as they are presented in the Transcendental Dialectic (Book II, 
chapter III, sections three to six). 
Kant considers all proofs of God to be instances of one of three types [CPR A 
590=B 618]. The first type is the ontological proof, which argues a -priori that 
the concept of God analytically entails his existence (after the manner of one of 
the arguments of Descartes in the Meditations). The point being made here is 
that `God' in its normal meaning means, amongst other things, an all powerful, 
all knowing and existent creator. Thus the claim that God exists is guaranteed by 
the fact that the meaning of the term God includes existence in its definition. 
This is taken to fail by Kant because it assumes that existence is a characteristic 
which could function as a genuine predicate of a concept, whilst Kant - contra 
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ordinary language - famously disputes this (though whether he is right to do so is 
not an issue that can not be studied in detail here). The second argument is the 
cosmological, which argues that contingent things must have been caused to 
exist by something else which, if also contingent, must in its turn have been 
caused, and so on until we reach a necessary being. This second proof failed 
according to Kant because it extended the concept of cause outside of the world 
of our possible experience and further failed to identify the concept of cause with 
an all powerful and all good God (at least without surreptitiously reintroducing 
the ontological argument). The third argument is the physico-theological proof: 
in essence, the argument from design. Put rather crudely, it argues that this world 
shows order in an analogous way to a watch and since a watch has a purposive 
creator we may presume the same to hold for the world. This proof from 
apparent purposivness in nature, Kant argues, is only licensed to posit an 
architect and not a creator of the world (and he might have added, as Hume's 
biting Dialogues on Natural Religion actually did, that for all we know that 
architect might now have expired). To postulate a creator ex nihilo it would have 
to fall back on the cosmological proof, which itself relied upon the ontological 
(unlike Hume's, Kant's counter-argument is therefore powerless against 
someone who wants only to prove a superhuman architect and not an all 
powerful creator - but Kant quite implausibly thinks that no-one would be 
interested in such reduced aims'8). All possible proofs of God thus collapse into 
the ontological proof, which itself is - as we have already seen - fallacious, 
according to Kant. 
18 J. Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 256. 
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So much, then, for the general structure of Kant's overall reasoning in the 
Critique of' Pure Reason (and his rather problematic position on God's 
`intellectual intuition'). It is time now to narrow down our focus and examine 
some of the main implications for theistic religion of this intriguing account: 
firstly, Kant's construal of God as existing outside of space and time and then 
what we shall term his `falsificationist' scriptural hermeneutics. In the final part 
of this chapter, I will then turn to tackle Kant's moral proof of God. 
III Kantian Moral Deism: The Unsacrif cable 
In the review of critical thought given above, it was implied that Kant 
unconditionally ruled out the possibility of human contact with a divine being. I 
should now like to say a little more about this and also about its implications for 
the study of religious scripture. 
The first step that allows Kant to rule out any human experience of God is his 
premise that we can perceive nothing and therefore know nothing that is not in 
space and time. We have already noted the thinking behind that premise. His 
second step is to construe the supreme being as just such a non-temporal and 
non-spatial existence, as we have also already acknowledged in considering what 
Guyer called Kant's `theological argument against the ultimate reality of space 
and time'. This construal of God is also illustrated in other of Kant's important 
works - so in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, for example, we read 
that `The existence of God in space involves a contradiction' [Rel 130 n]; whilst 
in the second Critique, Kant writes of `The infinite Being, to whom the condition 
of time is nothing' [CPrR 149]. Should it need spelling out, the condition of time 
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is said to be nothing to God because `if God were in time he would have to be 
limited. But he is a reulissimus, and consequently he is not in time' [LPT 71]. So 
Kant thinks that `God is wholly distinct from the world and has no connection at 
all with space and time' [LPT 104] because otherwise spatial and temporal 
boundaries would limit God, and a restricted God is, by definition, a 
contradiction. It should probably be stressed here that we cannot picture or 
represent such an atemporal and aspatial God however, since on Kantian 
premises we cannot represent to ourselves anything lying outside what are 
essentially our forms of representation, the ways that we picture things at all. As 
Kant puts it in the Critique of Judgement: `We think of the eternity of God as 
presence in all time, because we can form no other concept [... ] or we think of 
the divine omnipresence as presence in all places, in order to make 
comprehensible to ourselves His immediate presence in things' [CJ 337]. But 
however established this conception of God as outside of temporal and spatial 
determinations might be - itself a controversial issue, as there is still debate in 
philosophical theology as to whether God should rather be construed as eternally 
existing through time - it nonetheless means that, on Kantian premises, we are 
unable, even in principle, to encounter God sensibly at all. Since we necessarily 
see the world through space and time but God as conceived of by Kant exists 
outside such qualifications, then, as Kant himself puts it, the `feeling of the 
immediate presence of the supreme being would constitute a receptivity for 
which there is no sensory provision in man's nature' [Rel 163]. Yet this is quite 
obviously not an atheistic position, since by the same token knowledge of the 
non-existence of God is similarly ruled out in principle. 
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From a traditionally Judaeo-Christian-Islamic religious perspective of course, 
the spaceless and timeless God of Kant's philosophy appears to expressly 
contradict the revelations of God which we find in scripture (it could be argued 
that this is also a problem for certain other, more orthodox, Christian theologians 
who are committed both to Platonism and the Christian scriptures: but that is 
another, more expansive story and I will not be concerned to argue the wider 
point here). We are, for example, told by the Bible that God made the heavens 
and the earth in six days and that he has intervened in our physical world in 
various visible capacities. For a Christian the problem of the Kantian aspatial and 
atemporal God contradicting the Biblical account might appear to be very stark 
indeed, since according to the Nicene creed - published by the council of Nicaea 
in 325 to combat the heresy of Arianism - Jesus Christ was a wholly divine 
figure who nevertheless entered into human history and experience. So according 
to Christian tradition, God entered space and time but according to Kant: 'God is 
wholly distinct from the world and has no connection at all with space and time' 
[LPT 104]. Consequently, from what we know of Kant's - partly evasive - 
Christology, it seems that Kant, instead of sacrificing human reason to this 
paradox about an eternal God becoming finite and accordingly seeing 
Christianity as being rationally indefensible, as Christians such as Kierkegaard 
(himself possibly forced into such a position by his prior acceptance of a broadly 
Kantian epistemology19) were to appear to do, was instead scarcely inclined to 
treat Christ as divine-'O. But might we not suspect this position to be irreligious? 
19 See R. M. Green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, l Q922), 136: 'Kierkegaard's very understanding of why Christ is the `absurd' 
presupposes Kant's epistemology'. 
42 
The Kantian approach of trusting reason above revelation through scripture, in 
other words, might be open to the objection that the resultant concept of God is 
not truly the Christian God but has rather substituted a `God of the philosophers'. 
This is why Kant could be charged with being a `deist' in a way that Kierkegaard 
could not. What do I mean by 'deist'? By terms such as `deists' and `deism' I 
mean to refer to those who reject the evidence of historical revelation of God but 
believe the existence of God to be nonetheless assured by reason. So, has Kant 
indeed irreligiously spurned divine revelation? I would now like to investigate 
Kant's examination of Biblical theology in Religion within the Limits of Reason 
Alone to see if Kant can answer such a charge. 
In the first few pages of Religion, Kant acknowledges that philosophical 
theology is not the only kind of religious thought: a religion such as Christianity 
which has been historically revealed, at least in part, through specific, extant, 
canonical texts must include hermeneutic reflection as part of its discursive 
apparatus. Yet, to rehearse the point made above, the Kantian God and the God 
revealed through the Bible seem to oppose each other. The Kantian God remains 
outside of the human world of space and time and history whilst the God of 
scripture, especially (but not only) Christian scripture is a providential God who 
fully enters into human historical affairs. How does Kant attempt to resolve this 
conflict between reason and revelation? In a late work, Kant set to work solving 
it by analysing the relationship between Biblical theology and his own 
epistemology. Put bluntly, this analysis of Biblical theology in Religion within 
the Limits of Reason Alone effectively discredits the Bible as an unquestionable 
'ý' See G. E. Michalson, Kani and The Problem of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 102. 
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source of divine revelation by the apparent detour of entering into theological 
debate about the relationship of priority between God and the moral good. 
Readers acquainted with the history of philosophy will doubtless recall that 
this debate is in fact of ancient lineage, perhaps finding its locus classicus in 
Plato's Euthyphro: `Is the holy approved by the Gods because it is holy, or is it 
holy because it is approved? '21. In that dialogue, the character of Euthyphro 
himself espouses the second clause (7a), a position which is duly problematised 
by Socrates, who argues that strife within the Greek pantheon on moral questions 
vitiates any recourse to the Gods as final ethical arbiters, a theoretical difficulty 
within Greek polytheism that is perhaps ignored in Socrates' own admission in 
Plato's Apology that a so-called divine voice had advised him not to take certain 
courses of action and that is in any case logically absent from the corresponding 
position in any monotheistic religion, as is demonstrated in many of the writings 
of the Christian author, Soren Kierkegaard. By means of illustration, it is worth 
pointing to the logic of one of Kierkegaard's texts in particular: Fear and 
Trembling, which turns on the account of Abraham's potential sacrifice of his 
son in Genesis Ch. 22, a morally ambiguous incident which crops up regularly in 
controversies about and dramatic meditations upon this topic. In this incident, 
common to all three of the Semitic monotheistic faiths22, Abraham receives a 
summons from God commanding him to sacrifice his son. Abraham neither 
doubts nor challenges the vox dei: knife in hand, he takes his son to the 
designated spot only to be granted a last minute reprieve. One of Kierkegaard's 
21 Plato, Euthyphro, 10a. 
22 Although Islam is at odds with both Judaism and Christianity in claiming that the son in 
question is Ishmael and not Isaac. 
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chief arguments in this text is simply that given such sanguinary stories in the 
Bible one cannot paint God as wholly moral without doing some serious violence 
to the authority of scripture. It seems that on such a view, which in fact accords 
to some measure with that of St. Augustine, we are to obey the revelations of 
God even if they seem madness to our moral standards - even if, as Kierkegaard 
states, our moral standards then themselves become the temptation that would 
prohibit us from doing God's wi1123. So what is the basis of Kant's disagreement 
with such a clear and consistent position? 
The main premise of Kant's alternative view is that God is essentially moral. 
This is a conclusion that follows on naturally from the Kantian `moral proof of 
God', which is itself based on the necessity of morality (and I will be returning to 
the question of the validity of this particular proof in the succeeding section of 
the present chapter). Kant argues that we are thereby given reliable criteria for 
recognising as either spurious or (potentially) authentic revelations or commands 
that might or might not be believed to have come from God Himself instead of 
having to trust them by a criterionless faith, after the manner of Kierkegaard. In 
23 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), 88; see also 
Kierkegaard, Concluding LJnscienti fic Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 267: `Abraham was not heterogeneous with the ethical. He was 
well able to fulfil it but was prevented from it by something higher, which by absolutely 
accentuating itself transformed the voice of duty into a temptation'. Also St. Augustine, ('ity of 
God (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996), Book XIV, Ch. 15.575, Book XVI, Ch. 32,694: 
`Abraham's obedience is renowned in story as a great thing, and rightly so, because he was 
ordered to do an act of enormous difficulty, namely to kill his own son'; 'Abraham, we can be 
sure, could never have believed that God delights in human victims; and yet the thunder of a divine 
command must be obeyed without argument'. 
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other words, since it has been philosophically decided by Kant that God is to be 
wholly good, anything in the scriptures that suggests otherwise must be 
reinterpreted by us to fall in with the philosophical (Kantian) view of God. Thus 
is the revelatory power of religious scripture and by implication the freedom of 
the God of religious scripture and the Christian tradition subordinated to certain 
of the tenets of Kantian philosophy24. Our moral reason therefore supplies a 
24 Given the many apparent inconsistencies in scripture it might be argued that any consistent 
interpretation depends, at least tacitly, upon certain prior philosophical commitments (i. e. there is 
no specifically Biblical theology so we have to construct a philosophical one). The crucial question 
then surely becomes: are the set of commitments in question religiously acceptable? I have been 0 
suggesting that in Kant's case they are not. It might of course be thought that since religious 
acceptability is defined in terms of the religious tradition one belongs to, then it is a somewhat 
arbitrary standard to judge one's interpretative commitments by. I have largely eschewed trying to 
answer such a large-scale objection to religious tradition explicitly in this study but it is worth 
pointing out, although I cannot do full justice to this here, that it has been argued that certain 
social traditions - such as the Christian religious tradition - embody conceptions of rational 
enquiry within them and that innovation can indeed occur within traditions but that if such 
innovation does not in turn transform the sociological map by establishing enduring variant 
religious traditions - traditions again being conceived of as embodying forms of rational enquiry - 
then such innovation must be deemed not to satisfactorily answer any of the internal philosophical 
problematics of the preceding religious tradition. On this view, espoused by A. Maclntyre, what 
justifies a theory is the rational superiority of that particular structure to all previous attempts 
within that particular tradition to formulate such theories and principles', Whose Justice, Which 
Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988). 9. If successful, this type of response (which denies the 
possibility of an objective rationality outside - and therefore able to adjudicate between - all 
traditions) answers the charge that it is arbitrary to accept the philosophical commitments of a 
given religious tradition by showing that these commitments are not surd sociological facts but 
rather have themselves evolved by ironing out the problems in the preceding set of commitments. 
46 
criterion for our decision on the authenticity of outer revelation from religious 
scripture and so, as Allen W. Wood has rightly put it, `our moral conception of 
God provides us with a means of determining the moral purity - and 
consequently the possible authenticity - of the alleged revelation of such a 
God'25. There is no rational way of knowing whether a seeming revelation of 
God is absolutely true but there is a rational way of knowing whether it is false: 
i. e. if it does not meet the test of our internal moral reason. It is therefore Kant's 
considered opinion that divine revelations can never be verified - but that they 
can be conclusively falsified. 
So if something `flatly contradicts morality it cannot, despite all appearances 
be of God (for example were a father ordered to kill his son who is, as far as he 
knows, innocent)' [Rel 82]. This remark clearly alludes to the narrative of 
Abraham and Isaac, which is also explicitly mentioned later in Religion when 
Kant notes that since an ostensibly divine injunction is always interpreted by 
men `Even did it appear to have come from God himself (like the command 
delivered to Abraham to slaughter his own son like a sheep) it is at least possible 
that a mistake has prevailed' [Rel 175]. Thus since Kant's moral proof of God is 
taken to furnish us with an indication of God's existence and also with actual 
(moral) information about God, it furthermore provides what I have termed in 
this study a `falsificationist' guiding thread for Biblical exegesis. Scripture is 
thus not seen by Kant to be a higher court of appeal than those conclusions 
supplied to us by our faculty of reason: our moral reason limits what scripture 
can tell us. 
25 A. W. Wood, Kam 's Moral Religion (Ithica: Cornell University Press. 1970). 205-206. 
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Review of our discussion so far in this chapter reveals that although the 
Kantian and Biblical Gods do seem to contradict each other, Kant purports to 
explain this by pointing out that a wholly moral God is the philosophically 
rigorous one whereas the God of the Bible is, in a sense, not to be wholly trusted 
since the Bible itself is not a vehicle of autonomous revelation. The answer to 
the Pascalian objection that Kant is not dealing with the God of Abraham, Isaac 
and Jacob' as revealed to us through holy scripture is to concede that Kant has 
indeed replaced that personal and historical revealed God who is inscrutable to 
the human moral sense. The God whom Kant has put in His place is aspatial, 
atemporal, unconditionally moral and non-interventionist (Kant also wanted to 
argue that this God was an `intellectual intuiter' but we saw that this feature 
appeared incompatible with other elements of Kantian thought and for the sake 
of consistency should perhaps be abandoned). Yet this of course conflicts with 
the Biblical God who enters history and who sometimes seems incommensurable 
with normal human moral standards but Kant's implied answer to this is 
unequivocal: so much the worse for scripture. Given, in other words, that the 
Judaeo-Christian God is one wholly active in the course of history and that Kant 
seems not to hold this, Kant must be regarded as a philosophical rather than a 
religious monotheist: we must deem Kant to be a deist. And it should be noted in 
this connection that one Kantian commentator has suggested that Kant was the 
last great exponent' of deism, whilst another has admitted that Kant's concept 
of God is `little removed from that of deism'26 
26 C. J. Webb, Kant's Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 12; M. G. 
I 
Rearden, taw as Philosophical Theologian (London: Macmillan, 1988), 172. 
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IV The Moral Proof of the Being of God 
Kant, of course, conspires to present the God of his philosophy as the God of 
our religious tradition but as we have seen construing Him as absolutely 
excluded from space and time appears to challenge the content of Christian 
scripture, and the scriptures of the Judaeo-Christian religion are also themselves 
challenged by being presented not as definitively revealing God but as providing 
`falsificationist' support for an autonomous morality. Yet it remains to be 
mentioned that Kant does attempt to philosophically justify the positing of his 
God. This is principally attempted by means of the so-called `moral argument for 
the existence of God'. Kant's moral proof of God, as we have already remarked, 
is taken to furnish us with an indication of God's existence and also with actual 
(moral) information about God (which obviously backs up Kant's approach to 
reading scripture). I should therefore now like to say a little more about this 
proof. 
Kant's philosophy, as we have seen, withdraws God from the world of 
experience and from direct revelation through scripture. It still does, to be sure, 
suggest that we are nonetheless compelled to form an idea of God but even 
conceding - against a mass of sociological and historical evidence to the 
contrary - that the human mind is led to form an idea of one God, we still have 
no reason to believe this idea to be anything other than a unavoidable fantasy. I 
But whatever the demerits of his account of illusions (the details of which I have 
largely set to one side in this study), Kant's central indication of God, found in 
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all three Critiques, is based squarely on the importance of our moral lives"7. As I 
intend to demonstrate presently however, there are flaws to be found within the 
structure of Kant's argument. There is a sense in which this may not come as a 
startling disclosure: there are, after all, probably few explicit believers in Kants 
specific version of moral deism today - but it might nevertheless be argued that a 
generic type of moral deism nevertheless haunts the thoughts of more 
theologically minded reflective people on this subject, though perhaps it is less 
as a temptation than as a last resort, a residual feeling that in order for the world 
to be morally justified, God must exist. If this be accepted, then there is even 
more reason to examine a major philosopher's attempt to construct a proof of 
God based on ethics. Now, the moral proof's final formulation is to be found in a 
sequence of passages in the Critique of'Juu'gerent under the section heading `Of 
the Moral Proof of the Being of God'. It is this portion of text that will form the 
spine of our explication and examination of the moral proof, although it will also 
27 Both Kant and Levinas are religious philosophers of moral duty - but what is misleading about 
this often made comparison is that in the one case, the duty is to the pure form of the moral law; 
whilst in the other, the duty is towards the theoretically incomprehensible but still morally 
demanding existence of the `Other' subject. Still, in both cases this ethics is explicitly conceived of 
in religious terms and one might further argue that (a Levinasian) recognition of the `other' must 
precede the (Kantian) application of the categorical imperative: the imperative to, on one 
formulation, treat the other as an end and not simply as a means (this brings the epistemological 
problem of other minds and the ethical problem of moral recognition clearly and decisively into the 
Kantian picture). For one of the most explicitly Kantian formulations of Levinasian ethico- 
religious thought, see the foundational essay `Is Ontology Fundamental? ' in E. Levinas, Basic 
Philosophic It risings (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996). 
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be supplemented by the other Kantian accounts, where this will prove helpful"8.1 
will first give an account of what I take to be Kant's proof more or less without 
criticism before subjecting it to investigation. The proof runs as follows. 
First, Kant seems to claim that although the formal moral law requires us to 
act regardless of consequences, our human sensible nature requires us, if we are 
not to despair, to have some end in mind when we act: happiness. The moral 
proof is therefore an empirical one insofar as it relies on the non-illusory nature 
of our phenomenological experience of ourselves: what Sellars would, in a 
different context, later term our `manifest image' and what Joyce would declare 
to be `the ineluctable modality of the visible'. The moral proof thus -concerns us 
as beings of the world' [CJ 298]. Happiness, then, has such a purchase on us 
because wef not purely nournenal beings: our real sensible existence involves 
In 
certain needs, the satisfactions of which are captured in the distinctively human 
concept of happiness: `Happiness is the satisfaction of our desires' [CPR A 
806=B 834]. Our desire for happiness can therefore be said to be distinctively 
human because although the non-human animals can of course be attributed 
desires they cannot readily be said to possess the second order desire for the 
fulfilment of their first order desires29. Given, then, that we have a sensible side 
28 Kant formulates the moral proof of God in many places, e. g. CPrR pp 150-158, CPR B 425- 
426, A 81 1=B 839-A 815=B 843, A 828=B 856. Fortunately, the argument does not differ 
significantly from the second Critique to the third, although some of the formulations in the first 
0-itique are perhaps a little too uncomplicated to rely on as being definitive statements. 
29 Relatedly, nor can they readily be said to want to possess different desires, which is a 
constitutive part of Harry Frankfurt's concept of a 'person', see his 'Freedom of the Will and the 
tiI 
which desires happiness to our human nature as well as our intelligible side, the 
highest good for beings such as we are is a happy moral perfection: a summitin 
bonuni or `highest good' that cares for our actual sensual needs (happiness) as I 
well as our moral requirements [CJ 300]. 
So, as partly intelligible and as partly sensible beings we have a dual aim. 
Nevertheless, this dual aim need not fissure us irreconcilably, as it can be united: 
`Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum 
in a person' [CPrR 135]. More specifically, happiness and virtue can be 
combined not analytically - in which case they would have to be 
eudaemonistically identified to some measure in a way that Kant plausibly 
denies30 - but rather synthetically: our highest good is a place where virtue is 
rewarded with the happiness we all desire. 
In order, then, not to be torn in two different directions, we need to aim at a 
summum bonum. But how is such a happy moral perfection to be achieved? 
Happiness and moral worth are only contingently (if at all) related in this 
sensible world. Nature, therefore, clearly affords little hope for the systematic 
reward of good. Likewise, man as a species is extremely limited as regards his 
ability to control the consequences of his actions in the natural world and so 
man, no more than nature, can be expected to harmonise virtue with deserved 
happiness. Indeed, there is no a -priori' guarantee that the moral law will not 
concept of a Person', in Free Will ed. G. Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 81- 
95. 
'`ý Kant denies, that is, that virtue is a part of happiness or nice versa. See Wood, Kant 's Moral 
Religion, 87: An excess of happiness cannot go proxy for a good moral character'. 
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conflict with our sensible pursuit of happiness31. In such a disharmonious case, 
our practical reason would be antinomically torn between the sensible claims of 
happiness and the intelligible claims of virtue, claims neither of which we can 
eschew. On the one hand, eschewing the claims of morality is not an option 
because in the first place it is Kant's own view that the moral good is a `non- 
hypothetical', apodeictic' or `categorical imperative; and in the second place, 
Kant also seems to have seen with unparalleled perspicacity what his 
contemporary, De Sade, did not: that we must accept morality because, 
psychologically speaking, we are not really cut out for undertaking acts of pure ý1 
evil32. And on the other hand, eschewing the claims of human sensibility in the 
same way that we might eschew the claims of those of our baser desires that drag 
us down to the level of feral nature is no easy option for Kant because the desire 
for happiness is not a part of non-human nature: our desire for happiness is 
distinctively human (it is, to repeat, a second order desire for the fulfilment of 
first order desires). Eschewing the claims of happiness would thus be like writing 
off the call of our own nature. Furthermore, it would, as at least some of Kant's 
remarks very strongly suggest, lead us to a despair in which we gave up acting 
eth 1 cal ly altogether. 
31 Gardner, Kant and the C'ritigrie of Pure Reason, 316. 
32 This seems to me to be the clear message of CJ 302, CPR A 828=B 856 and, particularly, Rel 
30. For a dissenting view, see Allison Kant 's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 150. There it is suggested that Kant rules out the possibility of a devilish 
will, not because of psychological reasons that could only be empirically grounded but because to 
recognise the good is to recognise it as having valid claims. 
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Therefore, since neither man nor nature can ever be hoped to systematically 
harmonise that which we want as sensible humans and that which we desire as 
intelligible beings we must - to do justice to both of the rational claims on us 
and to avoid a despair in which neither claim could be answered - assume an 
effective harmonising force to exist outside the sensible world. That is to say, we 
are obliged to be moral and so if we can only be so by postulating a force that 
rewards virtue with happiness then we are also obliged to practically postulate 
that force. The only theoretical framework within which such a proportionate 
causal relation obtaining between virtue and happiness can be posited however, 
Kant concludes, is a theological one: 
We must assume a moral world cause (author of the world) in order to set before 
ourselves a final purpose consistent with the moral law, and so far as the latter is 
necessary, so far [... ] the former must also be necessarily assumed, i. e. we must admit 
there is a God. [CJ 301] 
So we can only imagine a realm where people are rewarded for their goodness 
(which is what we want to aim at if we are to be true to both our sensible and our 
intelligible nature and not to despair) as being under the command of an 
omniscient and omnipotent God who will take upon himself the task of 
organising, in Michalson's censorious characterisation, `a mysterious 
proportioning process occurring after my death in an unimaginably remote 
nournenal zone' 3. Yet the supposition of a wise author and ruler is, it should be 
stressed, conditional upon us accepting the claims of morality and of our sensible 
Michalson, Kant and The Problem of God, 116. 
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nature. If we believe in morality and if we also need happiness to aim at, our 
ultimate goal can only be a rewarding afterlife administered by an essentially 
benevolent God. 
Kant's moral proof of God is clearly a complex one but it at least seems to be 
coherent though at the risk of repetition it should probably be stressed that it is a 
proof that results from practical reason, not theoretical reason, which means that 
it results not in an objective finding but a kind of necessary existential X 
commitment: we have to assume and hope for God's existence to marry our two 
separate goals and stop us despairing. Yet even on this existential basis certain 
objections can be made to the proof, although I should initially say that the 
question of the acceptability of Kant's account of the `categorical imperative', or 
absolutely obliging nature of morality, that underlies the moral proof is not an 
issue which we can discuss adequately here, so that important aspect of Kant's 
practical philosophy will have to be largely set to one side. There are, however, 
at least two objections that can be made to Kant's moral proof of God as it now 
stands. The first relates to the fact that Kant controversially introduces happiness 
as a subjective condition of man striving, whilst the second relates to the limited 
nature of the God at stake. 
I 
A difficulty with happiness being assumed to be a condition of, or at least 
involved in, mans aiming for moral excellence arises simply because it is 
arguable whether Kant's psychological account of us 'as beings of the world' 
really rings as true as Kant himself supposed. Let us consider the position in 
tiý 
what is probably its most comprehensive statement, articulated around the 
conceit of a righteous but faithless man, where it at least seems to be suggested 
that without the hope for happiness we would cease to act morally: 
His effort is bounded; and from nature [... ] Deceit, violence and envy will always 
surround him; although he himself be honest peaceable; and kindly; and all the righteous 
men he meets will, notwithstanding all their worthiness of happiness, be yet subjected by 
nature, which regards not this, to all the evils of want, disease and untimely death, just 
like the beasts of the earth. So it will be until one wide grave engulfs them all (honest or 
not, it makes no difference) and throws them back - who were able to believe themselves 
the final purpose of creation - into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from 
which they were drawn. The purpose, then, which this well intentioned person had and 
ought to have before him in his pursuit of moral laws, he must certainly give up as 
impossible. [CJ 303] 
This is a nightmarishly well made point but it is hardly an uncontroversial one 
and it might be possible to attack Kant's moral proof of God here at its root by 
simply questioning whether we actually need the expectation of individual 
human happiness - the expectation of the satisfaction of the second order desire 
for the fulfilment of first order desires - as an end for human action (in the 
absence of which we would despair). The assumption that we do strive for such a 
happiness (which only God can systematically provide) to so impel us is 
seemingly central to Kant's moral proof but is it really possible that acting 
morally without the belief in adequate reward in terms of individual happiness 
alone would lead us to despair? It should be noted at this point that I am not 
going to give a precise definition of what constitutes a good reason' to act, or to 
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act morally, in this study. Instead, I propose to approach the issue by accepting 
some of Kant's assumptions in the moral proof and then trading upon certain of 
our intuitions in this area and asking the following question: Can anything else 
can be thought to function just as well as happiness in terms of motivating us to r 
act without incurring despair? Now, one might think that an attachment to a 
personal cultivation of the virtues, particularly those tied up with a more 
terrestrial and more attainable `perfectibility', might be enough to keep us acting 
without sensing any futility and then despairing34. However, given that Kant has 
of course eliminated any objective reason to think of ourselves as subject to a 
natural teleology of the sort which underpinned the original and the most famous 
version of such virtue ethics, Aristotle's, and that in any case such a teleology 
seems to rely on some slightly discreditable presuppositions today, any such 
attachment to terrestrial perfectibility would have to survive without the 
structural support of Aristotle's metaphysical biology. Could there be a 
metaphysically truncated theory of the virtues which would survive in a form that ' 
was consistent enough to move men in accordance with morality'? Well, as just 
such a theory has recently been elaborated by Alisdair Maclntyre in his After 
Virtue, there would clearly be something to be gained by considering this work 
as a test-case in just a little more detail. 
After Virtue is an explicitly anti-Kantian attempt to reconstruct a justification 
of moral action, seeing itself as radically departing from the moral grounding of 
modernity: 'Nothing less that a rejection of a large part of that [i. e. the modern - 
34 Kant would not see such an attachment as a moral one, of course, but neither does he see our 
desire for happiness as being moral. The point is that virtue ethics and Kantian deontolo-Qy are not 
incompatible if one is taken as relating to our sensible ends and one to our intelligible ends. 
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MR] ethos will provide us with a rational and morally defensible standpoint from 
which to [... ] act' 5. Maclntyre thinks that the notion of virtue is linked to that of 
a social practice and I now want to argue that his attempt to ground the motive of 
human moral activity on such attainable grounds is at least as plausible as Kant's 
attempt to connect motivation with happiness. The conclusion to which I am 
moving is obviously that happiness is not essentially connected with human 
motivation because it is not the only imaginable human end and that therefore 
we are not called upon to posit God by the fact of the necessity of morality alone. 
To ground ethical action Maclntyre introduces the notion of a kind of constant 
we can aim for that is as cross-cultural and as trans-historical as is the 
expectation of happiness or as would be a purported human metaphysical telos -a 
`practice'. So although there is, for Maclntyre, no given biological telos of a 
human life as such, there are nevertheless social practices, such as sailing or 
playing in a string quartet, that are found in some form or other across all human 
cultures and that clearly constitute goals for human desire. His technical 
definition of a practice runs as follows: 
By a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex fonn of socially established 
co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, 
are systematically extended. 36 
35 A. Maclntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 2000), x. 
36 Ibid., 187. 
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This is a compact definition and so it might be worth explaining in a little more 
detail here what `goods internal to a practice' actually are. Such goods, we might 
say, are those goods which can only be achieved through participation in that 
specific practice and such goods must moreover have historically evolved 
standards of excellence internal to them. On this account, social activities like 
playing chess would count as practices because the good of playing chess well 
can only be achieved through engaging in precisely that practice, a practice with 
a developed standard of excellence. The same can be said of playing in a string 
quartet. Human lives are thus intertwined with social practices and are, in a 
sense, therefore given certain goods (I omit here discussion of many of the 
technicalities and qualifications of Maclntyre's account). Virtue then becomes 
the name for those human capabilities that allow us to pursue practices and 
therefore aim for the goods internal to those practices. Resilience, for instance, 
allows us to pursue the good internal to the practice of sailing a ship. Similarly, 
diligence allows us to pursue the different good internal to the practice of playing 
in a string quartet and honesty allows us to pursue the good internal to, say, 
playing chess (we could of course cheat in any given game of chess but only 
external goods could be achieved that way: a rather restricted and short-lived 
form of social prestige, perhaps). And all these practices, because they have 
historically developed standards of excellence, call for the virtue of accepting the 
judgement of a legitimate authority on our part: as novices or beginners, we have 
to accept the judgement of a past master as to what the good of chess, or of a 
particular kind of musicianship, consists in. Maclntyre's concept of a virtue thus 
requires the background of a practice and the corresponding notion of recognised 
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internal goods and therefore his main disagreement with Kant lies in his 
suggesting that in order to be reasonably motivated to act (without moral 
weakness) we need not aim for a highest good partly constituted by a- otherwise 
than theologically, unattainable - happiness but rather that we can aim at 
fostering virtues which support goods internal to socially given practices, goods 
that do as a matter of fact matter to us, arguably as much as does happiness. Put 
differently, both Kant (at least in an important part of the moral proof, at any 
rate) and Maclntyre seem to agree that some pre-existent desires are somehow 
involved in practical reason but Maclntyre points out that one kind of moral 
reasoning appeals to desires for goals that do not need God to help us achieve 
them. 
Given, then, that we simply cannot say, without taking a dogmatic stance upon 
whether communitarian goods given through practices or libertarian individual 
happiness provides the better or stronger motive for human action without 
futility, After Virtue must surely be accepted as articulating a not indefensible 
way to ground or accompany action and specifically ethical action without 
calling upon the expectation of an omnipresent divinity with abilities to reward 
us with happiness so as to tie in our two aims37. And if Maclntyre can so ground 
or support ethics in this manner then Kant's claim that man, if he is not to 
succumb to dejection and immorality, must expect some reward for his 
endeavour and that this reward must come from God and cannot be reached by 
our own powers has been shown to be an unreliable assumption. 
37 It could further be argued at this point that as happiness is enjoyed by man qua phenomenal 
being or quasi-Heideggerean `being in the world', then it follows that Kant cannot postulate any 
noumenal happiness anyway. 
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It is also worth remarking here that, even if, as in any case seems unlikely, the 
moral man's resolve did break in the way that Kant thought it would if he did not 
have faith in God and a desire for happiness, perhaps despair might not be so 
unconducive to ethical rectitude as Kant seems to suppose. This is perhaps more 
obvious in our era than it was in Kant's time. Since that time, we have seen 
repeated instances of people coping with personal tragedies of religious faith that 
are wholly unaccompanied by moral weakness or failure. The alternative Kantian 
idea that such despair necessarily leads to immorally self-serving acts or even 
-Y 
acts of malicious evil is perhaps today only the commonplace of a certain kind of 
modem European narrative centrally concerned with sociologically disconnected 
`loners'. For real life individuals suffering from, or working through, the kind of 
post-Heideggerean anxiety that we find in the existentialist novels of atheists 
such as Sartre and Camus generally cannot be said to fall into the kind of highly 
immoral behaviour which we often associate with the `heroes' of such fiction38 
38 1 would like to draw attention to two further criticisms that have been raised against Kant's 
moral proof by Hegel and C. D. Broad, respectively. Hegel noted that `In the assumption that the 
highest good is what essentially matters, there is admitted a situation in which moral action [... ] 
does not take place at all', Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 376. The 
problem obliquely suggested here is one of consistency in the critical system: Kant's morality was 
established as being self-validating but Kant now assumes that without divine goodness the 
righteous man would see no reason to continue acting morally in the face of a cold and impersonal 
world. But to this it has been plausibly replied that happiness could be the foreseen end without 
being the main motive of moral action (see, for example, Wood, Kant 's Moral Religion, 51). 
Broad's very different criticism is that stating that something ought to exist implies only that this 
would involve `no logical contradiction and that any being who could bring it about ought to try 
and do so. But it does not imply any such being', Five Types of Ethical Theary (Routledge: 
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We have doubted, granting that humans need ends, whether we actually need 
the particular second-order end of happiness to motivate us or to accompany us 
in our pursuance of the good without despair. an end that needed God to 
synthesise it with our intelligible requirement of moral action. What seems to me 
to be the relative plausibility of Macintyre's alternative account in After Virtue, 
which relied upon the perfectibility of social practices 
to motivate us to virtue, 
and which we could combine with virtue without calling upon the thought of 
God, seemed to help our case (though it was not, of course, crucial for its 
success). I also hinted that despair might in any case not lead straight to immoral 
behaviour or sullen inaction. This too suggested that we need not assume a moral 
world cause to engage ethically with our fellows. In exposing what I take to be 
the second major difficulty with Kant's moral proof of the being of God, I would 
like to return to the issue of what I have been calling Kantian deism. For I now 
want to argue that even if the conclusion of this moral proof is that we must 
admit, albeit in an existential manner, that personally we must believe that there 
London, 1962), 141. What Broad appears to be saying here is that, it we do believe in morality 
then God indeed ought to exist in order to reward us. But there is no ontological implication to be 
found in this particular `ought' because the physical possibility of God bringing about a summum 
honen is uncertain. An analogy might make this clearer: when someone tells you in everyday life 
that you ought to do something, the possibility of you being physically able to undertake that 
action is presupposed in you being able to take that piece of moral advice seriously in the first 
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is a God, we must also admit that the God in which we must believe is a rather 
impoverished variety of Deity when compared with the God of the Christian 
tradition. 
The particular problem here might be said to be that the moral proof can only 
establish some but not all of what Kant claims for it. For it seems that only the 
simple existence of a moral rewarder of virtue must be assumed to motivate us to 
X 
act ethically in Kant's system (although some form of resurrection seems to be 
implied for humans). What this then further suggests is that although we must 
assume an effective harmonising force to exist outside the sensible world in 
order to act morally, there is still quite a leap from positing that harmonising 
force to believing in the traditional Christian God of infinite power, mercy and 
wisdom. As Y. Yovel has pointed out, the initial introduction of God into Kant's 
argument actually depends upon our subjective limitations, that is to say, our 
inability to imagine an `immanent principle of justice'. Yovel writes of the 
Kantian moral proof of God as follows: 
This procedure of postulation consists of two distinct stages. At the initial stage, which 
alone has logical necessity, all that we postulate is a vague and indefinite principle [... ] 
Of this something we know nothing except that it is there and it fulfils the function 
described [... ] but here our subjective limitations come into play, forcing us to imagine 
this factor with the aid of metaphoric, anthropomorphic imagery [... ] and regard that 
place. Similarly, we cannot take the claim that God ought to exist seriously into consideration 
before knowing that His physical possibility is vouched for. 
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`something' as a supreme personal being, endowed with understanding and will, who is 
the `moral author of the world', that is, God39 
Implicit in Yovel's characterisation here is the truth that, as Michalson has it: 
The God of the moral argument is chiefly an instrument in the realisation of a 
rational goal and little more [... ] certainly Kant's argument does not account for 
the full roster of divine predicates'40. So without the addition of our 
anthropomorphic imagery, all that logically follows from the moral proof of God t 
is in fact some kind of instrumental principle of justice. And it is highly 
unobvious that we should identify this bare principle either with the revealed 
Christian God of history, mercy and redemption or even with the God of the 
rationalist philosophers, who was the most perfect being, an uncaused cause and 
who held a providential design for the world. The traits or attributes of the deity 
who is at issue in the first Critique are considerably more numerous than those of 
the God produced by the moral proof 41. Some of the kind of problems that we 
might associate with Kant's own aggressive tactics toward theological 
argumentation in the Transcendental Dialectic therefore might be thought to 
come home to roost here: there is, for instance, no reason to be found in this 
particular moral argument, which logically proves only a principle of justice, 
why we must consider this `God' to be the creator of the world. It is in such a 
connection that D. M. Mackinnon has aptly noted: `For Kant, God is less the 
9 Y. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); 
89-90. 
40 Michalson, Kant and The Problem of God, 21. 
41 Ibid., 34 
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creator than the ultimate judge'4' and I would like to add that there seems to be 
no clear conceptual connection between the notion of a rewarder of just acts and 
the idea of a personal creator God that would bridge the clear gap in Kant's 
argument -a gap as large as that between what the cosmological and the 
physico-theological proofs attempt to prove and what they do in fact prove 
without the backing of the ontological argument. 
So the moral proof, even considered to be the result of practical and not 
theoretical reason, therefore - and only on the condition that we accept what I 
have already suggested in my look at Maclntyre that we should not, namely, that 
we cannot be motivated to moral action without the desire for happiness - proves 
only a `vague and indefinite principle'. This `principle' is not the God of the 
Christian faith. Yet there are two obvious ways of refurbishing the sparse 
Kantian concept of a principle of justice that results from the moral proof with a 
more substantial inventory of divine predicates. The first would be to return to 
one of the traditional demonstrations of an all powerful God, such as that to be 
found in the ontological proof of Descartes. The second would be to concede, 
alongside thinkers like Kierkegaard, that the real core of the Christian faith in a 
personal God is to be found in sacred revelation through scripture after all. Yet 
neither of these argumentative routes are live options for Kant because he has 
already shut off them both in a decisive fashion in the Transcendental Dialectic 
42 D. M. Mackinnon, 'Kant's Philosophy of Religion' in Philosophy, April 1975, vol. 50, no. 192, 
pp. 131-144. 
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of his first Critique and in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 
respectively43 
V Conclusion 
43 lt might be thought that there is yet another Kantian proof of God: for in the first Critique we 
are told that even for the man apparently devoid of right sentiment `enough remains to make him 
fear the existence of a God and a future life [... ] this may therefore serN'e as negative belief [... ] a 
powerful check on the outbreak of evil sentiments' [CPR A 830=B 858]. Although the negative 
modulation of the concept (of belief) here is a recognisably Kantian procedure - one is reminded 
of Kant's concept of negative pleasure in the third Critique's discussion of the sublime [CJ 83] 
and of negative moral perfection in the second [CPrR 189] - it is nevertheless misleading. For 
negative belief is not actually any kind of belief but is rather an agent acting as if he believed. This 
issue is further explored, twelve years later, in Religion Within the Limits of'Reason Alone. In this 
work, Kant notes that the recidivist who entertains no ho 
e 
of moral improvement glimpses an 
`incalculable misery'; a `cursed eternity' [Rel 63]: representations psychologically powerful 
enough, despite their potential untruth, to serve as an incentive if not to goodness then at least to 
restraint and God fearing `without our having to presume to lay down dogmatically the objective 
doctrine that man's destiny is an eternity of good or evil' [Rel 63]. It will be noted that neither the 
account in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone nor that which we found earlier in the 
Critique of Pure Reason declare that fear depends on the malefactor being committed to a belief in 
God and in the existence of human subjectivity in perpetuity: `Nothing more is required than he at 
least cannot pretend that there is any certainty that there is no such being and no such life' [CPR A 
830=B 858]. This `proof from fear' then, on closer inspection, is not a proof after the manner of 
Pascal at all but rather a form of policing behaviour with the end of getting people to act as if they 
believed in God. Moreover, given Kant's rigorism or strict doctrine of the categorical imperative, 
any deeds done from other motives, like fear, than those of duty can never be classed as moral. So 
it is a peculiarity of this supposed 'proof that it neither commits men to a belief in God nor truly 
evinces the moral good. 
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Kant rejected the possibility of any human sense experience of God by 
claiming that God, if He existed, did so independently of space and time. Kant 
also abandoned the possibility of the disclosure of God through Biblical 
scripture: we could never conclusively verify, Kant argued, but only conclusively 
falsify a divine revelation. I therefore attributed to Kant what I termed a 
`falsificationist' philosophy of revelation (I need hardly remark that the dormant 
reference here is to a famous philosophy of science). This `transcendental 
idealist' rejection of direct religious experience and `falsificationist' rejection of 
direct divine revelation led us to believe that Kant could be best characterised as 
a `deist': someone sceptical of the testimony of historical revelation but 
nonetheless convinced of the existence of God through reason. And indeed, Kant 
further argued that the mind naturally fabricates a so called idea of God. But the 
burden of theological proof within Kant's critical system clearly fell on the 
moral indication of God's existence. This proof however, was seen to rely on the 
questionable empirical assumption that without our expectation for happiness 
human moral action would be ruled out and to in any case prove only an abstract 
`principle of justice'. 
Kant himself, as is well known, thought that his removal of the ontological 
question of God's existence was actually open to a fideistic reading in the 
context of the critical system as a whole: `I have therefore found it necessary to 
deny knowledge', he declares in the preface to the second edition of the Critique 
cf Pure Reason, `in order to make room for faith' [CPR Bxxx]. Later, in the 
more unapproachable recesses of the first Critique he remarks: `For although we 
have to surrender the language of science we still have sufficient ground to 
employ, in the presence of the most exacting reason, the quite legitimate 
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language of a firm faith' [CPR A 745=B 773]. One immediately post-Kantian 
thinker however, will deny even this reduced claim, as we shall see presently. 
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3. Schopenhauer I: The Basic Structure of Schopenhauerian Atheism 
I Introduction 
Schopenhauer, although he attempted to retain what he took to be its moral 
essence``, definitively abandoned - rather than held in abeyance, as being 
beyond the scope of human knowledge - the metaphysics of Christian theism. He 
had both an indirect metaphysical argument and a more direct but wholly 
unKantian ethical argument for this atheism. The argument of this present 
chapter intends to demonstrate and examine the indirect metaphysical method 
used by Schopenhauer to argue for atheism. His direct ethical argument will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
I should however, state at the outset that as the focus of my interest is 
Schopenhauer's atheism, this means that detailing a convincing philosophical 
reconstruction of the whole of Schopenhauer's impressively comprehensive 
metaphysics of the will is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Nor is the 
concept of `will' itself as it appears in Schopenhauer's text something I should 
like to define precisely in this study. Nevertheless, it is in this chapter both 
possible and necessary to outline the Schopenhauerian metaphysic of the will in 
a serviceable way; that is to say, in a manner which allows us to look at 
44 Schopenhauer writes that `Christianity is composed of two very heterogeneous elements. Of 
these I should like to call the purely ethical element preferably, indeed exclusively, the Christian, 
and to distinguish it from the Jewish dogmatism with which it is found' [W 1 387-88]. This very 
partial acceptance of Christianity - particularly Catholic asceticism - further explains 
Schopenhauer's positive, if slightly unsettling, appreciation of Jesus Christ as an important prophet 
of asceticism [W 19 1, see also W 11584, W1 329 and W 11 628]. 
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Schopenhauer's attempt to argue against the existence of God. The chapter will 
be structured as follows. First, we shall examine the possible strategic reasons for 
the rather ambiguous presentation of Schopenhauer's atheism (and I begin with 
this issue because the way in which Schopenhauer presents his atheism has 
recently been critically questioned). Next, I shall then turn to the more 
philosophically substantial issue of how Schopenhauer broke with Kants 
tentative metaphysical scepticism: Schopenhauer's philosophy, it will be seen, 
leads from certain of the assumptions of Kantian transcendental idealism to a 
distinctive ontology that absolutely excludes the transcendent personal God of 
the monotheistic tradition. It also apparently excludes the immanent God of 
much of monistic philosophy (such as that of Hegel) and does so by 
extrapolating from self knowledge to `noumenal knowledge' -a kind of 
knowledge which Kant of course thought impossible - by means of an argument 
from analogy (a superfluous argument, as it turns out). After describing 
Schopenhauer's position, we shall then selectively investigate certain of 
Schopenhauer's arguments. They have had various objections raised against 
them and although a full survey of all of Schopenhauer's perceived philosophical 
errors is clearly beyond the limited scope of this chapter of my study, I will 
illuminate what I take to be two of the more troubling ones for our purposes. 
What we shall conclude is that Schopenhauer's metaphysical exclusion 
argument, whilst initially pursued according to strictly Kantian premises, was 
nevertheless flawed as an argument specifically against the existence of God, 
which, perhaps surprisingly, makes Schopenhauer's philosophy no less agnostic 
than Kant's. 
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In the next chapter, we shall then see how Schopenhauer nevertheless 
reinforces this indirect metaphysical contradiction of the existence of God with 
an important `argument from evil' that presents a rather more direct challenge to 
Christianity and, in a sense to be further explained, stems directly from his 
metaphysics as described in the present chapter. First, though, I would like to 
begin with an exploration of the presentation of Schopenhauer's atheism. 
II The Presentation of Schopenhauerian Atheism 
Whatever the philosophical successes, or otherwise, of his philosophy might 
turn out to be, Schopenhauer must surely be historically regarded as a deciding 
figure in the development of atheism within the mainstream of Western 
philosophy, a figure about whom Fredrich Nietzsche, writing shortly after - and 
often under the influence of - Schopenhauer, approvingly remarked: 
Schopenhauer was the first admitted and inexorable atheist among us Germans [... ] the 
ungodliness of existence was for him something given, palpable, indisputable [... ] This is 
the locus of his whole integrity; unconditional and honest atheism is simply the 
presupposition of the way he poses his problem. [GS #357] 
Nietzsche admits to admiring Schopenhauer's forthright atheism in several other 
places too, and he is certainly correct in suggesting that Schopenhauer quite self- 
consciously built an entire metaphysical system without feeling the need to have 
either explanatory or ornamental recourse to the concept of God, an approach of 
indirect contradiction to the Christian religion which was strongly at variance 
with most of his philosophical forebears and contemporaries. Accordingly, it will 
7 1 
not surprise us to learn that in the preface to the second edition of his magnum 
opus, the World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer himself complained 
- with an apparent detachment that actually contained not a little condescension 
towards his professionally employed peers - that his philosophy lacked the first 
requirement for a well paid professorial philosophy, namely, a speculative 
theology' [W I xxvi]. Schopenhauer later specified that this lack of a theological 
component in his thought was due to the fact that he was not `a person who aims 
with his writings at the approbation and assent of a minister' [W II 461]. 
Schopenhauer seems to have deeply mistrusted professional university 
philosophers, apparently on the grounds that they were heavily compromised by, 
amongst other things, religious affiliations, whilst he himself aimed - as he never 
ceased of reminding his readers - solely at the truth, which he took to be a duty 
of philosophers that can bring them into conflict with precisely those religious 
interests that the institution of the university more or less explicitly aims to 
support (also interesting in this connection is that Schopenhauer began his 
university studies in science and not, as was the case with Hegel, Schelling and 
others even including Nietzsche, in theology45). In accordance with this aim, 
Schopenhauer, without recantation, ever avoided what he regarded as being the 
conciliatory attempt to find a place for God in his philosophy. Schopenhauer also 
thought that such attempts to introduce God into philosophy, quite apart from 
being economic, social and political compromises, in any case exhibited a 
measure of ignorance with regard to the recent philosophical achievements 
45 See J. E. Atwell, Schopenhauer: The Human Character (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1990), 13. 
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brought about by Kant: `as if the Critique of Pure Reason had been written on 
the moon' [WN 4]. It is Schopenhauer's philosophic objections to the 
introduction of God into philosophy that will concern us in the pages that follow. 
Nietzsche's claim in The Gay Science that Schopenhauer had been the first 
admitted and inexorable atheist among the Germans has however, recently been 
questioned by one commentator. Not that David Berman thinks that 
Schopenhauer was not in fact an atheist (that is surely beyond all doubt); nor that 
Berman has discovered an even earlier admitted atheist of comparable 
philosophic significance among the Germans (there were, of course, well-known 
materialistic atheists who anonymously confessed their atheism during the 
French Enlightenment, such as Baron d'Holbach): rather, Berman's scepticism 
turns principally on the fact that Schopenhauer, against the subsequent 
interpretation of Nietzsche, seems not to have admitted very much at all in the 
way of his own personal religious unbelieving: `Schopenhauer', Berman claims, 
`was cautious and dissembling about his atheism'46, by which it is meant that 
Schopenhauer did not in fact deny God's existence outright; nor did he ever 
avowedly call himself an atheist; nor does Schopenhauer ever articulate an 
explicit argument against the existence of a monotheistic God. All this seems to 
be true (with the possible exception of the final claim, as we shall see in our next 
chapter on Schopenhauer's `argument from evil') but far from being unique to 
Schopenhauer it reflects a wider tendency that is observable in many atheistic 
writers - from Feuerbach to Freud, and arguably including Hume - to leave their 
46 D. Berman, `Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: Honest Atheism, Dishonest Pessimism', in Willing 
and Noihi igness, ed. C. Janaway (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 178-195; 186. 
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atheism half hidden, chiefly to avoid prosecution or offence. But as Berman 
concedes, any dissembling that Schopenhauer may have indulged in - though it 
seems to me that, strictly speaking, Schopenhauer was more guilty of omission 
than dissembling - by means of this mild form of self-censorship could scarcely 
have obscured the fact that his ontology was nevertheless as utterly atheistic as 
any that could be imagined. Schopenhauer's metaphysics is, in intention, 
intrinsically atheistic and so Schopenhauer does not require a separate argument 
to establish his atheism, a point with which Berman cannot but agree in his 
paper. Yet Berman goes on to make the controversial point that Schopenhauer 
was cautious about loudly disseminating the atheistic conclusions of his 
metaphysical system because `open atheism was liable to drive the vulgar 
crazy'47. If I understand this ambiguously expressed sentence correctly, Berman 
conceives of monotheism seen from within the Schopenhauerian system as 
providing support for morals and public order and this function of the protection 
of civil order explains Schopenhauer's reluctance to admit his atheism. Now, the 
principal place where Schopenhauer seems to admit that religion had a function 
is in a late essay included in Parerga and Paraliporena entitled `On Religion: A 
Dialogue', any interpretation of which should make allowance for the dialogue 
form and the conventions pertaining to it. One of the two characters in the 
dialogue, Demopheles, ascribes a certain sociological importance to religion that 
is captured in the following, high-handed, way: 
The needs of the people must be met m accordance with their powers of comprehension. 
Religion is the only way to proclaim and make plain the high significance of life to the 
47 Ibid. 
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crude intellect and clumsy understanding of the masses who are immersed in sordid 
pursuits and material labour. [PP 113241 
This, it might be thought, offers some primae facie support for Berman's 
interpretation. but the religious function referred to here is clearly metaphysical 
comprehension rather than the preservation of social order and moreover, there is 
no obvious reason why Schopenhauer should be wholly identified with 
Demopheles; nor indeed why he should not be identified with Demopheles' 
equally imaginary interlocutor, Philalethes: both of the characters in this 
dialogue are in fact atheists, their only dispute being over the presentation of that 
atheism. Even if the dispute reflects an ambiguity in Schopenhauer's own 
position (and that it is legitimate to use the dialogic form in philosophy when a 
subject admits of two views is accepted at PP 11 7) and Schopenhauer is therefore 
willing to entertain the view of Demopheles - i. e. that religion has a beneficial 
function - to some degree, the function and importance of religion referred to in 
part of that dialogue, to return to my first point, is not at all social restraint but 
rather individual metaphysical consolation. `Religion is', not the Marxist opium, 
but rather the Feuerbachian `metaphysics of the people' [PP II 325]. 
Furthermore, ancient Greek, Hindu and Buddhist cultures remained perfectly 
lawful whilst also refraining from monotheistic belief, as Schopenhauer records 
in the guise of the character Philalethes [PP II 331]. It might also be worth 
mentioning that Berman's view neglects that important strand of Schopenhauer's 
sociological thought - the threads of which will be picked up by Nietzsche - 
which maintains that religious faith was in any case simply dying out: `Mankind 
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is growing out of religion as out of its childhood clothes' [PP II 392, see also 
FFR 179, WN 5, WI35 7] . 
I therefore agree with Berman to the extent that Schopenhauer is not, strictly 
speaking, an admitted atheist but I disagree with him in so far as Berman seems 
to think that Schopenhauer hides the atheistic conclusions of his philosophy so as 
ensure social restraint. Schopenhauer seems to me to be forced by his own 
position to have to admit - and if, contra my exegetical intuitions, he does not in 
fact so admit, then he is at any rate to my mind best reconstructed as admitting - 
that the main, but nonetheless still dispensable, function of religion is personal 
consolation and not social order, in part because he acknowledges that atheistic 
and non-monotheistic cultures are not immoral and in part because 
Schopenhauer thought that religion was in any case dying out. There are good 
reasons, then, for not reading Schopenhauer in the way that Berman does. 
So much for my interpretation of the potential reasons behind the cryptic 
formal presentation of Schopenhauer's position as an atheist. Now we must 
examine the first, indirect, line of argument he actually provides for this atheism. 
This first line of argument is indissociable from certain of his metaphysical 
concerns but we shall have to be relatively selective in our examination and 
confine our research mainly to the basic assertions and doctrines that have an 
immediate bearing on Schopenhauer's atheism. With some of the wider 
philosophical issues raised by The World as Will and Representation we shall, 
therefore, of necessity not be concerned. Ultimately, it will be seen that 
Schopenhauer's line of metaphysical argument, irrespective of the partial 
successes it may achieve on other philosophical points, cannot be regarded as 
successfully excluding God from ontology. 
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III Atheism and Idealism 
As is well known, Schopenhauer elaborated his main philosophical theories in 
his major work The World w Will and Representation, which was first pub] 1 shed 
in 1819 and then revised in 1844 and once again in 1859. These revisions are 
additions rather than major doctrinal changes and instead of being interleaved 
with the remainder of his work they themselves constitute a second volume. 
Schopenhauer also published collections of short essays and longer self- 
contained essays on specific philosophical themes such as ethics and the problem 
of free will but these in no way - except perhaps on very minor points - 
contradict the conclusions that Schopenhauer had already reached on such 
matters in his magnum opus and largely stuck to throughout his philosophical 
career. It is this work, The World as Will and Representation, therefore, that 
must bear the brunt of any attempt to appreciate the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy. I cannot, to re-emphasise, offer an absolutely exhaustive account of 
Schopenhauer's philosophy as a whole here, of course, but the main line of 
reasoning that leads up to the exclusion of God can be put as follows. 
Schopenhauer opens The World as Will and Representation with some 
meditations on idealism. We are initially treated to a consideration of what he 
calls the representation (Vorstellung). Leaving aside the difficult question of 
what exactly Schopenhauer takes a representation to be (there would seem to be 
no clear answer to this, further than its obviously being mind-dependent), at first 
sight this position might perhaps seem to be heading in the broad direction of an 
ontology of pure experience a la the sceptical David Hume. Hume notoriously 
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conceded that on his empiricist premises he had failed to find any experience 
that answers to what we, in everyday life, call the self. He thereby - in the 
Treatise if not the Enquiry - became the first major modern philosopher to 
question the Cartesian orthodoxy that ego sum. As good a way as any of phrasing 
the Humean challenge would be to say that when we try to perceive ourselves all 
we actually find are one or another perception: all that we can know to exist, 
therefore, are perceptions. So we might think that Schopenhauer was agreeing 
with Hume but such an interpretation would be premature. For Schopenhauer's 
own gloss on the term representation is that it is: `an object for a subject' [W I 
169]. From a consideration of the representation, the subject is therefore 
immediately introduced, since Schopenhauer appears to follow Kant's attack on 
Huene in arguing that coherent experience necessarily requires an experiencer, 
despite never himself appearing to subscribe either to the specifics of Kant's own 
approach (say, the doctrine of the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and 
recognition which present unified subjectivity and enduring objectivity as 
intimately connected in the first edition transcendental deduction) nor to the 
format of transcendental arguments generally, which on one common 
interpretation characteristically assume that there is experience or experience of 
a certain sort and then attempt to show that a specific condition or set of 
conditions must be satisfied for there to be that experience in the first place. 
Schopenhauer therefore eludes what we might term the `negative logic of the 
subject' that is latent in Hume's empiricism by maintaining instead that the self 
is a necessary condition of experience and, as Christopher Janaway has 
remarked, he is in fact justified in doing so because without the condition of 
subjectivity that Kant and Schopenhauer supply, the ontologist of pure 
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experience, such as Hume, is left at a loss when he asked to explain why bundles 
of experience are organised in precisely the way that, as a matter of fact, they 
happen to be48 
So, Schopenhauer is not following Hume - but might he not instead be said to 
be following Berkeley? Schopenhauer, like Berkeley, refuses to consider the 
object as it is presented to a subject with any ontological implications about the 
perceiver-independence of that object put out of mind or bracketed (i. e. reduced 
in a kind of transcendental epoche) and instead construes the object as a wholly 
perceiver-dependent entity. Moreover, the arguments he sparingly uses to 
establish this idealistic position also appear to owe a good deal to the Irish 
Bishop. In now considering such arguments however, we shall see that the 
perplexities of Berkeleian idealism are not as relevant to the Schopenhauerian 
exclusion argument and so therefore are not as relevant to our present concerns, 
as we might at first suppose. 
Now, Schopenhauer plausibly considers realism to be the natural and the most 
intuitively attractive philosophy for the modern (Western) mind but nevertheless 
thinks that a little philosophical analysis can expose this initial plausibility as 
being wholly spurious. This now brings us to what is on one interpretation 
possibly one of the most notorious moves associated with the metaphysics of The 
World as Will and Representation, for Schopenhauer seems to argue - and it is 
an argument notoriously also to be found in Berkeley49 - that since anything that 
I imagine exists in my imagination, the possibility of a perceiver-independent 
48 C. Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauers Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
104. 
49 See Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hl'las and Philonous, in Works, 139,183. 
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world existing without subjects cannot even be imagined and therefore: In the 
assumption that the world as such might exist independently of all brains [sic] 
there lies a contradiction' [W II 5, also W1 15, W 11486, for further positive 
references to Berkeley's achievement see W 1434, W1 95, WI 444]. We should 
probably not ignore at this point the fact that the word `brains' in this claim 
marks an obvious confusion between Schopenhauer's Berkeleian idealism and 
the neurophysiological realism within which this argument is framed, a 
confusion which Schopenhauer - with arguable sincerity - elsewhere actually 
imputes to Berkeley himself [see W 11 3]. Yet this confusion is actually foregone 
in Berkeley's own immaterialism, where talk of the subject is invariably 
conducted in the clearly non-material terms of spirit and where the brain itself is 
explicitly and consistently construed idealistically: `The brain, therefore, you 
speak of, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind'50. But overlooking the 
apparent confusion and possible disingenuousness here, we can still say that this 
well-known Berkeleian argument for establishing idealism, if Schopenhauer is in 
fact subscribing to it, is in fact inconclusive, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it 
seems unreasonable to say that unperceived things cannot exist only because we 
cannot imagine them, not least due to the fact that Berkeley and Schopenhauer 
seem not to have been very rigorous in distinguishing between representations 
and the objects of those representations in this argument. What I mean here is 
probably best captured by the suggestion that despite its apparent superfluity,. 
substance might nevertheless exist and, if so, its existence would not be 
endangered by Schopenhauer's Berkeleian argument to the effect that 
50 Berkeley, Three Dialogues, 156. 
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representations cannot exist without a representer (because substance would be 
distinguishable from those representations). Secondly, some unacceptable 
consequences follow from holding this argument, such as the fact that either 
author would also be committed to suppose that nothing can exist when 
unperceived by them - Berkeley and Schopenhauer - themselves51. Unlike 
Schopenhauer however, it is noteworthy that Berkeley did not rely solely on this 
argument and had, amongst others, an argument from perceptual relativities to 
purportedly show that matter was incoherent. Schopenhauer however, was 
uninterested in sceptical arguments about sense perception52 
But perhaps Schopenhauer's argument for idealism, despite his apparent 
confession of influence, is on further examination other than Berkeleian and can 
therefore be reconstructed along other, perhaps much stronger, lines. One such 
possible line might be that suggested by T. L. S. Sprigge, who has argued that 
amongst what confronts us in perception are various characteristics which can be 
fitted under three headings: perspectival character; gestalt organisation (as is 
clear, for example, in the duck-rabbit picture much discussed by Wittgenstein); 
51 I. Tipton, Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994), 160-161. 
52 At one stage of the Principles of Human Knowledge (XV), Berkeley admits that arguments 
from perceptual relativities only show that we do not know which property exists in the object, not 
that no property so exists (which does not explain, as commentators frequently note, why 
Berkeley makes considerable use of such arguments in the later text, the Three Dialogues Between 
Hvlas and Philonous). Perhaps Schopenhauer recognised this weakness in arguments from 
perceptual relativities and was reluctant to place any emphasis on them. 
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and aesthetic quality53. One cannot, it is Sprigge's contention, imagine an object 
stripped of these three kinds of qualities; which, given that they are 'subject 
implying properties'; means that an object is inconceivable without assuming a- 
not necessarily our - subjective perspective on it ('In the assumption that the 
world as such might exist independently of all brains there lies a contradiction' 
[W II 5 italics added], Schopenhauer wrote; we must once again disregard the 
neurophysiological realism). But whether or not this is in fact so, it should, 1 
think, be noted that further discussion on our part is doubly unnecessary. First 
because it would lead us too far away from the essentially theological and 
atheological considerations of the present study and second because it is far from 
clear whether Schopenhauer actually needs to rely on this type of idealism 
derived from Berkeley - or indeed on the reconstruction by Sprigge - in the way 
in which he appears to do, given that Schopenhauer in any case accepts the 
Kantian view that `properties which presuppose the spatiality and (or) 
temporality of their bearers (properties pertaining to extension, location, 
duration, weight or colour, for example) characterise nothing as it is in itself 54 
For `transcendental' idealism - that is, idealism of a Kantian sort, which argues 
for the ideality of space and time and by implication all properties dependent 
upon them but nevertheless assumes the reality of some non-spatio-temporal 
`thing-in-itself - is arguably all that Schopenhauer really needs to prove for the 
purposes of his `exclusion' argument, given that he will soon, contra Berkeley 
53 See T. L. S. Sprigge, The 1 indicalion of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1983), pp. 1 10-140. 
54 J. Young, Willing and Uirx'illing: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenharuer 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 4 
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(for whom, incidentally, space was an empirical, not apriori, representation), 
arguably supply a thing-in-itself `behind' the spatio-temporal world of 
representation55. Of course, it may well be that none of the Kantian arguments 
for the transcendental ideality of time and space accepted by Schopenhauer 
himself in his writings would be accepted by Schopenhauer's own (modern) 
readers - but that is quite another story and one which need not detain us here: I 
have in the previous chapter already mentioned my strategy of provisionally 
accepting the conclusions - thereby to some extent leaving aside criticism of the 
particular arguments - of Kantian transcendental idealism so as to examine their 
specific implications for religion. I so remain within the scope of the critical 
philosophy, not by virtue of any assumed infallibility, but rather in order to 
illuminate its cogency. I now extend the same courtesy to Schopenhauer's 
transcendental idealism. It therefore perhaps suffices to say, in concluding these 
necessarily sketchy and provisional remarks on the establishment of 
Schopenhauer's own idealism, that on one possible reading that idealism may be 
detached from Berkeley's in Sprigge's way but that in any case nothing crucial to 
the Schopenhauerian exclusion argument hangs on establishing Berkeleian 
idealism because the essential assumptions of the exclusion argument can be 
supplied by Kantian transcendental idealism alone (although whether or not 
Berkeley's idealism is thereby assimilated to or incorporated into Kant's, being 
supplemented there with the notion of a -priori representations, rather than being 
`undermined' by Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, as Kant himself thought [CPR 
See Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, 150: `For all his complaint that 
Kant is not a consistent idealist because he relies on the thing in itself [... ] when it comes to the 
crux Schopenhauer will do the same'. 
83 
B274], is not an issue I should like to settle definitively here). In so far as our 
concentration on the exclusion argument is concerned, then, Schopenhauer links 
his project to Berkeley's in a way that we may regard as being, for present 
purposes, misleading. 
Schopenhauer is therefore best seen, for our purposes, as following neither 
Hume nor Berkeley but rather Kant, by establishing the a -priori ideality of space 
and time. Yet it should further be mentioned here that Schopenhauerian 
argumentation so far might still not be accepted as being entirely problem free 
for at this stage of the argument a collapse into solipsistic subjective idealism 
might seem possible, since Schopenhauer is describing a world where all that 
can be known to immediately exist is representations and the representing 
subject. It is evident however, that Schopenhauer consciously wishes not to 
assimilate his position to subjective idealism (by which I mean the ontological 
thesis that all that exists is the isolated subject) or to Cartesian scepticism (by 
which is meant the epistemological thesis that all that can be known to exist is 
the individual subject), for he expressly excludes such solipsism - which he 
discusses under the title of `theoretical egoism' - from legitimate debate, stating 
that theoretical egoism is really only seriously believed by lunatics and so 
requires `not so much a refutation as a cure' [W 1 104], which is just as well 
because he concedes here that it `can never be refuted by proofs'. However, it is 
worth further mentioning that this latter claim is itself one that could be 
protested against from a variety of anti-sceptical philosophical positions today; 
for example, by Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private 
language in the Philosophical Investigations. In light of this argument of 
Wittgenstein's, which I am not going to further examine here, we should perhaps 
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regard Schopenhauer's claim as not as self-evidently true as Schopenhauer 
himself supposed. 
It might of course be further protested at this point that Schopenhauer's 
position, though it attempts to avoid solipsism, nevertheless unintentionally 
entails such a solipsistic commitment as one of its unfortunate implications. 
Georg Lukäcs, for one, thought precisely this to be the case with regard to 
Schopenhauer's philosophy, although perhaps only because his own views on 
Schopenhauer had been prejudicially deformed by his adherence to a 
Hegelianised version of Marxism 6. The views and remarks of polemicists aside 
however, in reality Schopenhauer is no solipsist because he accepts a feature of 
Kantian thought that saves him from solipsism. I refer once again to the 
aforementioned Kantian division between the sensible, phenomenal world of 
space and time and the intelligible, noumenal world outside of space and time. It 
is crucial to once again recall that Schopenhauer accepts the ideality of space 
and time - along with Kant's own arguments for that ideality, which we 
familiarised ourselves with in the previous chapter - without reserve [see WI 6- 
7, W1 438]. For him as for Kant, space and time are a -priori `forms of intuition' 
that originate in us and mask things in themselves from our view; space being the 
a priori form of outer intuition and time being the corresponding form of inner 
intuition. In Schopenhauer's thought as in Kant's, time has a certain priority 
insofar as all experiences must take place in it, whilst only outer experiences 
take place in space (this necessity of time for our kind of experience will, as we 
shall see, come back to haunt Schopenhauer's attempted post-Kantian 
'ý' See, e. g., G. Lukäcs, The 1)estructionn of Reason (London: Merlin, 1980), 233. 
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metaphysics). It is also worth mentioning here that - as Julian Young above all 
has emphasised; ' - Schopenhauer also seems to think that accepting the tenets 
transcendental idealism accommodates `the undeniable moral significance of 
human conduct' [W 1 422]. Furthermore, Schopenhauer supplies a little 
supporting argument of his own for this standpoint: the ideality of time being 
suggested to Schopenhauer by the supposed `fact' of human clairvoyance [WN 
107] and also by the thought that time, unlike all phenomena, exerts no causal 
influence [W II 301]. Paul Guyer however, has recently claimed that 
Schopenhauer took 'Kant's inference from our a-priori knowledge of a feature of 
objects to its subjective validity completely for granted'58 but this does not seem 
to me to be a very satisfactory description of Schopenhauer's method, at least 
with regard to space and time. precisely because his own supporting arguments 
(although their force is admittedly debatable) provide at least some minimal 
justification for such an inference. 
On the face of it, Schopenhauer can therefore be said to avoid the madness of 
solipsism because he believes there to exist, not just himself and representations 
but also a non-spatial and non-temporal Kantian reality outside him: the realm of 
the thing in itself Another possible critical response to this position however, 
would be to argue that Schopenhauer has no reason to suppose that such a 
noumenal reality exists in the first place. According to this response, it appears 
unsure whether our representations do actually `stand in' for anything else 
57 J. Young, Willing and Unwilling, 7. 
'x P. Guyer, `Schopenhauer, Kant and the Methods of Philosophy', in C. Janaway, ed., The 
Cambridge ('ornpcnnion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
(hereafter, Companion), 93. 
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external to them. There are at least two answers to this objection that can be 
made on Schopenhauer's behalf The first is that the word representation, after 
all, itself suggests something represented: `Phenomenon or appearance' as 
Schopenhauer himself puts it at one stage, `presupposes something that appears' 
[W 1 486]. Although this answer actually has some Kantian precedent [see CPR 
Bxxvi] it is all too easily answered by the comment that the term `representation' 
is therefore something of a misnomer in this context and so Schopenhauer should 
be talking of presentations rather then representations. The second and much 
stronger reply that one can make on Schopenhauer's behalf is that his argument 
for discovering the character of that noumenal world beyond representation can 
also potentially double as an argument for that world's existence59 
Schopenhauer goes way beyond Kant though, in his supposing it possible for us 
to gain quantitative and qualitative knowledge of noumenal reality. Before 
examining Schopenhauer's methods of determining the qualitative character of 
the noumenal world however. 1 first want to observe the way in which he 
determines the quantitative character of that world. In first looking at his 
quantitative, and then at his qualitative determination of the Kantian thing in 
itself, it should be noted that the order of our exposition in this chapter will be 
the reverse of Schopenhauer's own. 
IL' Beyond the Limits of Experience 
59 This is the general line of argument of D. W. Hamlyn's Schopenhauer (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1980). It is also an argument that A. Maclntyre makes on behalf of Freud's discovery 
of the unconscious in his The (Inco,, scious: A conceptual Analysis (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1976), 30. 
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As is well known, Kant himself did not commit his critical philosophy to any 
one view about the quantity of the noumena/noumenon and in his writings he 
used both the singular and the plural in talking about things in themselves. The 
possibility that discrete noumenal selves exist alongside their creator in some 
noumenal region was thus, at least, left open within the critical philosophy of 
Kant. One of the most obvious Schopenhauerian departures from Kant's view of 
that world, therefore, is the conviction that it can be numerically determinable. 
Schopenhauer claims that it is legitimate to collapse the hitherto numerically 
indeterminate Kantian noumenal world into a single ground. Schopenhauer thus 
purges the Kantian noumenon -a word that Schopenhauer himself actually did 
not use, preferring the equally Kantian term `thing-in-itself - by means of a 
fairly straitforward, if heavily compressed, argument: `The thing-in-itself [... J lies 
outside space and time, and accordingly knows no plurality and consequently is 
one' [W 1 128]. Schopenhauer's extremely condensed line of reasoning here can 
be clarified as follows. 
First, he adopts the principle, which he shares with John Locke60, that it is 
purely spatio-temporal location that individuates a given empirical thing: `It is 
only by means of time and space that something which is one and the same 
according to its nature and the concept appears as different, as a plurality of 
coexistent and successive things. Consequently time and space are the 
60 See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, XXVII, 1, p 156: `The principium 
ilndividuationis [... ] is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and 
space'. I omit here any discussion of the exceptionally problematic Platonic ideas or grades in 
Schopenhauer, which are not in space and time but are multiple (most commentators advocate 
excising the grades from Schopenhauer's philosophy). 
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principium individuationis' [W 1 113]. Kant himself, it may be remembered, 
similarly argued that space and time are necessary to represent things as distinct 
from one another [see CPR A 23=B 38]. Spatial distance thus clearly 
differentiates entities but so does temporality, for separate things can come to be 
and pass away in time whilst both occupying the same spatial location (one of 
the obvious assumptions that allow us to talk of the phenomena of restoration 
and certain kinds of replacement, for example). After pointing this out, 
Schopenhauer then alludes to the implications which this may be taken to have 
for Kant's positioning of a noumenal world outside of such spatial and temporal 
determinations. If we accept the Kantian noumenal world as being outside of 
space and time then that world must therefore, Schopenhauer concludes, be 
thought of as unindividuatable -a night in which, not only are all cows are black 
but one in which the black cows themselves cannot be rigorously differentiated 
at all: `It is itself one, yet not as an object is one, for the unity of an object is 
known only in contrast to possible plurality. Again the will is one not as a 
concept is one, for a concept originates only through abstraction from plurality; 
but it is one as that which lies outside time and space, outside the principium 
individuationis, that is to say, outside the very possibility of plurality' [W I 113]. 
Schopenhauer is maintaining that since the principium individuationis is time 
and space, and given that space and time are absent from the thing in itself, then 
we cannot differentiate between entities in the Kantian noumenal world: the 
noumena is a unity (it is undifferentiated). And at least the formal validity of the 
logic of this argument - i. e. leaving aside the issue of whether he and Locke are 
in fact correct in surmising that the principium indi>>iduationis is time and space 
- seems faultless. 
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Our extended investigations into Schopenhauer's idealistic system have now 
reached an issue which has a crucially important bearing on the question of the 
existence of God: this specific argument can be regarded as the first stage of 
Schopenhauer's metaphysical exclusion of God from his picture of the world 
since it obviously leaves no space for a transcendent creator to stand apart from 
that world. However, it is well worth reminding ourselves at this point that it is 
nothing more than a first stage because monism per se is not a sufficient 
argument against the existence of God, as is well illustrated by the fact that 
within the history of philosophy many - if not most - philosophers attracted 
towards monism, from the Neo-Platonists all the way up to Hegel, though they 
have of course departed from the traditional dualistic belief in a creator and his 
creation, have nevertheless managed to maintain explicitly held monotheistic 
beliefs, in Hegel's case by conceiving of the Christian God as the process of 
Geist or Absolute spirit coming to be self-present in the world. It might however, 
be thought that the fact that such monists as Hegel held Christian beliefs proves 
nothing decisively because the thinkers in question might have failed to notice 
the incompatibility between what they argued for and the religion they claimed 
to believe in: to take one prominent example, their doctrine of God creating the 
world from his own substance seems at odds with Biblical creation ex nihilo. Yet 
in responding to just such a point, L. Kolakowski has pointed out in this regard 
that the Christian expression ex nihilo does not `suggest that Nothingness was a 
stuff which God moulded things of there was no stuff other than God himself 61 
If this point be accepted, then we can see that what separates such monists as 
61 L. Kolakowski, Religion (Glasgow: Fontana: 1982), 148. 
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Hegel from more traditional Christians might be more a matter of emphasis, 
rhetoric or articulation than heresy. But be that as it may, what decisively 
differentiates Schopenhauerian monism from the monism of such monotheistic 
thinkers as Hegel - heretical or not - is that Schopenhauer then refused to deify 
the One; indeed, quite the reverse was true in the case of Schopenhauer: he 
exhaustively determined the quality of his single fundamental reality in a way 
that he thought was utterly incompatible with the idea of a wise and benevolent 
God (and the word God, he thought in line with Christian tradition, was only 
worthy of being applied to an all intelligent, all powerful, all good creator [see 
PP 11 101]). Schopenhauer so determined this monistic reality by way of a purely 
metaphysical argument, involving a form of intuitive self knowledge and then an 
argument from analogy to bridge the gap between self-knowledge and 
knowledge of the external world. It was necessarily a purely metaphysical move, 
for although both interested and deeply immersed in the scientific literature of 
his time, Schopenhauer did not believe that natural science could yield any 
worthwhile metaphysical result (short of corroboration, that is). This refusal to 
grant the natural sciences a fundamental place in human enquiry was a result of 
his belief that such a naturalistic endeavour to conceive the world as a set of 
entities describable from the third person standpoint - which underpins science - 
excluded not only a valid component of that world qua observable world - i. e. 
excluded the subjective viewpoint - but that in neglecting the subjective 
viewpoint it thereby excluded the only constituent of that world that allowed us 
access to the unobservable, metaphysical world: `All the natural sciences labour 
under the inevitable disadvantage of comprehending nature exclusively from the 
objective side and of being indifferent to the subjective. But the main point is 
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necessarily to be found in the latter; and it devolves on philosophy' [PP 11 107]. 
In a Kantian vocabulary, we might say that the experience of the thing in itself 
will turn out to possess an intensive magnitude and not an extensive one (the 
only kind of magnitude that science can deal with). I will now engage in a closer 
examination of the relevant texts to see just how Schopenhauer thought that he 
himself could get past the restrictions that fettered the scientific understanding 
that, he wrote, `carries death in its heart even at its birth, because it passes over 
the subject' [W 1 29]. 
V Phenomenology of the Self 
But first, a brief synopsis. We have so far in this chapter seen that 
Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation outlines an idealistic 
ontology of representations and their subject then bypasses the madness of 
solipsism by accepting Kant's arguments for transcendental idealism, only to 
then demonstrate the quantitative character of reality, which - by persuasively 
exposing deep problems about differentiation in the Kantian noumenal world - 
effectively rules out the possibility of conceiving of a wholly transcendent, 
though perhaps not an immanent, God. With his case made for the unity of the 
thing in itself, Schopenhauer further attempts to advance beyond Kant by 
unlocking the mysterious secret of the qualitative character of the unified world 
of the thing in itself in a way that would rule out an immanent God. And 
although neither anti-scientific nor unscientific (his unhappy forays into 
scientific dead-ends like the study of physiognomy, generatio aequivoca and 
Goethe's theory of colours are merely mistakes of empirical investigation and 
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reflect badly neither on Schopenhauer's conception of science nor on his 
metaphysics), Schopenhauer does this initially by means of recourse to self- 
knowledge rather than knowledge of the external world, although the self that 
Schopenhauer has in mind here is not the self found in most of traditional 
philosophy. I should state here that although any account of Schopenhauer's 
metaphysics, including this one, has to provide a description of his crucial 
account of the self (as `will'), it will not be the purpose of the present discussion 
to elaborate upon nor to query this account at any length: the subject of the self 
in Schopenhauer deserves - and in Janaway's Sel f und Ii orlJJ in Schopenhauer '. s 
Philosophy, has received -a monograph of its own. The present aim is simply to 
reveal Schopenhauer's exclusion argument against God. To do this I will have to 
avail myself of the privilege of treating Schopenhauer's conception of the self as 
a workable theory. Eschewing overt critical engagement with - but not 
description of - Schopenhauerian thoughts on the self in this way- will better 
allow me to fasten on to the problems specific to the Schopenhauerian 
identification of the self with the thing in itself which is, after all, the argument 
that effectively leads to a denial of the existence of God. But before asking why 
knowing the self in the first place helps us gain access to the thing in itself in 
such a way that even an immanent God would be ruled out, we must first ask the 
preliminary question: what is it that Schopenhauer thinks we come to know in 
self-knowledge? 
It is of ovemding importance in this regard to recognise that, for 
Schopenhauer, the question of the self is no longer to be regarded as simply- 
being a question of the thinking mind. But why not" Schopenhauer believes - 
and the starting point for this belief appears to be a phenomenological one - that 
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in our everyday life we seem first and foremost to relate to the world in ways 
prior to pure knowing (he therefore anticipates Heidegger's point in Being and 
Time that Kant did not question the priority of `knowing' over `being-in-the- 
world'62 and to that extent Heideggerean phenomenology might be taken to 
support Schopenhauer's thought). Schopenhauer captures this point in the 
following way: `How does man become conscious of his own self? Answer: 
altogether as one who wills' [FW 1l]. The thought here is that the self of which 
we are generally aware is not a primarily thinking being. So whereas Kant very 
famously postulated an "`I think" that must accompany all our representations', 
Schopenhauer - and his intentions here are only partly parodic - postulates an "`I 
will" which accompanies all our actions' [FW 95-96]. This particular remark 
strongly suggests that the will is something of which we are aware in bodily 
action (and perhaps in bodily action alone), which might therefore be quite close 
to the position that the phenomenolgist Maurice Merleau-Ponty was aiming for 
when he suggested `abandoning the body as an object parses extra parses, and 
going back to the body I experience at this moment'63. However, understanding 
Schopenhauer's concept of will - as it surely begs to be understood in many of 
his passages - as essentially connected with voluntary bodily movement alone 
generates at least two philosophical puzzles. Firstly, it is uncertain whether 
Schopenhauer means to refer here either to intentional actions such as `saluting' 
or `pointing' (in which case the will could scarcely be said to be blind any 
longer) or whether he instead means to refer to the feeling that accompanies 
6.1 M. Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 45. 
o3 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1994). 75. 
94 
bodily movement (in which case such feelings of bodily movement would 
certainly have to be construed non-spatially; that is, as truly purses contra 
partes)64. And the second difficulty that results from understanding 
Schopenhauer's concept of will as essentially connected with voluntary bodily 
movement alone is that willing elsewhere seems to generously involve all 
affective states, of which some at least - e. g. the experience of pain - can seem 
to be experienced passively, that is to say, without active experience of bodily 
action at all (one thinks of feeling a pin-prick, for example). As this point may 
also be put, if we take seriously Schopenhauer's characterisation of willing as 
not only willing and deciding in the narrow sense but also all striving, wishing, 
shunning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating' [W 11202] or as `all desiring, striving, 
wishing, demanding, longing, hoping, loving, rejoicing, jubilation [... ] all 
abhorring, fleeing, fearing, being angry, hating, mourning, suffering pains - in 
short all emotions and passions' [FW 11], then our experience of voluntary 
bodily action would surely be but one instance of what Schopenhauer means by 
willing. 
So, Schopenhauer is rather vague about what willing precisely consists in. In 
any case, I largely want to forego further comment on what exactly 
Schopenhauer means by will here but I take it that the concept of will can 
negotiate the conceptual puzzles mentioned above and be sufficiently explained 
for our present purpose - i. e. the purpose of elaborating the Schopenhauerian 
exclusion argument against God - by saying that what he means by will is 
(1 4 In this connection, see S. Gardner, `Schopenhauer, Will and the Unconscious', in Companion, 
375-421, especially 383. 
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something like `the non-spatial feeling accompanying bodily action along with 
other affective states'. The further debate about whether the body I experience 
at this moment' is in point of fact non-spatial is not one that I should like to enter 
into at this point. Nor should I here like to embark upon the project of connecting 
Schopenhauer's remarks on willing and action with comparative accounts in 
contemporary analytic philosophy. But what I would like to make mention of is 
that Schopenhauer adds a lot of anecdotal and psychological evidence to support 
the thesis that the description of us as cognitive subjects - as opposed to conative 
and affective subjects - does not exhaustively characterise our essential nature 
but rather must be supplemented with an account of our autonomous `feelings of 
will'. Schopenhauer's broad methodology here is to suggest that as we are all 
subject to emotions, wishes and desires that are unbidden (and sometimes even 
unrecognised) then the will cannot be considered to be under the control of the 
intellect. Schopenhauer's case here is both intuitively powerful - particularly in a 
post-Freudian age such as ours - and convincingly argued and that there is much 
to be said for this approach is supported not only by the implicit support of some 
aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis and some aspects of Heideggerean 
phenomenology but also by the words of one leading commentator, who has 
remarked that Schopenhauer's amassed evidence presents a `massive challenge 
to the Kantian notion of the subject as pure, non-worldly, unitary, self-conscious 
and fully rational'65 
65 Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, 248. Much of Schopenhauer's evidence is 
assessed and found persuasive by Janaway at pp. 260-263. Let us remember here that the theme of 
the self as more than an abstract thinking being is also one of Kierkegaard's, specifically, for 
example, in his phenomenological analysis of Don Juan. 
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To develop this point a little by means of reference to the history of modern 
philosophy, Schopenhauer thus thinks that it is a philosophical falsification to 
suppose that we, qua human self, are primarily an abstract thinking being that 
conceives of willing as a product of thinking, after the manner of, say, Descartes 
or Locke, who wrote that. `To the question, what is it that determines the will? 
The true and proper answer is, the mind'66. Schopenhauer thus reverses what is 
arguably the traditional relation in modern philosophy between intellect and will: 
rather than being essentially soul or reason, Schopenhauer claims, we are 
essentially and most immediately - i. e. pre-reflectively - aware of ourselves not 
primarily as subjects of knowledge (though, somewhat mysteriously, we are also 
that67) but rather as subjects of affection and of non-spatially experienced bodily 
action. If we could only, Schopenhauer seems to be saying here, eschew the 
interpretation of the self which we have been handed down by the philosophical 
tradition, then we could see that we experience ourselves primarily as conalive 
and affective subjects. 
We have now roughly described the main elements of Schopenhauer's 
argument concerning self-knowledge: we introspectively know our self in the 
first place not as thinking mind at all but rather as will (will being composed of 
all affective states including the aspatial awareness of bodily action). If we thus 
accept such serviceably clear claims of Schopenhauer's, then we can be said to 
have a -posteriori knowledge of our self as willing. And as was earlier suggested 
in my brief methodological digression, I will accept these claims: I shall spend 
66 Locke, Air Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, XXI, 29, p 117. 
67 See note 69. 
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no time elaborating upon nor criticising the Schopenhauerian philosophy of the 
will and the self, even though, despite being fairly intuitively persuasive, 
Schopenhauer's formulations may prove to be far from unobjectionable when 
subjected to fine grained philosophical analysis (we might, for example, object 
that the `active and psychological' nature of will68 seems to be omitted by this 
account and/or that the model of self as will conflicts with the Kantian 
`transcendental' knowing self that Schopenhauer had earlier espoused69). I shall 
bypass these and other problems for the reason stated earlier: what interests me 
above all in the context of this study as a whole is Schopenhauer's attempt to use 
his philosophy of the self as will to exclude God from his monistic post-Kantian 
ontology; an exclusion which then - as we shall see in the next chapter - leads 
on to an important ethical argument against God and which only takes place 
when the argument about the self primarily being a willing self is allowed to get 
off the ground. 
Why, then, we ought now to ask, should the manner in which we know 
ourselves (i. e. as intensive will) be more indicative of the nature of the thing in 
itself than the manner in which we know other things (i. e. as extensive, spatio- 
temporal objects)? Of course, this kind of self knowledge is privileged over our 
68 Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer 's Philosophy, 226. 
69 Our understanding of the complexities of Schopenhauer's thinking on the self has been much 
advanced by C. Janawav's Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, the central thesis of 
which is that Schopenhauer has two competing and conflicting conceptions of the subject: as 
knower and as wilier (131). Janaway's conclusion is that Schopenhauer's philosophy can 
ultimately be made consistent only by interpreting the pure knowing subject as `conditional or 
apparent [... ] an illusion', (269). 
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knowledge of objects in the external world in Schopenhauer's method because it 
avoids the Kantian form of intuition that is space. Self knowledge is thus taken 
by Schopenhauer to bring us closer to the world as it is in itself (as it would be 
outside of the way we represent it). 
VI Analogy as a Method 
I have so far discussed the means by which Schopenhauer determines what is 
`the self. Schopenhauer further maintained however, not only that the self but 
that - rather more improbably, many readers will no doubt feel - the whole of 
the spatio-temporal world was essentially composed of what he called the `will'. 
How did he travel from the determination of the self as will to knowledge of the 
world as will? In point of fact, he does not need to. He has already determined 
the nature of the self as will and in very few pages, as we already know, he will 
numerically determine the world as a unity. So, since he has discovered the 
character of one part of a world that he will discover actually has no parts, his 
intuition of the will and the reduction of the intelligible world to one is all the 
argumentation Schopenhauer needs. Yet Schopenhauer demonstrably commits 
himself to such unnecessary argumentation, for he proceeds from the self as will 
to the world as will by an argument from analogy. He writes that: We shall 
judge all objects according to the analogy of this body' [W 1 105]. Clearly, an 
argument from analogy is being proposed at this point, even though we are not, 
strictly speaking, owed one. Which are the first objects to be so judged" 
The most obvious candidates for analogy from human willing are the non- 
human animals and this is precisely the route that Schopenhauer takes, laying the 
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blame squarely on Christianity for obscuring our kinship with them: 'Another 
fundamental defect of Christianity [... ] is that it has most unnaturally separated 
man from the animal world, to which in essence he nevertheless belongs. It now 
tries to accept man entirely by himself and regards animals positively as things' 
[PP II 370; see also BM 97]. Schopenhauer follows Aristotle in stressing that 
men are obviously separated from the animals by virtue of their possession of the 
ability to reason with abstract concepts (and so also by their supposedly closely 
related [FR 164] emotional ability both to laugh [W I 59] and to weep [W I 376]) 
but this fractional separation i. s not thought by Schopenhauer to be one of 
essence: `The essential and principal thing in the animal and man is the same [... ] 
in the intellect [Man's] superiority is traceable only to a greater development and 
hence to the somatic difference of a single part, the brain, and in particular, its 
quantity' [BM 178]. Quite apart from the issue of the relevance of his lateral 
criticism of Christianity (or indeed Judaism) here, it might be said that this 
analogy which Schopenhauer draws between human and animal willing may 
seem fairly persuasive, probably much more intuitively convincing than the 
argument, ascribed to the Cartesian philosophy, that animals are basically 
automata. This is a view which, despite being already found unappealing by 
contemporaries of Descartes, seems almost to be mirrored (albeit by default) in 
certain modern phenomenological methods of enquiry where the descriptive 
isolation of human subjectivity can engender weighty difficulties regarding the 
precise status of non-human animal subjectivity70. 
70 Heidegger's philosophical project, by means of illustration, involves expanding ontology so that 
subjectivity is ontologically categorised as well as objects, though the characteristics of 
subjectivity are of course found to be very different to the categories of objects, they are 'possible 
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Schopenhauer's argument from analogy thus arguably sits better with our 
intuitions about the lives of animals than does Cartesianism - and tie Judo 
phenomenological Cartesianism - by suggesting that animals are analogous to 
men in their essence, their willing. But it then cuts across our intuitions in its 
unlikely sounding suggestion that the same is as true for plants as it is for 
animals [W I 110]. What we humans share with the plants is not simply, as 
Aristotle had empirically surmised in his capacity as biologist, the nutritive 
faculty and our related ability to grow (or decay), since the often strongly 
unidirectional and sometimes forcible nature of plant growth suggests to 
Schopenhauer what we in the human world would term will. In this regard, in a 
ways for it to be, and no more than that'. These characteristics of subjectivity are technically called 
existentialia by Heidegger so as to rigorously distinguish them from the categories of Aristotle 
and other ancients and even those of Kant, who, in construing the categories epistemologically 
rather than ontologically in the Transcendental Analytic nevertheless, according to Heidegger, 
neglected existential categorisation. Heidegger is clear that these `existentialia and categories are 
the two basic possibilities for characters of being'; in other words, a table of existentialia and 
categories is both necessary and sufficient for a basic philosophic description of the world: `any 
entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence at hand)'- Yet as has often been 
remarked by commentators, this Heideggerean ontological distinction of our world into the realm 
of the "who" and of the "what" is not in fact sufficient for a general philosophical description of 
our world because it seems to neglect the lives of animals and plants. Accordingly, a little later we 
hear the concession that: 'Life is not a mere present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein'. Yet we never hear 
what, exactly, life is. Schopenhauer would regard this kind of hesitation or confusion over the 
issue of animality as a symptom of Heidegger falling victim to the (purportedly Christian) trap of 
regarding animals as things, even though it seems clear that Heidegger appears to have striven - 
albeit with little discernible success, at least in Being and Time - to avoid this. For the 
Heideggerean passages cited in this footnote, see Heidegger, Being and Time, 67,71,75. 
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collection of what Schopenhauer thought to be empirical and scientific 
corroborations of his theory of the will brought under the heading On the [Fill in 
Nature, nature's picturesque evidence is said to include the movement of the 
sunflower toward the light [WN 61] and mushrooms dislodging paving stones to 
emerge upwards into visibility [WN 69]. In a similar spirit, in The World as P V1// 
und Representation and On the Will in Nature, Schopenhauer then goes on to 
mention such inorganic natural occurrences which also seem to strikingly mirror 
the will as magnetism [W 1110], rushing water, electricity currents [W I 118] 
plunging waterfalls [W 11213] and celestial bodies gravitating toward each other 
[WN 85]. Such natural phenomena as these are all more or less clearly analogous 
to the human voluntaristic experience of will: `Everywhere in nature I see each 
particular phenomenon to be the work of a universal force active in thousands of 
similar phenomena' [W 11 470]. 
This is no doubt the most appropriate place to mention that in my description 
of Schopenhauer's method of analogy as a procedure in determining the nature 
of the nournenal world I am not only giving what I believe to be the most 
intuitively credible reading of Schopenhauer's text but I am also implicitly 
rejecting a recent interpretation of Schopenhauer that unusually denies the very 
existence of such an argument from analogy in his metaphysics. Such is the 
provocative but, to my mind, eventually unconvincing interpretation of J. E. 
Atwell, as found in his Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The 
Metaphysics of' Will. Here it is suggested that Schopenhauer is not essaying an 
argument from analogy at all: `The transference of self-knowledge to world 
understanding dges not', Atwell writes, `take place by means of an argument 
from analogy [... ] contrary to what Schopenhauer sometimes suggests himself 
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[... ] granted, there is a hint of such an argument'71. This point of view is clearly 
too extreme however, for there is substantially more than just a -hint' of an 
argument from analogy, as I have demonstrated in the previous paragraphs of 
this section72. Unless we accept that he did use this argument we have to accept 
the improbable claim that Schopenhauer repeatedly misstated his own position. 
This is the end result of Schopenhauer's sustained ontological and analogical 
argumentation from self-knowledge as will to the qualitative character of the 
unified thing in itself animals, plants and even the whole of the inorganic world 
is seen as the `objectification' of the universal wi1173. In addition to being the 
71 J. E. Atwell, Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will 
(California: University of California, 1995), 102. 
72 And in addition to the many passages I have just cited from The World as Will and On the Will 
in Nature where Schopenhauer manifestly strives to compare human willing with animals, plants 
and natural phenomena like electricity currents and waterfalls, there are also various other 
passages where a remarkable degree of methodological clarity is exhibited. At one stage, for 
instance, Schopenhauer tells us that the nature of the world is in us `and with the clue of the 
analogy with our inner nature it must be possible to unravel the rest' [W II 274, see also W II 
196]. Again in the supplementary essays of volume two, we read that `Everyone knows only one 
being quite immediately, namely his own will in self-consciousness- He knows everything else only 
mediately and then judges it by analogy with that one being' [W 113 21 ]. He also writes of organic 
natural phenomena that `oily from a comparison with what goes on within me when my body 
performs an action [... ] can I obtain an insight into the way in which those inanimate bodies change 
under the influence of causes, and thus understand their inner nature' [W 1125]. 
73 The necessity of using the word `objectification' in this context derives from acknowledging the 
nature of the relation obtaining between the will and the world, which has, on pain of 
contradiction, to be construed as a non-causal one. This is because Schopenhauer, like Kant, had 
argued that causality was but a feature of the understanding - he regards it as the first instance of 
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culmination of Schopenhauer's argument concerning the thing in itself it is also 
the conclusion of his atheistic argument from exclusion since given both the 
absence of any principle of individuation within the Kantian intelligible world 
outside space and time (where God, the theological summum bonum and our 
immortal souls were at least potentially taken to reside in Kants critical 
philosophy), together with the intuition of will as the essence of that world found 
through self-knowledge, one is forced to draw the conclusion that on 
Schopenhauerian premises God does not exist - as there is simply nowhere for 
him to exist. He cannot be sensed in the world of representation, as Kant had 
already pointed out, and the thing in itself - where Kant thought that He might 
exist beyond the possibility of human sensation - is found by Schopenhauer not 
to be a holy kingdom at all but rather to be one non-divine, non-wise, non- 
benevolent, non-personal `will'74 
the principle of sufficient reason - and so could only be applied to phenomena. What 
`objectification' itself actually consists in however, I follow Schopenhauer in leaving it to the 
reader to determine. 
74 Schopenhauer has demonstrated that, starting from Kantian assumptions about the ideality of 
space and time, one can draw a thoroughly atheistic ontological conclusion - unless one lapses 
into a variant of Platonism and posits a world of timeless and spaceless but nevertheless 
distinguishable objects. Frege thought that natural numbers could be construed as such anti- 
Kantian objects and Schopenhauer's own `grades' might be considered for such a role (see 
Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 1011 see also B. 
Magee, The Philosophy of , Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 243). 1 am not 
however, going to press this objection against Schopenhauer because it seems to me there are two 
important objections that can be raised against Schopenhauer's exclusion argument against God at 
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VII Some Points of Criticism 
I have just given an account of the main steps of Schopenhauer's central and 
ambitiously metaphysical argument in The World as Will and Representation, an 
argument which excludes God from the Kantian noumenal universe by replacing 
Him with what we might term a universal will. We are therefore now in a 
position to enlarge upon a couple of key criticisms that might be raised against 
Schopenhauer's endeavour that seems to lead so effortlessly from Kant's 
philosophy, through deepened self-knowledge, to atheism. The point of this 
investigation will be to show that Schopenhauer's philosophy is vulnerable to 
one of the objections and so therefore cannot be regarded as proving God's 
inexistence from Kantian premises (quite apart from any Platonic or Fregean 
misgivings75 concerning the possibility of non-spatio-temporal differentiation: 
the real shortcomings of Schopenhauerian metaphysics are, in my view, to be 
found elsewhere). The objections that I will look at are twofold and both concern 
the legitimacy of the claim that inner experience, as experience outside space, is 
closer to the thing in itself - and thus to the ontological `space' where God might 
be found - than all other forms of experience. The first objection will turn out to 
be unsuccessful however but it will nevertheless be illuminating to see in what 
way in is so unsuccessful, especially as it is an objection that naturally springs to 
this point without our having to espouse an alternative metaphysical commitment of dubious 
status. 
75 See note 74. 
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mind when one is made aware of certain other, apparently inconsistent, features 
of Schopenhauerian thought. 
I 
The first objection. which I would like to consider to Schopenhauer's 
exclusion argument against the existence of God, an argument which suggests 
that the blind feeling of will that we experience in movement and affection 
suffuses our entire universe, is one concerning the consistency of the 
Schopenhauerian system as a whole. More specifically, it draws upon a part of 
Schopenhauer's characterisation of the sense of hearing. For Schopenhauer - in 
the broader context of a rather Aristotelian passage concerning the senses - 
states that hearing, like willing, involves the a -priori form of time but not of 
space [W II 28]. Yet we might object here that if hearing is non-spatial then it 
too should surely be eligible for being an experience of the thing in itself - yet it 
remains stubbornly unlike such an experience, thereby giving us a strong reason 
to disbelieve that the will (also a non-spatial experience) is an experience of the 
thing in itself As this objection may also be put: since willing and hearing are 
both non-spatial experiences and since it is by virtue of its non-spatiality that 
willing brings us closer to the thing-in-itself, why are not hearing and willing 
more similar? Three possible answers to this objection might be made on 
Schopenhauer's behalf 
In the first place, we might say that hearing can actually be an experience of 
will. In his `metaphysics of music', for example, Schopenhauer declares music to 
be not only 'in time alone without any reference to space' [W 11453] but also the 
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sole art form which communicates an experience of the will directly to us: 
-Music is as immediate an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world 
itself is [... ] Music is by no means like the other arts' [W I 257]. Schopenhauer 
influenced Nietzsche in his unconditional rejection of `descriptive' music, so for 
him music is an art form qualitatively different from all others in that it does not 
seem to represent anything - so it cannot, unlike all the other arts (except 
perhaps architecture and dance, which Schopenhauer curiously ignores in this 
connection) relate to the world of the Platonic ideas (here I am anticipating a 
theme I shall introduce in the next chapter). Unlike Kant, who remarked that `of 
all the arts poetry [... ] maintains the first rank' [CJ 170], Schopenhauer therefore 
regards music as occupying the most distinguished place amongst the arts, and 
his decision in this regard will influence Nietzsche's The Birth of' Tragedy from 
the Spirit of Music as much as Kant's preference will inform Heidegger's The 
Origin of the Work of Art. 
It thus seems to follow for Schopenhauer that music "mirrors" the pure will; it 
is, in other words, a form of hearing that is an experience of willing76. But there 
is also another form of hearing that is purportedly an experience of willing: 
76 However, Malcolm Budd has argued that music does not, according to Schopenhauer, excite 
the will of the listener - and so is not an experience of the will after all - but rather represents an 
analogue of the human will. Budd has further argued that here we must understand the word 
`represent' here in a non-literal way: music presents neither concepts nor images to capture the 
will but rather is itself a structural counter-part to the form of the metaphysical will as manifested 
in time, e. g. by the way its melodies are resolved or unresolved: the satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
of the will is analogued through consonance and dissonance in music, Music and the Emotions 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 90-95. 
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hearing a `voice'. Closely following the Aristotelian - and no doubt broadly 
correct - distinction between `voice' and 'speech', the former of which applies 
to both non-human animals and men77, Schopenhauer writes: `The animal voice 
serves only to express excitement and agitation of the will: the human however. 
serves also to express knowledge; this is consistent with the fact that the former 
almost always makes an unpleasant impression upon us' [PP 11 565]. This 
passage includes another form of hearing in addition to hearing music in the 
experience of will and it further explains why hearing human speech seems not 
to involve the will - i. e. because its propositional content obscures the emotional 
charge inherent in its vocal articulation. Schopenhauer thus concedes that both 
hearing music and hearing voice are experiences of the will, so to some degree 
the non-spatial experience of hearing can be regarded as an experience of the 
will. Nevertheless, since hearing qua hearing and not only hearing either music 
or expressive voice takes place in time but not space - at least according to 
Schopenhauer: one could conceivably argue that space is required for sound but I 
shall leave this point pass - one feels that Schopenhauer is being inconsistent in 
only attributing the experience of will to certain forms of audible perception. 
The second possible way of attempting to deal with this problem of hearing 
not giving us an experience of the thing in itself not only claims that hearing can 
be an experience of will but further claims that all hearing is in fact an 
experience of the will. Such an argument is supported by the thought that since 
hearing is a perception that is always a pain or pleasure, it is consequently also 
an experience of the will as much as is the feeling accompanying bodily 
77 See Aristotle, The Politic., 1253a. 
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movement. But Schopenhauer himself did not accept this `hedonic' view of 
hearing78: `There are [... ] a certain few impressions on the body which do not 
rouse the will [... ] the impressions are therefore to be regarded directly as mere 
representations [... ] here are meant the affections of the purely objective senses 
of sight, hearing and touch' [W 1101]. There would, in any case, seem to be only 
an unproved empirical basis for such a claim that every perception contained a 
degree of pleasure and pain. This empirical basis has above all been debated by 
Berkeley scholars discussing Berkeley's conflation of qualities with hedonic 
states but it is still to find any lasting consensus amongst such scholars: whilst A. 
C. Grayling, for example, has exhorted us to place our finger over the flame of a 
candle and see whether the resulting sensation is simple or compound, his own 
view being that it is a simple sensation (and not one of both pain and the flame's 
heat's), other keen arguments, often similarly phenomenological in form, have 
been advanced to the contrary: A. A. Luce, for instance, has claimed that there 
can sometimes be a `perceptible time interval' between sensation and pain8O 
Even dogmatically siding with Grayling and accepting the Berkeleian thought 
that sense perception in extreinis is nothing but a pain or pleasure there is still a 
strong and obvious disanalogy between the spaceless inner experience of 
voluntary movement (which is always experienced as will) and the spaceless 
experience of hearing (which is only very rarely experienced as will related - the 
78 Not in The World as Will and Representation, at any rate. For the controversial claim that 
Schopenhauer extends his view to include representations as affecting the will (just as Berkeley 
did) in a later text, see C. Janaway, `Will and Nature', in his Companion, pp. 138-170,155. 
79 A. C. Grayling, Berkeley (London: Duckworth, 1986), 69. 
80 A. A. Luce, cited in Tipton, Berkeley: The Philosopkv of Immaterialism, 229. 
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senses of smell or taste seem much better placed to play this role, as is of course 
implicitly evidenced by their exclusion from Schopenhauer's reference to the 
`purely objective senses of sight, hearing and touch'). And if the phenomenology 
of hearing does not give us access to the will except in extremely rare and special 
cases we are still in no way afforded better access to the will through this 
particular non-spatial experience. 
I have discussed the first two attempted responses to this objection and have 
seen that they have been ultimately unavailing: no truly satisfactory explanation 
of why willing always reveals the noumenon but hearing does not has been 
offered by either response. There remains however, a final and more successful 
answer to this objection which has been provided by D. W. Hamlyn and which 
does successfully distinguish willing from other non-spatial experiences. 
Hamlyn's way of answering the problem generated by the epistemological 
disanalogy between the spaceless experience of hearing and that of willing is 
therefore not - as above - to partially or wholly conflate them in a more or less 
surprising way but rather to argue that willing affords us better access to the 
thing in itself than does hearing for the reason that non-spatial experiences such 
as hearing (not his example) are markedly different from willing. The relevant 
point here is that experiences such as hearing are nonetheless still 
representational experiences whilst affective experience as will is not. Hamlyn 
thus provides a strong distinguishing characteristic that willing does not share 
with any other non-spatial experience, and we may justifiably take this 
distinguishing characteristic to account for why it allows access to the monistic, 
noumenal world, principally as representations belong, by their very nature, to a 
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pluralistic world8l. The objection that hearing is an aspatial experience as much 
as willing is but does not reveal the thing in itself (or the same kind of thing in 
itself, at any rate) thus ultimately fails because hearing is significantly different 
from willing insofar as it remained tied to the phenomenal world of 
representation. This, it seems to me, is the right way of dispatching the objection 
that aspatial. experiences other than willing, like hearing, could give us access to 
the thing in itself. Nevertheless, it has been instructive to see precisely how this 
objection does so fail, if only because it affords us an example of the hazards of 
following a very long line of philosophical critics and thinking of the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy as being so patently internally inconsistent that it 
needs little attention. 
We have taken this particular objection concerning hearing, through many 
twists and turns, as far as it can go. But it has led us into a dead end: aspatial 
experiences such as hearing were significantly different from willing in that they 
failed to escape representation, that is, they were always representations 
presented to a separate knowing consciousness, not feelings of the monistic 
whole. We are not stuck at this argumentative impasse however, as 
81 Hamlyn, Schopenhauer, 37_ Janaway remarks: `His thinking is that if there is a way of knowing 
something about oneself which is not at all a matter of representation, then it is bound to provide 
access to oneself considered not as representation' Self and World in Schopenhauer 's Philosophy, 
192. Hamlyn, 1 should point, further demands `at least the additional premise that anything that is 
not a representation is a thing in itself, 93.1 suggest above that such a premise be linked with the 
notion of representations belonging to a pluralistic ontology (i. e. there being no subject/object 
divide in affective experience). 
Schopenhauer's exclusion argument against God is vulnerable to a second and 
rather different kind of criticism, as we shall see presently. 
II 
The final problem that I would like to look at can now be levelled against 
Schopenhauer's attempt to exclude God from the realm of the thing in itself. 
This objection is one that takes as its target the claim that since we can never, as 
subjects of experience, escape the form of time (`Before Kant [... ] we were in 
time; now time is in us' [PP I 85] Schopenhauer writes"), then inner experience 
is a phenomenal experience that is nearer to the intelligible world than any other 
as it is an experience that has shed one of our two forms of intuition. This claim, 
I now want to argue, is not an uncontentious point even if one accepts 
Schopenhauerian premises, as can be demonstrated by an examination of a 
problem that Schopenhauer himself pointed to in his remark that: `Our self- 
consciousness has not space as its form but only time' [W II 137; cf also FFR 
48]. He more often graphically uses one of his many metaphors to point to this 
problem, as when he states that in his philosophy the thing in itself has to a great 
extent cast off its veils but does not appear quite naked' [W 11 197]. Here, as in 
many other places, Schopenhauer therefore admits that the identification of the 
noumenal world with the will in his philosophy is problematic in so far as our 
xý This view of the history of philosophy surprisingly simply ignores Berkeley's pre-Kantian 
contribution to the philosophy of time, wherein time was similarly internal to us, being simply the 
succession of our ideas. 
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experience of the will is still bound to the form of inner intuition or time whereas 
the noumenal world is free even of this residual phenomenal commitment. 
The philosopher and sociologist, George Simmel, has endorsed the use of 
Schopenhauer's metaphor in the ensuing manner: `If we follow Schopenhauer 
closely we realise that even will in ourselves is not regarded as being-in-itself 
(Ding an sich) [... ] will itself is a phenomenon, though the one which the 
impenetrable veil covering our absolute being is the thinnest'83. From which it 
follows that what Schopenhauer's argument from phenomenological intuition of 
the self as willing proves is, as perhaps might not be realised at first blush, rather 
limited. For it shows not that the thing in itself is will at all but has rather now 
dwindled into the much weaker claim that only the phenomenal world minus 
space as a form of intuition is will. But then the most that Schopenhauer's 
metaphysics shows is that will is an element of the phenomenal world; arguably 
at the edge of that world but nevertheless still within its limits. Assuming that 
removing space from experience does indeed bring us closer to the thing in itself, 
then we can further identify the noumenon with the will we experience in time 
(but not space). But scepticism about precisely this assumption - that is, about 
how far the world of the thing in itself actually resembles the phenomenal world 
without space - is entirely possible. It is in this spirit that Janaway has objected 
that `there can in principle be no guarantee that a smaller number of subjective 
forms of the understanding takes us nearer the thing in itself than a larger 
G. Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 
ý, ýý. 
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number does'84 - an abstract point which Julian Young has elsewhere 
illuminated by means of a concrete illustration: 
That it is not the case that the apparent features of an object are the more likely to 
correspond to its true features the fewer `filters' or `veils' it is seen through can be seen 
by observing that grass is perceived with greater verisimilitude through a blue filter 
superimposed upon a yellow filter than through a yellow filter alone. 85 
Not only is this stark and sceptical objection concerning our access to the world 
of the thing in itself in the Schopenhauerian system both serious and without any 
obvious answer but Schopenhauer himself, as I have already mentioned, not only 
frequently and openly recognises this shortfalling in his argument as a 
methodological difficulty in arriving at the thing in itself through the will but he 
also, far from attempting to remedy it, admits it to be an insoluble problem. This 
might or might not be to his moral credit as an individual - and authors from 
Nietzsche to Simmel have disputed the question of whether Schopenhauer's 
system was wrongly imposed upon his insights or whether those insights, to turn 
the point on its head, broke through his system with a disarming honesty - but it 
clearly does his system, qua system of philosophy, no good at all. 
It remains true that whether, after acknowledging this crucially significant 
shortfall in Schopenhauer's argument, we then go on to construe the will as the 
thing in itself in appearance and therefore as a wholly phenomenal entity (a line 
that Atwell takes in Schopenhauer on the Character of the World) or whether we 
84 Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophv, 197. 
J. Young, Willing and Uint'llling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, 30. 
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construe the will, in more intricate terms, as situated in a third ontological realm 
that is certainly distinct from the noumenal world but is equally distinct from the 
phenomenal world as well (the approach of Young in Willing and (Jnwilling) is, 
as should scarcely need emphasising, of fundamental importance for the 
Schopenhauer scholar. It is equally evident however, that it would constitute 
something of a digression here in a discussion of Schopenhauer's exclusion 
argument against God: for once it has been established (and we have seen 
enough to be able to understand that it has indeed been established) that we 
cannot - cannot in principle - be certain that the noumenal thing in itself is the 
kind of bleak and manifestly undivine will that we familiarly experience in 
bodily movement and affection then Schopenhauer's exclusion argument against 
God, which rests entirely on the identification that has just been put in question, 
can no longer be regarded as being wholly conclusive. But this is not to say that 
we can reinstate God as a separate, transcendent creator of the world back into 
the realm of the Schopenhauerian thing in itself We cannot successfully carry 
through this particular pro-theological move because of the fact that 
Schopenhauer has already convincingly argued that there is a lack of means of 
individuation in the realm of the thing in itself and his particular argument to this 
effect is not at all. troubled by the pennanency, for true Kantians, of the form of 
time in human perception. Nevertheless, the possibility of an immanent God 
remains, an `absolute', perhaps of the generic form associated with those very 
German idealists whom Schopenhauer seems to have so despised. 
VIII Conclusion 
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If we accept the conceptual framework of Kantian transcendental idealism, 
and I have provisionally done so in this study, it seems that if we want a personal 
creator God to be wholly separate from his creation then we are also committed 
to finding a non-spatio-temporal means of individuation; which is something that 
Kant singularly failed to do. At the end of this chapter, we are now in a position 
to add that if we also accept the subsequent argumentative framework of 
Schopenhauerian thought, it seems to follow that if we want an absolutely 
atheistic ontology, then we are furthermore committed to categorically 
identifying the absolutely `naked' thing in itself that lies outside space and time 
with the `veiled' experience of insatiable will with which we are familiar with in 
time. And this is something that Schopenhauer did not - and given his Kantian 
premises and assumptions, could not - do. 
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4. Schopenhauer II: Questionable Features of Life and Imaginary Benefits of 
Death 
I Introduction 
Reading the foregoing chapter might well have convinced one that it is Arthur 
Schopenhauer, above all, who has tried - albeit unsuccessfully - to 
accommodate modern post-Kantian philosophy to a bleak vision of a Godless 
and even hostile metaphysical ontology. But his problematic attempt to identify 
the Kantian `noumenal' world with an undifferentiated and even savage will was 
not Schopenhauer's sole argument for the non-existence of God: Schopenhauer's 
resolute attachment to, of all things, Christian morality supplied him with a 
further reason for disbelieving in God's existence; an argument which we shall 
be examining - and in part, reconstructing - in the first part of the present 
chapter. Later in the chapter we shall also be examining Schopenhauer's 
surprising introduction of the notion of a non-theistic salvation into his system, 
primarily because this was an account that Nietzsche took great pains to discredit 
in his writings, on the grounds that since Schopenhauer's philosophy retained 
any such notion of salvation it was still to be regarded as being tied to a residual 
religious bias; indeed, at one stage Nietzsche wrote that it was to be considered 
as `merely the heir of the Christian interpretation' [TI 102]. Nietzsche thought 
that the Schopenhauerian - like the Christian - valorisation of a painless world 
over our terrestrial one was to be physiologically explained as the preference of 
an ailing constitution. Programmatically outlining the Schopenhauerian account 
of salvation, where the structural tie obtaining between the concept of salvation 
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and of present dissatisfaction is often quite self-consciously explicit - as are its 
ties to Christianity - will therefore prove to be of obvious benefit in preparing us 
for an examination of Nietzsche's approach to what he takes to be the `religious 
mentality' or `ascetic ideal' in the following two chapters. 
The specific line of approach that I propose in this chapter will be as follows. 
Firstly, I would like to describe Schopenhauer's moral theory. This first part of 
the chapter will also involve a reconstruction of Schopenhauer's argument 
concerning ethics in the fourth book of The World as Will and Representation 
and related texts, such a reconstruction being necessary due to the lack of 
scholarly consensus as to the exact nature of Schopenhauer's argument. I will 
look at three of the most plausible possible construals of Schopenhauer's 
justification of ethics. After my consideration of these alternatives and my 
eventual espousal of a reconstruction of Schopenhauer's argument along one of 
these lines, I shall then look at his criticism of the assumed existence of God as 
supported by his ethics. I would then like to show how this moral criticism of 
God could possibly be countered along just one of the traditional lines of 
Christian theodicy. I will then further demonstrate that a counter-objection to 
Schopenhauer along traditional lines of Christian theodicy is, in fact, superfluous 
in so far as the Schopenhauerian ethical objection to God already heavily relies, 
in a sense that I shall explain, upon certain metaphysical elements of the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy which are assumed to be true (from which it 
follows that Schopenhauer's ethical argument is vulnerable to criticism on the 
same grounds as his metaphysics). As it may also be put, after my philosophical 
reconstruction of Schopenhauer's argument concerning ethics, I will then show 
how Schopenhauer's moral argument against the existence of God is flawed at 
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very basic conceptual level. I am aware that it could well be objected at this 
point that in actually providing a specific philosophical foundation (by means of 
reconstruction) which I then proceed to treat as a stalking horse throughout the 
first part of this chapter, I have done nothing other than construct a straw man. 
This particular objection however, assumes that there are many other 
interpretations of Schopenhauer's ethics to be chosen between that are equally 
coherent. In what follows, I will concede that there is indeed one other 
supportable and coherent interpretation of the foundations of Schopenhauerian 
ethics but this other construal shares, as I shall point out, precisely the same 
pivotal assumption which proved the downfall of my own favoured 
interpretation. To close the present chapter I will, as already mentioned, finally 
turn to Schopenhauer's quasi-Christian account of salvation. The approach of 
this latter part of the chapter will be primarily elucidatory rather then critical and 
I will be concerned there to indicate how Schopenhauer's model of salvation 
(and in my description I will confine myself, for reasons that I shall explain, to 
its aesthetic ramification) shares certain central features with the traditional 
model of Christian redemption. First, however, I would like to examine 
Schopenhauer's ethical theory and then turn to the question of how it is used to 
argue against the existence of God. 
II The Right to Remain Compassionate (Phenomenology of the Passions) 
Schopenhauer, unlike Nietzsche, was unwilling to entertain even the suspicion 
that Christian ethical claims might be as culture bound as its theological beliefs - 
he explicitly asserts the contrary - and his writings on ethics accordingly tend, on 
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the whole, to reflect this (by Nietzschean standards) blithe attachment to the 
essentials of Western, Christian morality. His thoughts concerning morality are 
principally to be found in the fourth section of the World as Will and 
Representation and in On the Basis of Morality, a much shorter, self-contained 
philosophical text on ethics. Yet whilst the arguments of these two texts may not 
exactly parallel each other in every detail -a point that will bear repeating - the 
main line of reasoning is alike throughout both. But there does not seem to be 
any general consensus about the nature of some of the basic philosophical 
assumptions underlying this main line of speculation. 
The outline of what can be agreed upon by commentators however, goes 
roughly as follows. Schopenhauer, unlike Kant, does not start with a certain 
conceptual determination of morality and so himself strives to avoid formulating 
an abstract `moral law', preferring examining the actual motives of human 
conduct as he sees them to a-priorism in ethics, drawing up as he goes an 
empirical short list that includes egoism, malice and compassion. These three 
motives he regards as the basic data of any ethical theory and to counter the 
potential objection that he has assumed such data to be transhistorical without 
any argument whatsoever he amasses various examples from history, literature 
and the theatre (Shakespeare is a favourite place that Schopenhauer raids for 
support) throughout the ages to convince us that egoism, malice and compassion 
are standard human motives. This methodology of foraging in universal human 
experience and history to find standard norms of human motivation was quite 
common to earlier - i. e. pre-Kantian - British ethical theorists. And although 
Schopenhauer - as far as I am aware - nowhere admits his debt to British 
empiricism in ethics, the outlines of his general methodological position had 
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already been quite well stated by David Hume in his Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding: 
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history infonns us of nothing 
new in that particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal 
principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and 
situations, and furnishing us with material from which we may [... ] become acquainted 
with the regular springs of human action and behaviour86 
It is not however, Hume who provides Schopenhauer with the most observable 
influence in this specific regard but rather it is Hume's own friend and mentor, 
Francis Hutcheson: these Schopenhauerian classes of human motivation (egoism, 
malice and compassion) correspond extremely closely to those laid down by the 
Eighteenth century British empiricist and moral sense theorist Hutcheson in his 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense, where Hutcheson categorises the reasons that 
excite us to action into: `self-love, self-hatred, or desire of private misery (if this 
be possible), Benevolence toward others or Malice'87. In fact, so closely do 
Schopenhauer's and Hutcheson's lists correspond that the only difference 
between Hutcheson's empirical division and Schopenhauer's is that the former 
tentatively and provisionally accepts the desire for misery (i. e. what nowadays 
we might designate `masochism') as a motive. 
86 D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 83. 
87 F. Hutcheson, Illustrations on the : Moral Sense, in Collected Works (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 
1971), Vol. II, 216. 
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Leaving to one side the question of Hutcheson's actual influence on 
Schopenhauer, we might point out that from this belief that there are a certain 
select amount of human motivations to the deeper and rather more controversial 
assumption that there are a corresponding select amount of generic human 
character types is quite a leap - but it is nonetheless a leap that Schopenhauer 
makes unreservedly, backed up once again by examples from history (the essay 
On the Freedom of the Will presents examples which are to my mind more 
persuasive than those Hume presents to suggest uniformity in human behaviour 
in his Enquiry), literature and drama. Hence Schopenhauer claims to have further 
discovered - and it will no doubt seem an extremely improbable `discovery' to 
many of his readers - that there exist three or four main human ethical character 
types, types which correspond to the main motives of human conduct and into 
which individuals are simply born and out of which they cannot be converted. As 
it may also be put, these character types are inborn and inescapable. 
Schopenhauer thus allows no room for either psychoanalytic or Aristotelian 
theories of the development of human moral character in infancy, either by 
socio-sexual circumstances or by the form of moral upbringing, respectively. He 
is therefore committed to the extremely counter-intuitive view that a child raised 
by a morally indifferent and possibly even vicious guardians would be as likely 
to turn out to be a moral adult as would a child raised by earnest and morally 
concerned ones. He is also committed to the similarly counter-intuitive position 
of rejecting the notion of moral immaturity". Irrespective of the question of how 
88 Schopenhauer's views also seem to conflict with the intuition that we are responsible for 
something only if we could have done otherwise - but there are in any case well known objections 
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far Schopenhauer's views on the constancy of moral character minor those of 
Kant, they are nonetheless views that, as I have illustrated, sit uneasily with some 
modem ethical sensibilities (specifically those concerned with the necessity of a 
moral education). However that may be, these innate and immutable groups are 
said to include the egoist, the malicious person and the altruist. Briefly put, the 
egoist is someone who is above all systematically concerned with his own well 
being; the altruist is someone who is largely selflessly compassionate and the 
malicious person is a selflessly cruel individual. Now, I rather ambiguously said 
three or four above because although in On the Basis of Morality Schopenhauer 
elaborates only the three mentioned types, later, in a footnote to the second 
volume of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer amends this 
tripartite taxonomy of the ultimate motives of human conduct by the addition of 
a purportedly hitherto suppressed fourth category of unalterable character: the 
person who is concerned with his own woe, which is to say, the masochist (recall 
that Hutcheson, too, equivocated over admitting `self-hatred' into his catalogue 
of motives). Further, it seems that this apparent change of view, which seems 
finally to close the slight distance between Schopenhauer's moral theory and that 
of Hutcheson, is not a change of view at all but rather a tactic of strategic 
prudence with which Schopenhauer approached the philosophical audience of 
his day: this fourth motive had to be passed over in silence, since the prize 
question was stated in the spirit of the philosophical ethics prevailing in 
Protestant Europe' [W 11607 n6]. 
to such an intuitive concept of responsibility which makes avoidability a necessary condition 
(Frankfurt cases). 
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Yet it is clear, Schopenhauer thinks, that only the motive of compassion, as 
manifested by the unalterably altruistic character type, could really be regarded 
as an authentically moral one. Schopenhauer thus seemingly relies upon the self- 
evidently moral nature of compassion. However, such an appeal to what we 
would approve of as being moral is problematic in so far as it seems to take for 
granted two things. First, that we are sufficiently reflective, informed and 
impartial at the very moment of such an approval89. And second, that our 
empirical appeals to self-evidence would really reflect a consensus of opinion. 
And yet, certainly, this latter condition scarcely seems to hold. Kant, to cite just 
one instance, had explicitly argued against the specifically moral nature of 
emotions such as pity in the Groundwork and elsewhere as a part of his general 
downplaying of the moral role of the emotions (Nietzsche cites more examples 
of philosophers who doubted the moral worth of compassion in section five of 
the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, where he remarks, with no doubt a 
certain amount of exaggeration, `up till now, philosophers were agreed to the 
worthlessness of pity'). I think it true to say that Schopenhauer never really 
seriously and satisfactorily confronts this problem concerning moral 
disagreement; indeed, to my knowledge he never recognises it as a problem at 
all. Nevertheless, the lack of consensus on the subject of compassion's moral 
nature does not amount to a devastating objection to Schopenhauer's ethics of 
compassion because Schopenhauer also supplies a powerful metaphysical reason 
to justify compassionate actions. 
89 See H. Jensen, Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson 's Moral Theory (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 54. 
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Rehearsing the main argument of Schopenhauer's ethical methodology as 
presented so far, we can say it is thus in the first place empirical and descriptive 
(after the manner of the empiricists, Hutcheson and Hume): finding the real 
motivations of human action and then asking which considerations we would 
approve of as being self-evidently moral. The only one we can ascribe a self- 
evidently moral character to, he thinks, is compassion. He therewith interprets 
compassion - i. e. the welfare of others being the motive of my actions - as 
resting upon some sort of metaphysically justified identification with the other. It 
is at this point however, as Schopenhauer starts to go beyond metaphysically 
innocuous empirical description and into the area of speculative justification, 
marrying British empiricism with German idealism, that commentators lose the 
thread of Schopenhauer's precise line of reasoning, necessitating its 
philosophical reconstruction. 
III Ethics Reconstructed 
Schopenhauer's insufficient clarity with regard to the main proof structure of 
his justification of ethics makes possible a number of understandings or 
misunderstandings. I would now like to look at - and indeed adjudicate between 
- three central ways in which commentators have philosophically reconstructed 
Schopenhauer's argument justifying compassion, beginning with the argument 
that I should now admit I favour, which could be called the noumenally egoistic 
interpretation. 
According to the noumenally egoistic interpretation, what Schopenhauer 
seems to be noting is that the kind of identification with the other that 
l2ý 
compassion manifests is not only self-evidently moral but actually 
metaphysically appropriate or legitimated for the following reason. Since it has 
been established through intuition and analogy that there exists an ultimate 
ontological identity between all existents beyond the principle of individuation 
(space and time), so it could be said that when in the world of space and time we 
hurt another being, on a more profound ontological level we are just hurting 
ourselves: `In this root point of existence the difference of beings ceases' [W 11 
325]. Therefore the man who is compassionate in his dealings with others is in 
fact acting in accordance with the metaphysical truth that behind the apparent 
difference of beings is a so-called `root point', where the difference between him 
and others is annulled. We might say that, ontologically, our relationship to the 
noumena is one of identity and that, normatively, we should actively identify 
with it. Schopenhauer can therefore say that `to be just, noble and benevolent is 
nothing but to translate my metaphysics into actions' [W II 600]. The 
compassionate man is thus, so to speak, a noumenal egoist, believing it to be 
irrational to hurt others because they are, on one level, extensions of oneself and 
oneself an extension of them (in the vocabulary of contemporary meta-ethics, 
this gives us an `internal reason' to be moral). This interpretation has been 
acknowledged as the correct one by, amongst others, D. W. Hamlyn, who has 
said of Schopenhauer: `His view of morality reduces itself in the end to one 
based on prudence'90. On this view, of the various kinds of emotional response 
that we can possibly respond to our human situation with, only compassion is 
self-evidently moral and we are in fact justified in being compassionate to others 
90 D. W. Hamlyn, Schopenhauer, 139. 
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on this spatio-temporal side of the noumenal-phenomenal divide because on the 
other side, beyond space and time, we are all one and so harming other beings is 
irrational in the sense that it is fundamentally harming the essence of our self. I 
mentioned earlier however, that not all commentators accept this reading of 
Schopenhauer's ethics as noumenal egoism. 
It would not be inappropriate to mention here that one commentator, Hans- 
Johann Glock, has recoiled from interpreting Schopenhauer in the way that 1 
have just done because it `would turn altruism into a gigantic form of egoism'91 
Patrick Gardiner has similarly censured the reduction of compassion to egoism92. 
Yet if this class of objection is to amount to more than the view that questioning 
compassion is in itself in some way morally suspect, then it must be interpreted 
to mean that the Schopenhauerian reduction of compassion to egoism - albeit to 
noumenal egoism - contradicts a view expressed earlier by Schopenhauer: that 
the actual motives of human conduct (as he sees them) include true compassion. 
In this spirit, Janaway has remarked that the `strange kind of egoism' involved 
here rules out genuine compassion, which `surely presupposes belief in 
distinctness as a minimum condition'93. However, interpreting Schopenhauer as 
eventually reading compassion as something other than genuine only seems to 
me to generate a verbal contradiction which can itself be erased by recognising 
here the oft mentioned developmental or `dramatic' character of Schopenhauer's 
philosophy; that is to say, by seeing Schopenhauer as initially presenting an 
91 Hans-Johann Glock, `Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein' in C. Janaway, ed., Companion, 422- 
458,449. 
92 P. Gardiner, Schopenhauer (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1963), 276-77. 
93 C. Janaway, Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 83. 
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essentially incomplete view in earlier parts of his text which will then be 
supplemented or even supplanted by a metaphysically deeper account (it is this 
model of textual arrangement that A. Philonenko recognised in his comment that 
`L'oeuvre de Schopenhauer est comparable ä une spirale'94). Also, interpreting 
Schopenhauer as ultimately rendering compassion as something other than 
genuine in fact solves a more serious problem that his earlier account had 
generated for how genuine compassion can reside in human nature is deeply 
mysterious given that the human being is a naturally egoistic expression of the 
will to life'95 
Janaway however, himself goes on to propose a different interpretation of 
Schopenhauer's defence of compassion. I would now like to say a few words 
about this, our second reconstructed account. According to Janaway's 
reconstruction of the argument concerning compassion, what might ground 
compassionate actions is the idea that, though individuals are indeed separate, 
there is nothing very distinguished about the individual that 1 am. `If the beggar 
and I are both equal portions of the same underlying reality, equal manifestations 
of the same will to life, ' Janaway writes, `then from the point of view of the 
world as a whole, it is a matter of indifference whether my ends are promoted or 
the beggars thwarted, or vice versa'96. This `indifference to individuality' thesis 
is arguably capable of grounding compassion and is indeed supportable by the 
texts. One possible objection to this line of argument however, is that if it really 
is a matter of such indifference whether mine or the beggar's ends are promoted 
94 A. Philonenko, Schopenhauer: une Philosophie de la tragedie (Paris: Vrin, 1980), 11. 
95 Janaway, Schopenihauer, 82. 
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then there is no more reason to stop me being partisan than there is to let me 
vigorously promote my selfish ends. I am not going to pursue this specific 
criticism at any length however, since I want only to note that both my - and 
Hamlyn's - favoured `noumenal egoist' and Janaway's somewhat different 
`indifference to individuality' thesis presuppose that underlying our phenomenal 
(spatio-temporal) differences we are in fact one in a profoundly ontological 
sense; we are, in Janaway's words `equal portions of the same underlying 
reality'. Both interpretations; in other words, share the assumption of monism97 
Turning now to a third possible reconstruction of Schopenhauer's ethics, 
another response to the problem would be to point to the self-evident nature of 
compassion and claim that this alone can ground our ethics in Schopenhauerian 
moral philosophy. This alternative of reconstructing Schopenhauerian moral 
philosophy simply on the basis of the evidentness of compassion being morally 
good was suggested to me by a remark made by Dieter Henrich. In the context of 
a discussion of Schopenhauer's and Hegel's criticism. of Kant's moral theory, 
Henrich has claimed that 'Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion [... ] stands 
96 Ibid., 84. 
97 In his Schopenhauer: The Human Character, J. E. Atwell points out a difficulty regarding our 
linking of Schopenhauerian monism and compassion: when intuiting the thing in itself `I am facing 
something that I am more likely to shrink from in horror than I am to sympathise with [... ] how 
could one have compassion for the will-to-live? ', 123. The answer to this objection - an answer 
which Atwell accepts - involves reverting to the findings of my previous chapter: i. e. that the 
brutal phenomenal will is not necessarily the noumenal oneness we experience. 
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entirely in the tradition of the moral-sense school'98. Henrich thus seems to think 
that Schopenhauer, like Hutcheson, is something of a moral sense theorist. To 
the following extent Henrich is correct: there is indeed a striking resemblance 
between the categories of motivation in Schopenhauer and in those in 
Hutcheson. However, stressing Schopenhauer's indebtedness to the moral sense 
school is nevertheless to some extent misleading because if we distinguish 
between the motivating reasons for our actions and the reasons for our approval 
or disapproval of something - between, that is, exciting reasons and justifying 
reasons - then we can see that whilst Schopenhauer and Hutcheson do share a 
view of the possible motivational reasons for acting, their reasons for ultimate 
approval differ. The moral sense theorist's reasons for approval have been 
characterised by Jeremy Bentham as follows: `One man says, he has a thing 
made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called 
a moral sense: and then he goes to work at his ease, and says, such a thing is 
right, and such a thing is wrong - why? `because my moral sense tells me it is"99. 
Or, as a less partisan author puts it. `justifying reasons presuppose a moral sense 
[... ] the appeal to the approval or the disapproval of the moral sense is the end of 
the line for justification' 1°0. In contradistinction to this position, Schopenhauer 
again and again tells us that virtue springs from the `intuitive knowledge that 
98 D. Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994), 68. 
99 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation in J. S. Mill, 
Utilitarianism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 78. Schopenhauer offers a very similar 
characterisation, which he explicitly connects with Francis Hutcheson's views, at [BM 168]. 
goo H. Jensen, Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson s Moral Theory, 59. 
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recognises in another's individuality the same inner nature as in one's own 
individuality' [W 1 368]. An observer with such an intuitive knowledge that 
recognises an identical inner nature in others as in one's own is very far indeed 
from the man who can only justify the morality of a certain action with the 
remark that it is moral because his moral sense tells him, which is what 
Hutcheson ultimately seems to base his approval on (in most of his works), i. e. a 
moral sense that is bereft of further rational justification. Thus commentators on 
ethical intuitionism such as W. D. Hudson appropriately separate moral sense 
theorists who believe moral awareness is supplied by sense perception (such as 
Shaftsbury and Hutcheson) from those who argue that it is man's reason or 
understanding that gives him this awareness (such as Price) and there is ever 
reason to describe Schopenhauer as an ethical intutionist of the latter sort, i. e. a 
theorist of `rational intuitionism' (as opposed to moral sense), who believes that 
benevolence is both instinctive and rational. As Hudson puts it in a 
characterisation of rational intuitionism: `This virtue [benevolence - M. R. ] is in 
accordance both with the nature of things and the nature of man' lol. This 
characterisation seems to sit well with Schopenhauer's position, according to 
which pity is avowedly a natural emotion but one with an important 
metaphysical imprimatur. Reconstructing Schopenhauer as a pure moral sense 
theorist however, which we might consider to be a line of argument that follows 
on naturally from Henrich's view, means ignoring Schopenhauer's remarks upon 
metaphysical justification and moreover, leads straight back to the impasse of his 
appeal to self-evidence being rejected by thinkers of the stature of Kant. 
101 W. D. Hudson, EthicalIiitnitionism (London: Macmillan, 1970), 7. 
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The leading approaches to grounding the goodness of compassion appear now 
to have been exhausted. I plausibly suggested that such approaches could 
basically be divided into three main interpretations. The final `moral sense 
school' interpretation was an unsustainable candidate because Schopenhauer was 
demonstrably not a moral sense theorist but rather a rational intuitionist who 
needed a further metaphysical component in his theory and the two surviving 
metaphysical reconstructions which. aimed to supply such a component both hold 
assumptions about the dependency of goodness upon the possibility of discerning 
the numerical identity of the noumenal world. With this exposed shared 
assumption in mind, I would now like to see how Schopenhauer goes on to argue 
that his ethical theory can be turned against monotheistic religion. 
IV Virtue or Religion? 
It will surely come as no surprise at this point to learn that Schopenhauer's 
moral objection to monotheism is articulated in terms of an `argument from evil' 
presented within the framework of his compassionate monism. This is how it is 
established. First, in the manner we have just seen, Schopenhauer justifies his 
morality of pity which springs from the knowledge of our ontological intimacy 
with all life. On the basis of this argument, he then uses this standard of pity to 
judge the moral standing of the monotheistic faiths. Unsurprisingly, some of the 
claims of traditional Judaeo-Christian theism are found wanting in 
Schopenhauerian moral terms. For example, in one of his later essays, entitled 
`Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of the Suffering of the World', 
Schopenhauer considers the various creation myths of the world religions, 
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expressing a qualified approval of certain of them, particularly those of 
Hinduism and Buddhism. Yet when it finally comes to the Judaeo-Christian 
account of creation ex nihilo by a morally perfect God, Schopenhauer takes a 
somewhat different view: `But that a God Jehovah creates this world of want and 
misery anima causa and de gaiete de couer and then applauds himself [... J this is 
intolerable' [PP 11301 ]. 
When first confronted with this compressed argument, the casual reader may 
perhaps be confused as to whether it is logical or rather moral unacceptability 
that is being alluded to; that is, whether Schopenhauer is exhorting us to reject 
the concept of God for being incoherent or to reject God Himself, if he exists, for 
being immoral. On reflection, it will be seen that it is the former: Schopenhauer 
is pointing out that according to the Judaeo-Christian creation story God has 
created a clearly bad world, which is contradictory and therefore philosophically 
unacceptable because God Himself, according to the monotheistic tradition, is 
meant to be infinitely good: `The synagogues, the church and Islam use the word 
God in its proper and correct sense' [PP H 101]. Before going any further, it 
might be worth emphasising at this point, to dispel any doubts about whether 
Schopenhauer has in fact got the right target in his sights here, that the God of 
the theistic tradition is indeed infinitely good. One obvious way of doing this is 
to cite a representative remark from a prominent Christian thinker. The example 
I have chosen is from a prominent Protestant Christian who puts it in this 
manner: `He is infinite wisdom, righteousness, goodness, mercy, truth, power 
and life' 102. This characterisation of God from Calvin is not at all atypical of the 
102 J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1995). 15. 
1 )3 
Christian tradition at large and must be understood as entailing that an almost but 
not quite all good God - or an almost but not quite all powerful God - though he 
would arguably escape Schopenhauer's objection, would not be the God of the 
Christian tradition. 
We might then say that, according to Schopenhauer, we are justified in not 
supposing there to be a good God like that pictured by the Hebrew-Christian 
creation story in Genesis, given the misery that that God would be incoherently 
responsible for: 
Generally, such a view of the world as the successful work of an all-wise, all benevolent, 
and moreover almighty being is all too flagrantly contradicted by the misery and 
wretchedness that fill the world on the one hand and by the obvious imperfection and 
even. burlesque distortion of the most perfect of its phenomena on the other; I refer to the 
human phenomenon [PP 11301, see also WI 406-7n]. 
But to say that when Schopenhauer points out the moral unacceptability of the 
creator God of the Semitic monotheistic religions he is primarily doing so only to 
emphasise the incoherence of that notion (it is `flagrantly contradicted' by 
misery) is not incompatible with claiming that part of Schopenhauer's 
programme is also to cast a moral slur upon Christianity, and his occasional 
remarks upon Christianity's relationship to the animal world and its intolerance 
and consequent proselytising violence when compared with polytheistic religions 
[see PP II 358] are obviously intended to fulfil such a function. Nevertheless, this 
specific argument aims in the first place to show that Christianity's world view is 
incoherent. This, then, in its essentials, is Schopenhauer's moral argument 
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against the being of God. It accepts the premise of an all powerful and all wise 
creator to illustrate how incoherent that notion is within the context of this 
existentially distressing world. It should of course be pointed out here that 
Schopenhauer's argument about the existence of evil is so far from being novel 
that it has for a very long time occupied an important place within philosophical 
theology. And Schopenhauer himself was alive to the fact that religious thinkers 
had various strategies to justify the pain and suffering that we find in this world: 
The evils and misery of this world, however, are not in accord even with theism; 
and so it tried to help itself by all kinds of shifts, evasions and theodicies' [W II 
591]. 
Which neatly brings us to the very objection, or family of objections, to 
Schopenhauer's argument that I should now like to consider. For although 
Schopenhauer flirts with the notion that what he prejudicially calls `shifts, 
evasions and theodicies' might be raised against his position by theologians and 
other thinkers sympathetic to monotheistic religion, he does not bother to 
provide an account of the main trends of thought regarding theodicy; much less 
does he offer anything in the way of a head-on argument against them. This is 
probably neither accident nor oversight on Schopenhauer's part: the subtleties of 
monotheistic theology and theodicy attracted Schopenhauer so very little that he 
appears to have been unable to entertain them even to the extent of using them as 
targets of criticism. Schopenhauer is clearly an extremely temperamental writer 
and seems always to prefer abuse to serious philosophical engagement when he 
comes up against positions that are, in his eyes, unimportant (think of his ad 
Hominem relationship with the philosophy of Hegel). Nonetheless- this perceived 
unimportance should certainly not be taken on face value and if we attend to the 
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history of Christian thought we can find a range of many-layered and powerful 
arguments against Schopenhauer's central thesis - that the existence of evil in 
the world is incompatible with the supposition that an all powerful and all good 
God exists - that are either ignored or only treated to a perfunctory analysis by 
Schopenhauer himself Let me now provide some examples taken from the 
writings of just one Christian thinker who seems to have provided forceful 
answers to Schopenhauer's charge. 
In late antiquity, the church father St. Augustine of Hippo (a man certainly 
alive to the sense of his own sin, as readers of his Confessions 1w1il1 be aware) 
suggested in his monumental City of ' God that we are in fact all more or less 
sinful and so all deserving of some punishment, as scripture testifies in the story 
of the flood. Augustine also argued that natural disasters are sent from God to 
test man's piety, like the appalling afflictions in the book of Job. Such arguments 
as these certainly offer good primae facie explanations of why there might exist 
human suffering in a world created by an omnicompetent and all. good God. But 
however plausible these particular responses to evil by Augustine may be 
considered, one could still maintain on behalf of Schopenhauer that they have no 
direct bearing on Schopenhauer's own specific challenge because his conception 
of suffering is not exhausted by talk of specifically human suffering (in a 
discussion of this problem of evil he tellingly remarks on the suffering of all that 
lives' [PP 112 1]). Recent philosophy of religion has sharpened and sophisticated 
this reliance on animal suffering in the argument from evil by developing 
detailed examples of the pointless suffering and death of animals that have never 
come into contact with human life. Because such animals have never come into 
contact with humans, these are cases where no afterlife, no presence of free-will 
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nor any improvement of moral character can be brought into the argument to 
mitigate or justify the pain suffered103 Given, then, that Schopenhauer's remarks 
upon the suffering in the world partially anticipate - certainly in spirit, if not in 
precise detail - such `Bambi cases' (as they are inauspiciously called) or at least 
that such cases can be regarded as natural extensions of Schopenhauer's own 
views, are not Augustine's explanations to be considered disarmed by this 
sophistication? It is reasonable to suppose that they are. However, Augustine's 
argumentative resources are not themselves empty, for he also claimed that 
God's ways are simply inscrutable as far as humans are concerned and so God's 
good judgement is less absent than untraceable for the limited human mind104 
This may seem an unfashionable argument today but it does at least provide one 
relatively uncomplicated way of allowing the suffering of the world, including 
cases of animal suffering, not to bear weight against the existence of God. And it 
is surely significant that Schopenhauer seems to admit as much at PP 11 101: 
`Therefore even if we attribute to him the quality of the highest goodness, the 
inscrutable mystery of his decree and decision is the refuge by which such a 
doctrine still always escapes the reproach of absurdity'. 
These are of course only some of the answers that but one religious 
philosopher has provided in response to the problem of the existence of pain and 
suffering in a Christian context. Moreover, my unelaborated sketch of even these 
answers undoubtedly does violence to their varying levels of sophistication. But 
103 For critical discussion of such cases, see K. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 137-143. 
104 The Augustinian passages referred to in this paragraph can be located at C/tv of -God, Book 1, 
Ch 9, pp. 16-17, Book XXII, Ch. 24, p. 1070 and Book XX, Ch 2, pp. 896-897. 
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even from this relatively small list of examples from the writings of just one 
(major) thinker we can see that there are clearly many feasible routes open to the 
theologian or religious philosopher to argue against Schopenhauer's moral 
objection to God, even if that objection is taken to include apparently senseless 
animal suffering. 
Yet despite the fact that it seems Schopenhauer was fully aware of 
Augustinian theodicy - `Augustine [... ] wears himself out in an effort to 
exonerate the creator' [PP 1 63] 105; - he does not counter any of Augustine's 
objections themselves with sustained argument. However, I am going to eschew 
criticising Schopenhauer for neglecting traditional lines of theodicy such as 
Augustine's here because I next intend to show that the very basis of 
Schopenhauer's moral objection to God is provided by a position itself already 
atheistic. And if this is right, then all the examples of Augustinian theodicies 
given above were therefore not real solutions to Schopenhauer's specific position 
as the framework in which they arise is a metaphysics that has previously already 
removed God from ontology. In other words, I would now like to show that as an 
argument against God, Schopenhauer's moral objection - and therefore any 
attempted theological solution that tries to confront that objection on its own 
moral terms - is superfluous on Schopenhauerian premises. 
As has already been remarked, Schopenhauer has assumed that there is a good 
measure of pain, suffering and evil in this world. We can regard this assumption 
as being uncontroversially true; certainly, the monotheistic religions themselves 
105 See also W 1406n, where Augustine's sophistic exertions (Bemühungen und Sophismen) are 
mentioned, derisively. 
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presume this to be the case in propounding doctrines of salvation and 
forgiveness. And what has then been claimed by Schopenhauer is that the notion 
of God is of an all knowing and all powerful and all good creator. This is also 
accurate, it is indeed precisely what the Judaeo-Christian tradition supposes. This 
then entails that God is responsible for subjecting his creatures, animals and 
humans alike, to such suffering and therefore seemingly not all good. Another 
way of putting the point would be to say that given that an all powerful and all 
good God would be capable of preventing suffering and would be motivated to 
do so and given also that our world happens not to be a good one, then such a 
God cannot exist. Yet there is a powerful reason for being suspicious of this 
argument from. evil in its Schopenhauerian form. That reason may now be 
expressed as follows. 
One of the underlying assumptions of this phase of the Schopenhauerian 
argument against God from evil is that we should care about all the suffering that 
occurs in the world (and that God is purportedly responsible for). Put somewhat 
differently, we know that this world is bad because it offends our justified sense 
of compassion. But there is a crucial problem here: namely, that the terms in 
which Schopenhauer's justification of compassion is grounded within 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics - on either my own or Janaway's reconstructions 
- are the terms of an ontology of a single will. What I mean here is that the way 
in which we come to know that what we call good is justifiable is through an 
intuition of an ultimate identity between us and all other creatures (which causes 
us either to act in our noumenal self-interest, or to relinquish individual 
partisanship). We are, on either Janaway's or my own reconstructions, justified 
in being and feeling compassionate to other persons and creatures because on a 
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fundamental metaphysical level we are all one. Our intolerance of apparent 
divine irresponsibility in subjecting his creatures to pain and humiliation is 
therefore primarily premised upon a feeling for our fellow creatures derived from 
an intuition of the oneness of those creatures, ourselves and the world. But this 
monism that allows us to be compassionate and so to reject God was established 
by the already atheistic conclusions Schopenhauer drew from Kant. And 
Schopenhauer is compelled to rely on such a monism if he is to escape problems 
concerning moral disagreement jeopardising his espousal of compassion being 
self-evidently moral. 
So, as should now be clear, Schopenhauer's moral argument levelled against 
God is therefore already launched from an atheistic metaphysical framework. 
Which means that criticising God's moral injustice and so ultimately his logical 
inconsistency (in being contemporaneously both unjust and all good) on such 
intuitive compassionate grounds as Schopenhauer's is to implicitly rely on a 
metaphysical argument that has already concluded that God does not exist. 
Schopenhauer's moral objection to God on compassionate grounds - his reu'ucio 
ad absurdum of the Biblical creation story - therefore already supposes an 
atheistic ontology, albeit covertly. Consequently, we can not but conclude that 
since Schopenhauer's moral objection against God is already implied by his 
exclusion argument for the non-existence of God, it not only fails to further 
strengthen his position but also collapses alongside that atheistic ontology. 
Nevertheless, despite its ontological and ethical limitations there can be little 
doubt that Schopenhauer's system was of high importance in the history of 
atheistic philosophy and that it dramatically influenced the thought of Nietzsche. 
But before moving on to consider Nietzsche's own distinctive post- 
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Schopenhauerian arguments against religion, it will be necessary to touch upon 
another element of Schopenhauer's philosophy that indirectly but powerfully 
influenced Nietzsche, if only by spurring him on to refute it. 
V The `Ascetic Ideal' (aesthetics as a substitute for existence) 
In the following, final few sections of this chapter, I will be concerned to 
describe some central elements of Schopenhauer's account of salvation and to 
further maintain that this account does, as Nietzsche will come to persuasively 
suggest in his reflections upon the `ascetic ideal' in On the Genealogy of'Morals 
and elsewhere, share a central specific feature with mainstream Christian 
thought. Since Nietzsche - who was to some extent only following hints laid 
down by Schopenhauer himself - often groups Christianity and Schopenhauer 
together, the following discussion will therefore enable us, in the next two 
chapters, to present Nietzsche's often made criticisms of the search for salvation 
in the actual context in which they arose. In briefly outlining this doctrine of 
salvation, I will focus solely on Schopenhauer's method of salvation through art, 
largely leaving to one side his two other methods of asceticism and ethics, partly 
for reasons of space and focus and partly because it is this particular aspect of his 
theory that most transparently illuminates Schopenhauer's quasi-Christian 
valorisation of another painless world beyond this world (and as I have already 
mentioned Schopenhauer's aesthetics of music in the previous chapter, I will pay 
no further attention to that branch of his aesthetics here). 
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`It is to the end of salvation', J. E. Atwell has recently written, that 
Schopenhauer's philosophy is entirely directed' 106 and Schopenhauer's account 
of salvation from the will specifically through art, which takes up a quarter of his 
magnum opus, stresses that this route is thought to be far more expedient for a 
certain elite of men: the genius (and here, as elsewhere, Schopenhauer is very 
Nietzschean in his love for the exceptional, although it should be noted that it 
was of course Kant who inaugurated the Romantic meditation on the figure of 
the genius). The Schopenhauerian genius is a man with a greater ability to 
perceive in things what Schopenhauer calls their `true form' and without 
reference to one's own self interest. More specifically, the object of art is said to 
bring about knowledge of a thing's `true form' in the sense that it exhibits what 
Schopenhauer calls the thing's `grade of objectification'; a perceptual experience 
which raises us above the concerns of the will, conferring upon us an 
aestheticised objectivity which allows us to see the world disinterestedly. A work 
of art is thus created by a genius in a special state -a state of observing `grades' 
- and aims to trigger similar states in its spectators. Leaving aside the question of 
what precisely a `grade of objectification' is, we can at least say that 
Schopenhauer's aesthetics - prefiguring that of the later Heidegger in this 
respect1°7 - is premised upon the idea that in our everyday non-aesthetic dealings 
106 J. E. Atwell, Schopenhauer: The Human Character, 180. 
107 The separation of what Heidegger calls the `ready to hand' from the `present to hand' in his 
analysis of everyday life in Being and Time is a phenomenological distinction which closely 
corresponds to the Schopenhauerian distinction drawn between `the ordinary way of considering 
things' and the way of considering `the what'. For Heidegger, the ordinary way of considering a 
hammer would be to see it as `equipment', i. e. as a tool to deal with nails: `The less we just stare 
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with objects (and, sadly, other subjects) in the world, all we desire to know about 
them is their relations, by which Schopenhauer means their many `connections in 
space, time and causality' [W 1 177]. That our everyday interest in objects is so 
instrumental follows from the Schopenhauerian contention (examined in the 
previous chapter) that we are tethered to the world in the first place by a relation 
other than knowing. There, our nature as essentially striving creatures was 
described. Since, therefore, the self in Schopenhauer's eyes is primarily a willing 
one, its view on the world is influenced by the requirements and expediencies of 
willing: `In the immediate perception of the world and life, we consider things as 
a rule merely in their relations [... ] For example, we regard houses, ships, 
machines and the like with the idea of their purpose and suitability' [W 11 372]. 
From day to day, then, in the first place we do not meditate on the objects that 
we encounter; rather, we use them (or avoid them) because we are essentially 
willing, and not knowing, beings (or in the terms of Schopenhauer's speculative 
at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our 
relationship to it become and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as 
equipment', Being and Time, 98. Purposive involvement - which Heidegger terms `caring' - 
rather than detached perception is thus the primary way in which we relate to the world: detached 
knowing is just one mode of already being in the world. However, this changes for the later 
Heidegger, when rather than being an a -priori form of human perceiving, the instrumentality of 
perception is seen to be a form of `disclosure' historically tied to the post-industrial world. It 
therefore follows that we can in fact rid perception of this instrumentality and one prominent way 
in which we can do so, Heidegger suggests, is brought about by the aesthetic attitude. For an 
overview of Heidegger's development in this regard, drawn with Schopenhauerian parallels in 
mind, see J. Young, `Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Art and the Will' in Schopenhauer, Philosophi- 
and /lie Arts, Ed. D. Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 162-18. 
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account of evolution: the quasi-Kantian faculties that we possess have evolved 
for the purpose of the manipulation of the external world according to our 
needs). The fact that `the ordinary human comprehends quite clearly in things 
only that which directly or indirectly has some sort of reference to himself (has 
an interest for him)' [WN 81] can thus be explained by our nature as selves, 
which tends to biological prudence. Prudence is not all powerful however, and 
we can, Schopenhauer suggests, occasionally `relinquish the ordinary way of 
considering things' and `no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and 
the whither but simply and solely the what' [W 1 178]. This relinquishing of 
ordinary instrumental perception in favour of painless and disinterested insight is 
seen by Schopenhauer to constitute a form of salvation and such an unusual kind 
of representation is most obvious in aesthetic experience, a subject to which I 
now turn. 
VI The Worth of Tragedy 
Schopenhauer's argument for the self as primarily a willing self, we saw in an 
earlier chapter, partly relied upon a phenomenological description of our 
everyday, non-epistemologically oriented behaviour. Yet he also thought, in a 
radically proto-Heideggerean manner108, that instrumental perception could be 
overcome and could be overcome by means of the experience of art. 
108 The possibility is not excluded here that we must rethink Heidegger's relationship to 
Schopenhauer, notably on this issue of aesthetics and particularly with regard to Heidegger's work 
of art essay, wherein the possibility that artworks instantiated Platonic ideas is explicitly 
discounted, arguably indicating that Heidegger had a Schopenhauerian aesthetics expressly in 
mind. 
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Schopenhauer's views are that purifying human perception of its instrumentality 
can be achieved by developing an aesthetic sensitivity, which discloses the 
essential truth about things. For Schopenhauer, who seems to have Kant's notion 
of aesthetic disinterestedness somewhere in mind and even follows Kant in 
distinguishing the beautiful and the sublime in aesthetics (though, to my mind 
under the influence of Edmund Burke in this regard, he ditches all the moral and 
even theological baggage that the concept of the sublime freighted in the critical 
philosophy109), contemplating art removes us, at least for a time, from the world 
of desiring and ushers us into a painless world of truth. For Schopenhauer, an 
object's truth or `true form' means that we see through the empirical object into 
the now unconcealed `ideal type' that it represents. This study is not the place to 
deal with the extremely controversial question of the ontological status of those 
improbable entities, the `ideas' `grades' or `forms' in Schopenhauer but it will 
serve our present purposes to make the relatively uncontroversial claim that 
109 Theological implications creep into Kant's account via the first Critique, where it is said that 
the contemplation of immensity backs up the Kantian moral proof of God because it leads to or is 
accompanied by `illimatableness in the possible extension of our knowledge and a striving 
commensurate therewith' [CPR B 426]. In the third Critique it is explained that the contemplation 
of absolute enormity (experience of the mathematical sublime) makes us aware of a supersensible 
faculty - reason - in our mind and this awareness, which 
he calls respect, then gives us a (moral) 
respect for our supersensible destination [CJ 109]. As P. Crowther puts it. `The judgement of 
sublimity is in accord or harmony with the law of our rational vocation because it produces a state 
of feeling analogous to the effect of that produced by morality and this (Kant presumes) will make 
it conducive to morality', The Kantian Sublime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 100; see also 
Jean Francois Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 126-127. 
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Schopenhauer's ideal type or `grade of objectification' is an entity that is meant 
to be a little like the original Platonic notion of forms, which were unchanging 
universalia ante res. Schopenhauer appears to believe that there exist 
innumerable observable forms that the will achieves - in nature but not in the 
articles manufactured by men [W 1 211, W II 365]"0 - which are eternally 
existing templates: `Different grades of the will's objectification expressed in 
innumerable individuals, exist as unattained patterns of these, or as the eternal 
fonns of things [... ] these grades are nothing but Plato's ideas' [W 1 129]. Yet the 
distinction between Platonic Idea and Schopenhauerian grade cannot be entirely 
collapsed since Plato's Ideas are not simply of organic species and other natural 
items in the way that Schopenhauer's are (see Republic 596 b) and 
Schopenhauer's grades are empirically perceived by the senses, which Plato 
famously denied. 
So when we appreciate art, what Schopenhauer thinks is going on is that we 
are contemplating these quasi-Platonic Ideas and are consequently removed from 
the mundane world of desires and needs (it is this sense that we must understand 
Schopenhauer's occasional and very approving allusions to the celebrated 
Platonic metaphor of the cave [see W1 171, W1 419]). This relation to the 
`forms' holds for nearly all the non-musical arts: painting, sculpture and poetry, 
the highest form of the latter being tragedy, which by its presentation of suffering 
exhorts us to renounce our willing selves, an interpretation of tragedy as 
110 1 would suggest that recent attempts in analytic philosophy to argue that natural kind concepts 
have a specific nature - e. g. dog - whilst non-natural kind concepts only have a function but no 
essence - e. g. water carrier (of which there can be very different instances) -- has a direct and 
supportive bearing on this Schopenhauerian issue. 
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renunciation - explicitly rejected by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy - which 
allowed Schopenhauer to support the notion of a properly Christian drama [W II 
434]. In point of fact, Schopenhauer argues there that modern drama, under a 
Christian influence, is actually superior to its ancient counterpart. Schopenhauer 
thus goes much further than John Milton, who in the introduction to his Samson 
Agonistes, convincingly suggested that the form of Greek tragedy can be 
rendered equally acceptable - although not enhanced - in a Christian setting] 11 
Such. then, concludes our brief description of salvation in its 
Schopenhauerian, aesthetic form: one is removed from instrumental engagement 
with the world by aesthetic contemplation of the grades or ideas. 
No one will deny that we have only very briefly sketched Schopenhauer's 
aesthetic theory of salvation here. Nonetheless, we are now in a position to 
illustrate the link between Schopenhauerian salvation and the Christian religion. 
The link consists in an assumption which Nietzsche termed the `ascetic ideal' 
and attacked in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. According to 
Nietzsche, this line of Schopenhauerian reasoning on aesthetics which stresses 
the need for detached abstraction from our everyday world of desires should be 
criticised on the basis of what he thought to be a remaining `religious' 
tt Schopenhauer makes it clear however, that the connection between Christianity, modern 
tragedy and the asceticism and detachment which he espouses is a contingent one, Bellini's opera 
Norma, for example, is said to be a model of tragedy even though `No Christians or even Christian 
sentiments appear in it' [W 11 436]. Hence Schopenhauer states it is in reality immaterial whether 
denial of the will to live `proceeds from a theistic or an atheistic religion' [W I 385]. But there 
is 
nothing here which endangers Nietzsche's diagnosis of Schopenhauerian philosophy, 
Christianity 
and atheistic religions as all being subject to a life denying `ascetic ideal'. 
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assumption, found particularly in one specific religion: Christianity. The 
assumption that Nietzsche took to be religious was simply that some kind of 
escape from the everyday instrumental empirical world of purposes and desires 
in which we live should be found. Nietzsche, I would claim, is clearly and simply 
right in this instance: one of the obvious assumptions of Schopenhauer's system 
- and arguably even of the semi-Schopenhauerian 'system' of Nietzsche's own 
Birth of Tragedy - is that it is better to be outside of or detached from our earthly 
world of purposes and activities than it is to be in it (there is, as this point may 
also be put, an inference from suffering to worthlessness in religious pessimism). 
That this is so can be demonstrated by the fact that certain other thinkers 
accepted a description of the world that was not in fact significantly different 
from Schopenhauer's but that they argued, to the contrary, that far from requiring 
a palliative through art or other means, we should instead enjoy this world of 
rapacious instrumental exploitation. That Nietzsche himself is one such thinker 
should be obvious from such remarks as: `My instinct went in the opposite 
direction from Schopenhauer's: toward a justification of life, even at its most 
terrible, ambiguous, and mendacious' [WP #1005]. But Nietzsche is not 
however, the only such philosopher. On Nietzsche's own interpretation in The 
Birth of Tragedy, the Greek tragedians were cases in point. But even quite 
independently of Nietzsche, the `young Hegelian' Max Stirner, for instance, 
wrote that: `For me, no one is a person to be respected, not even the fellow man, 
but solely like other beings, an object, in which I take an interest or else I do not, 
an interesting or uninteresting object, a usable or unusable object' 112. This 
112 M. Stirner, the Ego and Its Own (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 276. 
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position has been glossed as follows by one commentator: `Stirrer considers all 
human relationships to be founded on exploitation in one form or another. This 
truth is not something to be deplored but something to be accepted - and in turn 
exploited. In this last respect he differs from Heidegger' 113. In this last respect he 
differs also from Schopenhauer. 
Schopenhauer's detached ideal of redemption is strongly related, Nietzsche 
believes, both to the views of Plato, who famously favoured the intangible world 
of forms over this mundane world and to the views of Christianity ('Platonism 
for the people'), as perhaps best exemplified in the medieval theological notion 
of the beatific vision of God that, as St. Thomas Aquinas writes in his 
Compendium Theologiae, fulfils all our hopes `so that nothing can remain to be 
desired [... ] This ultimate end of man we call beatitude. For a man's happiness or 
beatitude consists in the vision whereby he sees God' i 14. Now, these - Platonic, 
Christian, Schopenhauerian - traditions understand themselves to be bemoaning 
the state of the world and its unmistakable drudgery, suffering and pain but since 
Nietzsche believes that one can actually joyously affirm precisely such an 
unmerciful world as this one, he feels compelled to offer in addition a further 
interpretative explanation of why certain strands of thought are world denying 
113 R. W. K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1971), 182. 
114 St. T. Aquinas, The Compendium of Theology (London: Herder, 1993), Ch. 106. The 
similarity between the Christian beatific vision and Schopenhauerian aesthetics is recognised by W. 
Caldwell in his Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance (Bristol: Thoemmes 
Press, 1993), 368 and also by P. Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), pp. 233-235. 
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whilst others are not: `Now, when suffering is always the first of the arguments 
marshalled against life, as its most questionable feature, it is salutary to 
remember the times when people made the opposite assessment' [GM 47]. Put 
differently, because just describing a world of suffering is not justification 
enough for seeking to escape it - as is confirmed by others describing a similar 
world but then accepting it or affirming it - another reason must be supplied to 
explain why those who seek salvation feel that need. Nietzsche's conclusion with 
regard to Schopenhauerian and religious pessimism is that it is not the world but 
rather the individual in whom the world inspires such pessimism that is at fault 
and that intellectual detachment which aims at salvation, far from being a virtue, 
is a sin of evasion that exposes the unhealthy. Favouring the `higher world' 
(Platonic ideas, Christian heaven, Schopenhauerian grades, arguably even the 
Kantian thing in itself... ), Nietzsche thinks, whatever goal the Christian 
theologian or Schopenhauer saw themselves to be pursuing, should, in fact, 
therefore best be read as an inadvertent expression of the preference of a 
physiologically afflicted human being: `Exhaustion can be acquired or inherited 
- in any case it changes the aspect of things, the value of things' 
[WP #48]. The 
chief `error' of Western philosophy for Nietzsche is thus not to be historically 
traced to some fundamental but contingent mistake or omission originally 
perpetrated by Plato and then perpetuated in ignorance by practically all 
subsequent theorists (as it is for philosophers such as Heidegger, Derrida and 
Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of ' Nature). Rather, the ' ascetic ideal' that 
finds expression in many philosophies is the product of a continual possibilit\' of 
human nature as we know it. 
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Now, this physiological interpretation by Nietzsche appears to be a major 
insight into the psychology of religion and of salvation. Whether it is actually 
sustainable in the face of empirical and conceptual investigation however, is an 
issue to be addressed in the next chapter. 
VII Conclusion 
Let me now attempt to draw together some of the findings of this chapter and 
to point towards the aim of the next. Examining - and partially reconstructing - 
Schopenhauer's moral argument against God in the first part of this chapter was 
important because it is an attack on the Judaeo-Christian concept of God that is 
periodically asserted or implied by Schopenhauer. And even in its failure we saw 
that it did exhibit a strong degree of consistency with and was supported by other 
elements of his philosophy. Furthermore, demonstrating how Schopenhauer then 
connected his metaphysics to a doctrine of secular salvation has been useful in 
serving to illuminate the great resemblance between Schopenhauerian 
redemption and Christian salvation to which Nietzsche's philosophy is, in part, a 
reaction. Nietzsche will come to suggest that the Schopenhauerian prejudice 
against life as manifested in, amongst other places, his aesthetics is 
physiologically rooted in the kind of constitution that Christians, for the most 
part, also share. One central thrust of Nietzsche's work thus has to be understood 
as an attempt to regard the successive Platonic, Christian and Schopenhauerian 
rejection of the empirical world as belonging to an essentially religious frame of 
mind because the desire for escape indicates dissatisfaction (and this still holds 
even though, phenomenologically, they might turn out to be slightly different 
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kinds of escape: there is, for instance, no notion of a positive salvation in 
Schopenhauer, whereas in Christianity salvation of the soul is positive ecstasy 
and not mere redemption from suffering). We shall now turn to Nietzsche's 
account, according to which such apparently positive judgements about death 
and disinterest are symptomatic traces of a certain - for Nietzsche, degenerate - 
kind of life and the conclusion that those judgements should be reviled follows 
only from an unnerving aesthetics of health that Schopenhauer does not share. 
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5. Nietzsche (1): An Experiment in Strength 
'Sinf'ulness' in man is not a fact but rather the interpretation of a fact, namely a 
physiological upset, - the latter seen from a perspective of morals and religion 
which is no longer binding on us 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals [GM 100] 
I Introduction 
Nietzsche's words offer no consolation. Kant denied the possibility of any 
unambiguous revelation or of any human sense experience of the divine but 
nevertheless invoked God both as a necessary dialectical illusion and, along with 
the summurn bonum, as a practical presupposition of moral conduct. 
Schopenhauer revealed a philosophic vision of a world without any trace of God 
but stilled our terror, as we have just seen, with the possibility of a certain kind 
of redemption. Nietzsche however, almost alone amongst philosophers, does not 
seek out the absence of suffering. This he takes to be the mistake of religion. 
In certain passages to be found in his work, Nietzsche, like his predecessor 
Schopenhauer, can be seen to believe that monotheistic religion is being phased 
out of world history. In the important On the Genealogy of Morals, for example, 
he refers to `the unstoppable decline of faith in the Christian God' [GM 67]. As a 
sociological phenomenon, religion is becoming a thing of the past, Nietzsche 
seems in places to have forcefully argued, although he added that the resulting 
`social vacuum' was being filled by morality. Yet we might point out that it is 
arguable whether this sociological thesis of inevitable secularisation espoused by 
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Nietzsche and Schopenhauer is, in point of fact, historically true. If it is true at 
all, it is surely true only of certain sectors of the rarefied Western world and even 
then, it could be objected, countries like the United States and Israel seem to be 
undergoing or to represent something of a religious renaissance within the 
developed world itself But at all events, Nietzsche nevertheless went beyond 
Schopenhauer by adding a normative objective to his anthropological account by 
diagnosing Semitic monotheistic religion - and, for good measure, 
Schopenhauerian philosophy itself - as pathological, a morbid decadence on the 
part of the human species that was best avoided. It is this nonnative account that 
will be our main subject of consideration in this chapter. Nietzsche's principal 
line of argument against the Christian religious tradition is that it is a sign or 
symptom both of escapism traceable to physiological weakness (the 'ascetic 
ideal' which we have already briefly encountered in its Schopenhauerian form) 
and also of what he calls ressentiment and that humanity would therefore be best 
served forgetting all about it. Despite, perhaps, their appearance within the 
Nietzsche corpus, these are not unsupported opinions about religion and in the 
following pages I will explicate what I take to be the arguments for, and 
presuppositions of, Nietzsche's principal theory of the degeneracy of the 
Christian tradition. These Nietzschean arguments have deep philosophical roots 
and have not, as one might expect, gone uncontested since he wrote them and in 
this chapter I will be focusing on the criticism that Nietzsche's account receives 
at the hands of P. Poellner and A. Danto. The central thesis which I will be 
defending will be that although some elements of Nietzsche's psychological 
characterisation of the Christian religion are in actual fact surprisingly coherent 
and endure much of their recent philosophical criticism, other elements cannot 
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be sustained in their present form. Before such an examination of Nietzsche's 
criticisms of the Christian religion can be embarked upon however, I would first 
like to remark upon some preliminary methodological points and then to mention 
Nietzsche's attitude toward the founder - as opposed to the adherents - of the 
Christian religion. 
II Problems of Interpretation 
It is well known that certain difficulties beset any reception of Nietzsche's 
philosophic thought, not least because with Nietzsche one feels that a certain 
traditional way of doing and presenting philosophy changes: for although he 
often addresses problems - of metaphysics and epistemology as well as of ethics, 
politics, culture, aesthetics and value - that are without doubt philosophically 
conventional, his writings not only often hold views which many people would 
see as far from `sensible' but his style is unconventional in the extreme, not 
because of its obvious irony and sarcasm, the presence of which is in any case 
hardly unique in the history of philosophy (one thinks especially of Socrates, 
Hume or Kierkegaard in this regard) but rather because of the aphoristic form 
and because of its being abbreviated, "literary", hectoring, and even exhibiting a 
tendency toward being abusive when not being consciously obscure. Such 
stylistic extravagances are clearly to some degree inherited from the example of 
Schopenhauer's prose but in their exaggerated Nietzschean form they make the 
problem of reading Nietzsche one degree more difficult, even to the extent that it 
is rare to find a book on Nietzsche today without some preparatory consideration 
of the question of how 'Nietzsche's style' is related to his overall philosophical 
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and cultural programme. But not only does Nietzsche's literary style 
problematise the interpretation of his work, so does the fact that, unlike Kant and 
Schopenhauer, he wrote no magnum opus - the posthumously published series of 
notes known as the Will to Power can not be considered his masterpiece, despite 
the ambiguously motivated efforts of Heidegger to prove the contrary - but 
rather published over a dozen, often fragmentary works. This means that I should 
state in advance that this study will claim only to have isolated what appear to 
this reader to be the central themes of the mature Nietzsche's writings on 
religion. Mature: I have followed the by now fairly standard division of 
Nietzsche's thought into three periods (the mature thought beginning around the 
time just after Thus Spoke Zarathustra). 
Also, I have not followed what one could broadly call a `Heideggerean' 
approach to the problem of Nietzschean exegesis. By this I simply mean that I 
think that Martin Heidegger's influential published lecture notes on Nietzsche - 
which extend to several volumes - and the work on Nietzsche that he in 
particular inspired (especially in some recent French philosophical circles) will 
not have much bearing on the outcome of this chapter and will not even be 
critically dealt with at any substantial length within this - or indeed any other - 
section of my study. This is because Heidegger, rather confusingly, offers, not an 
account or explication of the tenets of Nietzsche's philosophy but what he 
himself calls an interpretation, that is, a confrontation in the light of the 
grounding question of Western thinking' 115. Needless to say, the `grounding 
question of Western thinking' is not Nietzsche's own but is rather a part of 
115 M. Heidegger, Nietzsche (New York: Harper and Row, 1991), II, 151. 
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Heidegger's enduring and pervasive personal preoccupation with a certain 
question of ontology. Whether or not these lecture notes be read as one of 
Heidegger's celebrated `Destruktionen' of the history of philosophy, given this 
persistent ontological preoccupation, Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche 
in 1936 tells us far more about Heidegger's own philosophy than it does about 
any kind of Nietzscheanism; it is an attempt to read the history of philosophy 
through the lens of Heidegger's own ontology of being. And although Nietzsche 
is presented in Heidegger's work essentially as a philosopher of value -a thesis 
that this chapter and the next will indeed follow - nowhere in Heidegger's 
writing do we, for instance, find an account of Nietzsche's central concept of 
nobility, despite the fact that Heidegger wrote more on Nietzsche than he did on 
any other philosopher. Rather, we again and again encounter the question of 
being and how it relates to Nietzsche. Consistent with the vast remainder of his 
work, in his Nietzsche lectures Heidegger is elusive on anything other than 
Being. In not concentrating on specifically Nietzschean problematics, Heidegger 
thus definitively sets the tone for the recent, popular and generally French `post- 
structuralist' or `deconstructive' readings of Nietzsche, such as Spurs: 
IVietzsche 's Styles, written by Jacques Derrida' 16. Such meditations upon the 
`deconstruction' of reading as this text - which is at crucial points quite 
obviously indebted to Heidegger's questionable and thematically intrusive 
reading of Nietzsche - often, more or less obliquely, suggest that Nietzsche 
himself is very concerned with certain theses about language, theses that he 
shares with the author of the critical text. Not all of these purportedly 
116 J Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche 's Styles (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993). 
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`Nietzschean' theories of reading were published in French, of course; Paul de 
Man's Allegories of' Reading, which claims to be consequential for Nietzsche 
studies, is another avowedly deconstructive study, although de Man rightly 
admits that Nietzsche's own theories about language take up but an 
inconspicuous corner of the Nietzsche canon' 117. Nevertheless, de Man takes the 
philosophical ramifications of this modest piece of Nietzsche marginalia to be all 
too obtrusive, eventually concluding, with Derrida, that the Nietzschean text in 
some way subverts its own authority. It is not however, my intention in this study 
to deal with the `deconstructive' issues raised by Derrida and de Man since they 
demonstrably attend less to the difficulty of reading Nietzsche than to the 
difficulties attending the process of reading as such. Nevertheless, when these 
rather apocalypticly expressed theories of reading can be seen to touch on more 
local difficulties of Nietzschean exegesis I will not hesitate to call upon, or to put 
into question, their testimony. 
I have now detailed what I shall be avoiding and why but I should like to 
assure the reader that what I will be focusing attention on will be at least as 
interesting as these other areas. Methodologically, I shall be undertaking what 
we might term a `naturalistic' reading of Nietzsche (the interpretation that I feel 
to be least exegetically contentious). By this I broadly mean that I will be reading 
Nietzsche as offering an account of man as a part - an extremely interesting part 
- of nature, and shall therefore see ressentiment and other phenomena as 
being 
as explainable - though not necessarily in precisely the same way, of course - as 
117 P. de Man, Allegories of Reading. Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and 
Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 103. 
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is the animal behaviour of other species. In this I am following Nietzsche 
himself, who referred to the second essay of On the Genealogy of Moruls as `a 
piece of animal psychology (Tierpsychologie), nothing more' [GM 110]'18. The 
function of this chapter will be to show that Nietzsche's atheism is, in intention, 
as philosophically grounded as is Schopenhauers, although that grounding will 
take a very different form. The chapter will be structured as follows. We shall 
see that Nietzsche analyses the Christian religion in terms of two enduring 
features we can find in its adherents. Firstly, the individual's `decadent' need for 
salvation (an `ascetic' need we saw shared by Schopenhauer in the previous 
chapter's examination of Schopenhauer's aesthetics). In examining Nietzsche's 
psychological critique of Christianity as being obsessed with salvation and 
therefore supposedly being a crutch for the weak and physiologically 
maladjusted, we shall see that this interpretation seemingly fails according to one 
recent commentator, P. Poellner, because certain strong and healthy individuals 
also converted to Christianity. I will be arguing that although Poellner's 
objection seems to be overcome via the doctrine of `bad conscience' contained 
in the second essay of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, that doctrine 
itself is not without its own intrinsic problems. Secondly, Nietzsche can, in 
various places but particularly in the first essay of On the Genealogy of ,, Morals, 
be seen to analyse Christianity in terms of a submissive desire to assuage a fear 
of, and a need for revenge upon, on 
Is 
superiors which finds expression in the 
propagation of a purportedly divinely underwritten universal moral code. When 
118 In this connection, see also Nietzsche's many notes on the 'naturalisation of morality' [e. g. at 
WP #462). But for a dissenting view, see S. Gardner, 'Schopenhauer, Will and the Unconscious'. 
section VI, `The Unconscious in Nietzsche'. 
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we look at Nietzsche's characterisation of Christianity as vengeful and therefore 
base or unhealthy and, moreover, as condemning as wrong precisely those drives 
that lead to the establishment of monotheistic religion in the first place, we will 
find that this account is based upon an investigation into the language of 
morality. Is it then simply a linguistic rather than an ethical inquiry? I shall argue 
that it is not and in so doing will make use of certain theses first introduced into 
philosophy by J. L. Austin. We shall also see that this account has been disputed, 
by A. Danto, on the grounds that its conceptual grounding is fundamentally 
flawed. The disputation is itself unsuccessful however, I will maintain, since it 
can be shown that it has misinterpreted the true intentions of Nietzsche's analysis 
of religion and morality. But before proceeding to examine the two main 
Nietzschean objections to religion (as escapist and as the product of 
ressentiment) in more detail, I would first like to briefly clarify Nietzsche's 
attitude toward the figure responsible for the genesis of the Christian religion: 
Jesus Christ. 
III `Truly, too early died that Hebrew' [Z 981 
In earlier chapters, I may have mentioned but I certainly did not explore at any 
length the attitude of Kant and Schopenhauer to the figure of Christ, whereas I 
am now going to characterise Nietzsche's position on Jesus. I make an exception 
in the case of Nietzsche because he, far more than Kant or Schopenhauer, was 
haunted by Christ: notoriously, he even titled one of his last books The Anti- 
Christ. That book is essentially a sustained polemic against the Semitic 
monotheistic tradition split into two parts: a preparatory analysis of what 
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Christianity - and its precursor, Judaism - represent in psychological terms, 
followed by a more specific psychology of the figure of Christ himself. 
Nietzsche, it emerges, felt acutely that one should not confound Christianity as 
a movement with the historical figure of Christ: `One should not confuse 
Christianity as a historical reality with that one root that its name calls to mind 
[... ] What did Christ deny? Everything that is today called Christian' [WP #158; 
cf. AC #31, WP #164]. The thesis is scarcely an exceptional one and reminds 
one of similar remarks by certain Christians themselves, such as William Blake 
and Kierkegaard. What, then, was the true message of the historical Christ that, 
according to Nietzsche, was denied and replaced by the later church? According 
to Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ, Christ was physiologically so constituted as to 
be susceptible to pathologically extreme degrees of suffering and so 
consequently developed an ascetic and forgiving way of life with the purpose of 
avoiding social or interpersonal conflict to feel at home in a world that was, as 
Nietzsche put it, `undisturbed by reality of any kind' [AC #29]. This 
physiological description of Christ as being disproportionately perturbed by the 
events of everyday life is undoubtedly highly speculative. But leaving issues of 
historical verification to one side for a moment,. Christ's pronouncements were 
thus taken by Nietzsche to refer to an individual psychological goal and it is this 
psychological "inner world" and not the eschatological fantasies of the 
evangelists that constitutes the true Christian kingdom of God (Nietzsche takes 
the tale of Christ's cursing and withering of the barren fig tree in the Gospel of 
St. Matthew to be `a dreadful corruption' by the Gospels [WP # 164]; and 
presumably Nietzsche feels the same , -,, ay about Christ's enraged overturning of 
the tables of the merchants in the temple). And although Nietzsche does come to 
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finally condemn Christ - in The Anti-Christ he calls Christ's physiological 
condition `a sublime further evolution of hedonism on a thoroughly morbid 
basis' [AC #30] - this is only after a hesitancy on Nietzsche's part that suggests 
that Nietzsche ascribes to Christ a genuine nobility. Even in his middle period, 
when Nietzsche seems to have thought that Jesus did proclaim himself the son of 
God, he sympathetically adds that `one should not judge too harshly, because the 
whole ancient world is aswarm with sons of Gods' [HATH #144]. 
Turning now to the question of Nietzsche's attacks on Christianity itself rather 
than on the person of Christ, it should be pointed out that Nietzsche, as I have 
suggested, characterises the Christian religion as being composed of two 
psychological strands that can both be subjected to evaluation by determining the 
level of power or strength -a term we shall be examining - they presuppose in 
their adherents. These two characteristics of Christianity are seen to be a desire 
for salvation from this terrestrial world and the fear of, and desire for revenge 
upon, a type of person whom one has already experienced as superior. Let us 
now assess, in turn, the plausibility and coherence of these two psychological 
characteristics of religion and see how they are then evaluated by Nietzsche. 
Initially, I will advance what I take to be the main thrust of each of Nietzsche's 
views more or less without criticism before then considering important 
objections to Nietzsche's description of each of the two characteristics. 
IV Christianity as Escape 
Nietzsche, in Ecce Homo, tellingly described the French Christian 
philosopher, mathematician and religious thinker Blaise Pascal as the most 
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instructive of all sacrifices to Christianity [EH 57], instructive because in his 
posthumously assembled Pensees - and particularly in those dealing with his so- 
called `wager' argument - Pascal represents an explicit example of Nietzsche's 
egotistical Christian, believing in God simply because of a subjective redemptive 
interest in the Christian religion's blissful afterlife: `Pascal as type' [WP #51 ]. 
Nietzsche contends - and it is a charge which is of course earlier to be found in 
the work of Feuerbach and later to an even greater degree in Freud's The Future 
of' an Illusion - that all Christians are of this type, yearning for a painless 
. summum bonuni for themselves located beyond the reaches of this world. It is not 
only the case that `The Christian makes all existence revolve around the question 
of the salvation of man' [WP #917] but that even more parochially the Christian 
makes all existence revolve around the issue of his own personal salvation: 
"`Salvation of the soul" - in plain words: "The world revolves around me"' [AC 
#43]. The desire for painless immortality finds natural expression in the doctrine 
of a personal God awarding us rewards in the afterlife and it is a personal God 
presumably because cold nature gives us little reason to believe in immortal 
reward and so, as our look at Yovel's reading of Kant's moral proof of God in an 
earlier chapter illustrated, our subjective human limitations arguably constrain us 
to imagine an anthropomorphic rewarder if we are to believe in a redemptive 
reward at all. The next question Nietzsche addresses as part of this first 
characterisation is why Christians are as concerned as they are with the next life 
and what this might indicate about them personally (Deleuze has aptly told us 
that Nietzsche asks, not the Socratic question `what is... ' but rather `who? ') 
Christians must be so obsessed about an afterlife, Nietzsche argues, because they 
experience this terrestrial life as dissatisfying and painful, an elementary but still 
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significant insight which Nietzsche shares with certain other atheists such as 
Feuerbach and Schopenhauers 19. That is to say, if this life were felt to be 
inherently satisfactory then there would be little in the way of motivation to 
attain a heavenly state. It might readily be said in this connection that the very 
presence of the desire for salvation, like the presence of the emotion of en-vy, 
indicates a certain dissatisfaction as a condition of the possibility of its being 
held. Yet it should be pointed out that Christians like St. Augustine had already 
used this insight concerning dissatisfaction as a part of their theodicy, arguing 
that this world is painful because it is corrupt and needs to be escaped: its 
intrinsic unsatisfactoriness naturally leads us to God. Nietzsche however, 
advances beyond the insight of Feuerbach and Schopenhauer and thereby 
challenges St. Augustine by making the further point that this world cannot be 
intrinsically sorrowful because some humans do not feel the need to seek 
redemption: `Now, when suffering is always the first of the arguments 
marshalled against life, as its most questionable feature, it is salutary to 
remember the times when people made the opposite assessment' [GM 47]. The 
Christian's sense of terrestrial dissatisfaction, Nietzsche can be taken to be 
remarking here, is in a certain sense a matter of taste rather than a reflection of 
fact. Nietzsche then addresses the quintessentially naturalistic question of how 
119 Schopenhauer writes that `To the hope of immortality there is always added that of a "better 
world"; an indication that the present world is not worth much' [W 11 467]. Likewise, Feuerbach 
remarks `Belief in the heavenly life is belief in the worthlessness and nothingness of this life. I 
cannot represent to myself the future life without longing for it, without casting down a look of 
compassion and contempt on this pitiable earthly life', The Essence of Christianity (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1956), 161. 
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such a taste could arise in some individuals (but not in others). Nietzsche comes 
to the conclusion that Christians earning for salvation must be the `physiological 
casualties and the disgruntled' [GM 72, GM 96, GM 102]. Supposing some 
individuals to be physiological casualties explains why they might experience 
this world as being unsatisfactory in a way that others would not. The main point 
encapsulated here, and it is a point that we touched upon in the previous chapter, 
is that if a given individual was well adjusted to the world, as some indeed seem 
to be, such an individual would not strive after deliverance from his present 
condition, as some indeed seem to do not. The physiological twist added by 
Nietzsche at this point is just that being well adjusted is primarily a biological 
matter. The body itself perfects the soul. 
Individuals - it is specifically individual Christians who bear the brunt of 
Nietzsche's physiological characterisations - who are excessively concerned 
with their salvation are, on this account, unhealthy or ill-adjusted: they simply 
cannot cope with being in this world without fabricating metaphysical 
consolations. This Nietzschean criticism is applied not only to Christians of 
course but also to adherents of other religions with rather similar soteriological 
structures to Christianity - particularly religions historically connected to 
Christianity, such as Judaism and occasionally also Islam: `Mohammedanism in 
turn learned from Christianity: the employment of the beyond' [WP #143]. It is 
also applied to the work of philosophers such as Schopenhauer, whose account 
of aesthetic contemplation of the `grades of objectification' clearly assumed a 
desire to escape the empirical world. The desire to escape this world is thus, for 
Schopenhauer and thinkers like him (although perhaps in a less graphic fashion 
in their case, with the arguable exception of Plato) less a philosophical 
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contention than a religious one. And such religious philosophies and 
philosophical religions of escape are, Nietzsche contends, in fact signs of 
profound sickness, moroseness, exhaustion, biological etiolation' [BT 11], hence 
`the almost inevitable bowel complaints and neurathensia which have plagued 
the clergy down the ages' [GM 17]. Those who want redemption are, by 
definition, having a hard time of it and Nietzsche thinks that this dissatisfaction 
and suffering can be successfully explained in physiological terms. Such 
physiological reductionism toward religion is in clear evidence in many of 
Nietzsche's late works - he is particularly enthusiastic about it in On the 
Genealogy of Morals and in Ecce Homo - and is also given great attention in his 
notebooks: 
Preoccupation with itself and its "eternal salvation" is not the expression of a rich and 
self-confident type; for that type does not give a damn about its salvation - it has no 
interest in happiness of any kind; it is force, deed, desire - it imposes itself upon things, it 
lays violent hands on things. Christianity is a romantic hypochondria of those whose legs 
are shaky. 
Wherever the hedonistic perspective comes into the foreground one may infer 
suffering and a type that represents a failure [WP # 781]. 
Christians are pictured here as physically degenerate and therefore their level of 
power or strength is evaluated as extremely low. Christianity is severely regarded 
as a religion catering for the weak and for the unhealthy, an institutionalised 
support system for the physically distressed and therefore as a phenomenon of 
little worth: To divide the world into a "real" world and an "apparent" world 
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[... ] in the manner of Christianity [... ] is only a suggestion of decadence -a 
symptom of declining life' [TI 49]. In this way, then, Nietzsche can be said to 
reduce religion to a question of the (unhealthy) body. Nietzsche, as this point 
may also be put, considers the inevitable and inescapable shortcomings of 
religious people to be the consequence of certain ultimately physiological 
defects. In doing so however, Nietzsche has obviously made some significant and 
controversial claims about those who desire salvation and I will now question to 
what extent they are justified. 
We might say that Nietzsche's characterisation of Christianity as enervated 
and therefore worthless is comprised of two levels of allegation. First, the 
empirical suggestion that Christians are obsessed about the afterlife, which 
primae facie does not appear to be obviously untrue, at least in certain versions 
of Christianity: we could of course point to Christians such as Pascal, the 
theological utilitarians and Kant (who thought that happiness was an essential 
part of our ultimate goal, our summum bonuni) here but we might also mention 
that no less a figure than St. Augustine, for example, concedes in this regard that 
'God is to be worshipped for the sake of eternal life and everlasting gifts and 
participation in that city on high'120. Nietzsche's empirical claim is then 
followed by the secondary interpretation that this obsession with salvation must 
indicate a dissatisfaction rooted in a state of physical unhealth from which, given 
Nietzsche's own concern with the value of power, it follows that it must be 
worthy only of abandonment or eradication [TI 99, AC #2]. Possible theoretical 
120 St. Augustine, City of God, Book V, Ch. 18, p. 211; see also Book VI, Ch. 9, p. 247: `It is, 
strictly speaking, for the sake of eternal life alone that we are Christians'. 
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objections to Nietzsche's hypothesis could however, be launched at either - 
empirical or interpretative - level of statement. So, might not the example of 
either a physically healthy Christian or a Christian devoid of interest in the 
afterlife be seen to falsify this aspect of Nietzsche's characterisation and 
evaluation of Christianity? 
In his recent book on Nietzsche and Metaphysics, Peter Poellner has argued 
against precisely this contention of Nietzsche's, finding fault with it by citing - 
and here Poellner is to some extent following the defensive work of the Christian 
phenomenologist Max Scheler - certain prominent cases where Christians were 
apparently very "healthy" by Nietzschean standards and even totally 
unconcerned with an afterlife and so, by extension, thereby neither weak, 
unhealthy nor unsatisfied. Admittedly, some clerics were famously unhealthy 
and Nietzsche's comic reference to `bowel complaints' is no doubt a reference to 
a troubled feature of Martin Luther's life. Yet it seems improbable, an objector 
could maintain at this point, that a defective constitution is common to all 
clerics. In this spirit, as an instance of a healthy Christian, Poellner cites the 
example of St. Francis of Assisi as being `What Nietzsche would call 
physiologically well constituted' 121 If allowed to stand, this apparent exception 
would of course cast doubt on Nietzsche's interpretative assumption that 
Christians are physiologically weak or badly constituted (and that this explains 
their being disgruntled). However, this specific objection does not seem to hold. 
It falters because, whilst for Schopenhauer St. Francis was indeed an example of 
121 Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 239; for Max Scheler on the health of St. Francis, see his 
Re_csentimerrt (New York: Schocken, 1972), 91-92. 
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healthy humanity denying the will to live [see W 11 614]. there is clear textual 
evidence to show that Nietzsche, whose opinion of asceticism was very different 
to Schopenhauers, would not call St. Francis well-constituted. In an unpublished 
note he wrote with characteristic provocativness of `Francis of Assisi, neurotic, 
epileptic, a visionary, like Jesus' [WP #221; the general notion of religious 
sensibility as being conditioned by epilepsy is present elsewhere in Nietzsche, 
see WP #135]. Poellner declares that there is no evidence to support this 
characterisation and - leaving aside the debatable question of whether we are to 
explain reports of St. Francis's stigmata in psychopathological terms - he seems 
indeed to be historically correct but nonetheless Nietzsche, confirming and 
reinforcing the standing of this particular unpublished note in The Anti-Christ,, 
writes that the psychological type of `St. Francis of Assisi is contained in the 
legends about him in spite of the legends' [AC 152]. We cannot determine the 
actual state of health of the historical St. Francis but we can at least note that 
Nietzsche was aware of such objections to his theory of the weak Christian and 
strove to counter them on grounds that, whilst not certain, are perhaps no more 
uncertain than those of the opposition. 
Poellner's specific critical response to the interpretative historical claim that 
Christians are, as it were, born of poor health thus cannot be substantiated any 
more than can Nietzsche's original claim to the contrary. But Poellner also notes 
the absence, not only of physical ill health but also of any concern with salvation 
in the textual testimonies of historical literary Christians like Meister Eckhart 
and St Teresa of Avila. This acknowledgement attacks the first, more descriptive 
and empirical claim of Nietzsche's: that all Christians are, after the manner of 
Pascal, Kant or Augustine, centrally concerned with the afterlife. This level of 
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response to Nietzsche's characterisation of the Christian as morbidly obsessed 
with redemption and thus as unhealthy and furthermore as worthless seems better 
placed to succeed. Neither of these two prominent figures in the Christian 
literary tradition, Poellner rightly asserts, appeared to make all existence revolve 
around salvation. Quite the contrary: St. Teresa, in particular, in a well known 
declaration suggested that she would love God regardless of his punitive or 
rewarding abilities122. Poellner admits in this regard that in view of his dark 
sayings the mystic `Eckhart might be thought to be unrepresentative' but 
nevertheless maintains that `Teresa is a more orthodox figure' 123 So according 
to Poellner, St. Teresa is a more orthodox Christian who seems to be 
unconcerned about the afterlife and so contradicts Nietzsche's theory that all 
Christians are physiologically maladjusted people who possess a need to escape 
from this hard, competitive world. But yet, for Nietzsche, once more the matter 
is quite to the contrary: he considers St. Teresa to be quite as exceptional as 
Eckhart and in a note entitled `When the Masters could also become Slaves', 
Nietzsche advises us to `Consider St. Teresa, surrounded by the Heroic instinct 
of her brothers - Christianity appears here as [... ] strength of the will, as a heroic 
quixotism' [WP #216]. Nietzsche's response to Poellner's objection that not 
every Christian cares about the afterlife is that those who do indeed hold such a 
`tragic faith' are the exceptions, in that they are strong people who have accepted 
conversion to Christianity: `Truly many of them once lifted their legs like a 
dancer [... ] And now I have seen them bent - to creep to the cross' [Z 198]. 
122 See Scheler, Ressentiment, 183, n. 17. 
l'-3 Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 248. 
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According to Nietzsche, Christianity does not originate amongst the strong but it 
can be taken up by them, although for very different reasons than those by which 
it originally captured the imagination of the weak. As it stands this response is 
not particularly convincing however, largely because it needs considerable 
fleshing out in terms of explaining how strong people could accept conversion. 
But all is not lost for Nietzsche's naturalised account of the Christian need for 
salvation: he does go on to provide such a naturalistic explanation of religious 
conversion itself In answer to the question of how strong people like St. Teresa 
could submit to Christianity, Nietzsche further suggests that it is the strong's 
immoderate love of danger. Nietzsche believes that the strong oppose any 
`calculation of prudence' [GM 13]. According to the Nietzschean interpretation, 
although Christianity arises in the hearts and minds of those who feel impotent in 
this world and so want or need a salvation of some sort, it can also convert the 
strong because of the strong's love of enduring hardship and their lack of 
prudence: precisely the opposite of a need for salvation. Out of a love for risk 
and danger the strong masochistically turn their aggressive and cruel instincts 
back upon themselves and thus the phenomenon that Nietzsche calls `bad 
conscience' is born. Therefore, when it progressed from the lower, slavish orders 
`Christianity no longer had to presuppose weary human beings but inwardly 
savage and self-lacerating ones' [AC 143]. There is, as he writes in a passage 
from Beyond Good and Evil: 
an abundant, over abundant enjoyment of one's own suffering, of making oneself suffer - 
and wherever man allows himself to be persuaded to self-denial in the religious sense 
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[... ] he is secretly lured and urged by his cruelty, by the dangerous thrills of cruelty 
directed against himself [BGE #229]. 
Unfortunately for Nietzsche, the difficulties that Poellner articulates so well are 
not wholly resolved by such an answer, for elsewhere Nietzsche - in a manner 
strikingly foreshadowing Freud's account of the neuroses - argues that that our 
instincts are internalised only when the desire for cruelty cannot find outward 
expression and is channelled inwards. The internalisation of acts of aggression 
are therefore seen not as products of mere masochistic whim nor capricious 
experiment but are socially and politically contextualised. This is particularly the 
case in the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, entitled `Guilt, `bad 
conscience' and related matters', which attempts to understand bad conscience 
specifically and our modern moral and political capacities generally as products 
of an extremely violent kind of social enforcement posterior to the establishment 
of a pol is: 
I look on bad conscience as a serious illness to which man was forced to succumb by the 
pressure of [... ] that change where he finally found himself imprisoned within the 
confines of society and peace [... ] I do not think there has ever been such a feeling of 
misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort, - and meanwhile, the old instincts had not 
suddenly ceased to make their demands! But it was difficult and seldom possible to give 
in to them: they mainly had to seek new and as it were underground gratifications. All 
instincts that are not discharged outwardly turn inward - this is what I call the 
internalisation of man: and with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his 
soul'. [... ] Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying 
- all this was pitted against the person who 
had such instincts: that is the origin of `bad 
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conscience'. Lacking external enemies and obstacles and forced into the oppressive 
narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart [G%, 4 61. see 
also HATH #137, BGE #76]. 
Nietzsche thus sees a profound psychological purpose behind those "monkish 
virtues' such as `penance, mortification, self-denial' that Hume could only turn 
away from with aversion: the pleasure of internal instinctual discharge is 
detected. The secret lure of inner torment such as that which the strong, like St. 
Teresa, supposedly find in the Christian religion is thus interpreted as a partial 
(outward) denial and a partial (inward) expression of cruelty; an internal 
expression of a drive that is denied outward manifestation. Nietzsche calls this 
phenomenon of the self infliction of pain either 'internalisation' or `bad 
V 
conscience' and he explicitly connects it with the desire to believe in a 
monotheistic God of the Christian type in the following manner: 
That will to torment oneself, that suppressed cruelty of animal man who has been 
frightened back into himself and given an inner life, incarcerated in the state to be tamed 
[... J has discovered bad conscience so that he can hurt himself, after the more natural 
outlet of his cruelty has been blocked, - this man of bad conscience has seized upon 
religious precept in order to provide his self torture with its most horrific hardness and 
sharpness. Guilt towards God: this thought becomes an instrument of torture [GM 68]. 
This now seems like a step towards a more coherent and psychologically tenable 
answer to the riddle of why there are individual Christians unconcerned about 
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salvation; for these are not said to be `original' Christians but rather strong men 
and women denied any other way than inward to express their aggressive drives. 
Suitably reformulated, Nietzsche's account might now run as follows: typical 
Christians, like Pascal and St. Augustine, are generally captivated by the thought 
of redemption and salvation and so are therefore weak and worthless by 
Nietzschean standards, apart from certain exceptional Christians, like St. Teresa, 
who, powerful and potentially cruel but with no outlet for their cruelty, have to 
internalise it. Such strong Christians therefore utilise Christianity as an 
`enjoyable' way of suffering. The majority of Christians can still be seen to be 
thus indeed obsessed with personal salvation in the manner of Pascal or 
Augustine but pointing out counter-examples as Poellner does only marks out 
those converts who use Christianity as an internal vent for their exuberant 
strength and relentless, repressed cruelty. 
Yet there remains an unresolved problem even in this reformulated account. 
The problem starkly emerges when we consider what Nietzsche means when he 
thinks that the strong have no outlet for their cruelty. For surely, it may be 
maintained, the strong, bereft of prudence as they are, have no reason not to 
outwardly express their cruel, aggressive instincts and follow an ethic of 
imprudent squandering. If, in other words, the strong hold within them a great 
passion for chance and insecurity, then they would assuredly let their animal 
nature run free even within the confines of the polity. Elements of Nietzsche's 
account of Christianity as `ascetic', that is, as an escapist desire for heaven, are 
therefore highly problematic. But this is not because of the unexplained 
existence of simple counter examples, such as St. Teresa. Rather, it is because 
the further explanation of those counter-examples that Nietzsche does give fails 
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to account for why the supposedly strong favour self-destruction of a specifically 
Christian - rather than exuberantly antisocial - nature. `Heroic quixotism' does 
not explain why the strong convert to Christianity when the greater heroism 
would appear to lie in ignoring it. 
There is, then, an important shortcoming in the Nietzschean characterisation 
of religion as ascetic and escapist, at least in its present form. Nietzsche's second 
attack upon Christianity however, will prove to be much more coherent under 
scrutiny. It is to this issue, then, that we now turn. 
V Christianity as Ressentiment 
We have mentioned that Nietzsche seems in places to have thought that 
individual Christians, since they eschewed personally negotiating the conflicts 
and rigors of this world in favour of hoping for a painless afterlife, were to be 
naturalistically interpreted as disgruntled escapists, inventing worlds in which to 
enjoy the successes that this life denied them. One problem with this belief 
however, we noted, was that it apparently failed to account for those Nietzsche 
would regard as being healthy or strong Christians who did not express any such 
interest in a painless afterlife. 
The equally important second reason Nietzsche had for believing Christians to 
be weak and worthless is that he thought that the Christian way of life is, in its 
unmasked and essential form, a specific way of domesticating or taking revenge 
upon those who Nietzsche thought were the more flourishing and dangerous 
members of the human species. Nietzsche thus attempts to expose the 
supposedly good and virtuous man as a vindictive and embittered, as well as 
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weak and wearied, individual. Once more, I will offer what I take to be the main 
thrust of Nietzsche's view more or less without criticism before subsequently 
interrogating it. 
First of all however, I would like to very briefly mention - but only at this 
stage to mention -a certain background assumption to the argument that can be 
found throughout much of Nietzsche's work (and it is an assumption, no doubt 
buttressed by certain elements of Schopenhauer's thought, that I will return to in 
the next chapter). Namely, that Nietzsche appears to have induced a general law ý, 
of nature and history with which to compare the actions of the religious people 
he brings into his argument. For example, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he writes `I 
have followed every living creature, I have followed the greatest and the smallest 
paths; that I might understand its nature [... ] where I found a living creature, 
there I found will-to-power' [Z 137]. This passage - however poetically 
expressed it may be - clearly suggests that Nietzsche has generalised the 
hypothesis of a barbarous nature by means of an inductive inference from facts 
observable in natural history and zoology. It is, as Kaufmann notes in his gloss, 
`evidently offered in an empirical spirit' 124. In this next passage I would like to 
124 W. Kaufmann Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), 206. Kaufmann has said of the concept of the will to power that 
`Nietzsche based his theory on empirical data and not on any dialectical ratiocination about 
Schopenhauer's metaphysics', ibid., 207; Cf also the reiteration on 229. Others however, such as 
Poellner, think it a metaphysical theory similar in many respects to Schopenhauer's - see Nietzsche 
and Metaphysics, 268 - and yet others believe it to be a thought experiment (see K. Jaspers, 
Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity (Tuscon: 
University of Arizona Press, 1966), 318). 1 am not going to examine any of NI ietzsche's specific 
arguments for the will to power in this study however (though if pressed I would point out that it 
176 
look at, Nietzsche implies that he has generalised a picture of a nature essentially 
red in tooth and claw from an examination of human history: the whole of 
history is indeed the experimental refutation of the proposition of a "moral world 
order"' [EH 128]. From here, Nietzsche reaches the conclusion that there is No 
goodness in nature' [WP#850]. Now that we have simply registered Nietzsche's 
important background assumption about the non-beneficent character of nature 
(and it is an assumption to which I will return in the next chapter), let us turn to 
the specifics of Nietzsche's argument concerning what he calls ressentiment. 
The approach of characterising Christianity as a product of ressentiment is 
most clearly developed by Nietzsche in the first essay of On the Genealogy ?t 
Morals. There, Nietzsche undertakes an investigation of the development of our 
religious, moral and political language. An objector could perhaps make the 
immediate rejoinder here that since On the Genealogy of Morals is primarily an 
investigation of language (and Nietzsche indeed continually refers to `words' and 
`ideals' in the Genealogy), all Nietzsche is therefore doing in this book is 
linguistics, describing and criticising the language of an ethical tradition and not 
what is actually done in that given tradition. This question concerning whether 
examining the language of morality tells us about morality or just about language 
applies equally to Nietzsche, J. L. Austin and just about anyone who examines 
speech situations with an eye to their ontological import. Austin got around this 
difficulty by stating that speech did not describe an ontological state of affairs 
but actually contributed to it. And Austin was explicit that this was of ethical 
is given most prominence as an inductive inference in the published work), partly because even 
conceding to Nietzsche the will to power we are still left with a mass of problems in his philosophy 
of religion, as the next chapter will make clear. 
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significance: `A great many of the acts which fall within the province of ethics 
are not, as philosophers are too prone to assume, simply in the last resort 
physical movements' 125. In what follows I will be arguing for the acceptance of 
two points: firstly, that the same kind of thing is true for Nietzsche and also, 
secondly, that Nietzsche consciously intended this to be an integral part of his 
account. 
Nietzsche's inquiry primarily involves embarking upon a historical description 
of the emergence of moral language so as to show that although in its 
declarations it purports to objectivity (that is, it claims to be reporting on matters 
of discernible ethical fact) it is in fact the instrument of subjective interests (the 
Genealogy could therefore fairly be said to be an `error theory of morality' in 
something like J. L. Mackie's sense and we might further say - and this will 
become clearer - that Nietzsche's ethics is a mix of emotivism and 
prescriptivism). The idea of a historical approach to morality through a study of 
its language has been a recurrent theme throughout Nietzsche's writing - 
emerging as early as Human, all too Human and surfacing in various other texts 
[see HATH #45; also D #26; Z 65] - but it is only in 1886's Beyond Good and 
Evil that Nietzsche coined the definitive phrase `the slave revolt in morals', 
where this phenomenon of stigmatising the enemy not only as opposed but also 
as evil begins to be concretised in a historical and not fortuitously religious 
setting. The psychological process is at this point and henceforth historically 
interpreted (in what would be wholly anti-Semitic terms, were it not for 
Nietzsche's passion for the kings as opposed to the priests of Israel as expressed 
125 J. L. Austin, How to do things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 20. 
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in the Anti-Christ and his fervour for the Old Testament as opposed to the New 
in the Genealogy). `The Jews', Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good und Evil: 
achieved that miracle of inversion of values thanks to which life on earth has for a couple 
of millennia acquired a new and dangerous fascination - their prophets fused `rich', 
`godless', `evil', `violent', `sensual', into one and were the first to coin the word 'world' 
as a term of infamy. It is this inversion of values (with which is involved the employment 
of the word `poor' as a synonym of `holy' and `friend') that the significance of the 
Jewish people resides: with them there begins the slave revolt in morals [BGE 195 cf. 
also GM 19]. 
Yet although it has often been gestured towards, the Jewish and then the 
Christian slave revolt in morals does not receive anything like a comprehensive 
treatment until the first, short essay of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of vforals, 
where an etymology of the terms for `good' (gut) in certain languages - German, 
Greek, Latin and Gaelic are Nietzsche's chosen examples - provides him with a 
clue for comprehending the genesis of morality as we know it. Central to On the 
Genealogy of A'forals is the insight that the word `good' has not always had the 
same sense (thus the highly speculative pre-history of the Genealogy can be very 
roughly situated at a time after the acquisition of language but before the 
emergence of what we would recognise as morality). This is shown, Nietzsche 
thinks, by the fact that it has been opposed by two kinds of terms: bad (schlecht) 
and evil (böse) - hence the title of the first essay: "Gut und Böse', `Gut und 
Schlecht". In what way have people tended to equivocate with the word `good"' 
Primarily, the word `Good' has been utilised by a type of person that Nietzsche 
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characterises as the `masters' or `nobles' to designate their own aggressive 
nobility: `Good and bad are for a time equivalent to noble and base, master and 
slave' [HATH #45, GM 12]. We will need to return to this initial notion of the 
noble man characterising himself as `good' but I would first like to consider the 
second element of the slave revolt: the fact that, secondarily, the word `good' is 
used by those who Nietzsche calls the `base' or the `slaves' to define themselves 
in contradistinction to the masters whom they, as an opening gesture, have 
already condemned as evil. `Good' is a contrastive concept only for base, slavish 
souls. 
It is important to point out, on the subject of the second way of using the term 
`good', that Nietzsche says that the base's condemnation of the noble man as 
`evil' is not, as the noble's condemnation was, an afterthought but rather `the 
actual deed in the conception of slave morality' [GM 24, original italics]26]. 
VI The Slave Revolt in Morals: Performance Not Description 
It is crucially important to note that Nietzsche characterises the slave's 
designation as a deed, and that this is a characterisation that Nietzsche 
emphasised elsewhere in the text: `Slave morality says `no' on principle to 
everything that is `outside', `other', `non-self and this `no' is its creative deed' 
[GM 21]127. It is so significant because Nietzsche's distinction between thought 
and deed in language clearly suggests that the latter is something like what, 
126 It is extremely important to note here that this is not a quirk of translation; in this regard, see 
Nietzsche, Werke in drei Bänden, ed. K. Schlechta (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1966), vol. II, 785: `die 
eigentliche Tat in der Konzeption einer Sklaven-Moral'. 
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following the pioneering analyses of J. L. Austin, has become known as a 
`performative' or a `speech act', in the sense that it is not primarily or not just 
the transmission of information but that it also contains a performative 
dimension. From the perspective of recent philosophy of language, language is 
comprised - either wholly or partly - of actions, and previous linguistic 
philosophy has suppressed the discovery of this aspect of language by mistaking 
a product (the sign) for its condition of possibility (the speech act). As J. R. 
Searle puts it: `The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been 
supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of 
a sentence in the performance of a speech act. To take the token as a message is 
to take it as a produced or issued message' 28. Looking anew at Nietzsche's 
account of the slave revolt in morals from the highly influential position of the 
speech act theory of linguistic communication, we can see that the slave's 
condemnation of the strong as outlined in the Genealogy is clearly what has in 
recent times been called a performative act, since it is important primarily not for 
its meaning but for its accomplishments: it reverses the values hitherto venerated 
and aims to actualise guilty feeling and more behavioural predictability in the 
strong by `aping', as Austin would say, a description. More specifically, 
Nietzsche only refers to the slaves' speech (and not that of the masters) as a 
deed, suggesting that he reserved the term only for language without any 
descriptive validity (as indeed Austin seems to have done in the first few 
chapters of How to do Things uwith Words, before then radically concluding - in a 
127 Again, Nietzsche uses the word 'Tat' here, Nietzsche, Werke in drei Bänden, vol. II, 782. 
128 J. R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 16. 
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way that would influence Gilles Deleuze but not John Searle - that all language 
was in fact performative129). For Nietzsche, as for the speech act theorists. 
language is not necessarily just description; saying you are evil' is a 
condemnation, and a condemnation is not simply a report or a description but an 
act. The act of condemnation is however, clearly not the kind of explicitly 
performative act that Austin deals with in the opening chapters of his work. It is, 
instead, what Austin calls a primitive rather than an explicit performative and 
moreover, seems to belong to that particular class of performatives he calls 
verdictives130. Verdictives are those set of performative acts that, as the name 
suggests, pronounce a verdict upon a given party and as such belong to the realm 
of ethics and not simply linguistics. 
Does anything stand in the way of our classifying the first slave revolt in 
morals as a speech act? Well, if we are to construe it as a speech act then we 
must surely be able to determine what kind of speech act it is according to the 
further division of performatives into locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts that comes later in Austin's How to do Things with Word031 
With regard to these distinctions, the slaves' condemnation is obviously a 
locutionary act (in that words with meaning are voiced) but it does not at first 
glance seem to be what this school of thought calls an illocutionary act, that is an 
act done in accordance with a social convention that accomplishes something in 
the very act of saying it (say, a judge in court passing a sentence, or a bride in 
church saying `I do'). Rather, it seems to be a perlocutionary act, which is the 
1'9 Austin, How to do things with Words, 145. 
130 Ibid., 42. 
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technical Austinian term for an act that accomplishes something by means of 
saying it (we might frighten someone, for example). Nevertheless, historically 
developed, the act can be seen to become an illocutionary act: a Roman Catholic 
priest telling a churchgoer he has sinned in the institutional context of a 
confessional has obviously acted in a way that an ordinary member of the public 
could not have done. Here however, there is clearly something of a problem, for 
it seems unclear how any such perlocutionary effect as the slave revolt in morals 
could be rendered by a priestly figure without any conventions what. socvcr to 
back him up. Without already established religious conventions conferring 
authority upon the priestly figure there seems little reason for the initial 
condemnation of the strong to achieve its intended perlocutionary effect: 
Nietzsche has a good deal to say about the last pope - but what about the first 
priest? Or, as this point can also be put, who is going to be frightened by the 
counter-intuitive ramblings of some embittered old man wringing his hands at 
the margins of the human community? But, on the other hand, assuming such 
conventions already extant prohibits precisely what Nietzsche intends to explain 
and describe in On the Genealogy of Morals, namely, the emergence of the very 
first reversal of natural morality. This zone of enquiry is happily not a dead end 
however, and is helped out the apparent impasse considerably by Austin's albeit 
brief allusion to the very initiating of the procedures that enframe illocutionary 
acts. According to Austin, someone can initiate a set of conventions necessary 
for an illocutionary act simply by 'getting away with it'. Now, Austin notes that 
the terminology here employed is rather suspicious (by which he presumably 
1z1 Ibid., 98. 
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means vague) but nevertheless regards `getting away with it' as essential132. The 
priests first condemnation of the strong can, then, after all, be regarded as an 
illocutionary act and not just a perlocutionary one, since, although not 
surrounded by a setting of already existing convention it has `got away' with 
suggesting, and therefore by instituting, such a surrounding. 
So much for the potential objection that since On the Genealogy of Morals- is 
primarily an investigation of language, it is therefore a contribution to linguistics, 
not ethics. We must now leave aside this question of the relationship between 
Nietzsche's thought concerning the slave's `revolt in morals' and modem speech 
act theory in order to return and review Nietzsche's exposition, in On the 
Genealogy of Morals, of the first value assumption in human social history, that 
evaluation which preceded the slave revolt. The first value assumption was 
voiced by a human power elite referring positively and spontaneously to 
themselves, a phenomenon which Nietzsche describes as `a heated eruption of 
the highest rank-ordering and rank defining judgements' [GM 13]. On this 
account, we can see that it is human agents themselves and not their actions that 
are the essential - or at least the original - subjects of `moral' predication. The 
noble man spontaneously deems himself to be good, not to accomplish anything 
thereby nor even by measuring himself against an external standard. We might 
therefore venture to say at this point that the noble's self ascription of the term 
`good', the `rank defining judgement' as Nietzsche puts it, has less of a 
performative force than the slave revolt in morals - although it would be 
inattentive to deny that a locutionary and possibly some perlocutionary effect is 
132 Ibid., 30. 
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brought about by it (words are voiced by the nobles after all, and the slaves may 
well be rendered quite panicky by them). Nevertheless, given that the nobles do 
not seek any social changes by means of their locution but rather seek to express 
their self-pride, there is clearly a case to be made here for saying that the noble's 
`rank defining judgement' has less a performative function and more a kind of 
emotive meaning' in C. L. Stevenson's sense: that is, it simply evokes or 
expresses an attitude133. It is a spontaneous cry of enthusiasm. This idea of 
emotive linguistic enthusiasm - whereby the noble `I am good' can be roughly 
translated as `I approve of myself - seems to me to be a very Nietzschean one 
and further it is, I would like to now suggest, a crucial factor in the Nietzschean 
account as it is an intrinsic part of the very power or strength of these types: `The 
noble method of evaluation: this acts and grows spontaneously' [GM 22]. 
To spell out precisely how this relates to the emergence of religion, in the 
pivotal section seven of the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche 
sites the slave revolt in morals at a time just after a supposed split in the social 
elite between the warrior and the priestly class'34. The priests, driven by the will- 
133 C. L. Stevenson, Ethics And Language (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1965), 
33 3. 
134 This type of social topography sketched by Nietzsche in the Genealogy certainly seems to fit 
the society of the ancient Celts, or at least the Celts as they were described by the Romans in 
Britain, i. e. as only possessing two social classes of distinction: the warrior and druidic classes. A 
very different story however, is to be found in Celtic self-description, at least when this came to be 
written down: the Welsh speaking peoples, for example (i. e. the pre-Anglo-Saxon peoples of 
Britain), attached immense importance (as is clear from the laws pertaining to the property that 
they were entitled to claim) to a class of professional poets and storytellers whose ranks could 
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to-power as much as anyone else, then enlisted the common man to help 
undermine the strong type135. The priests found willing accomplices in this 
venture because the base or slavish, who suffer from life, were looking out for 
some pretext to take their mind off their smouldering emotions of painful 
inferiority [GM 99]. The slavish man, the man prone to ressentimenl, thus 
experiences things as painful - `everything hurts' [EH 45] - in a way that 
constantly leads him to recriminate, to apportion blame, to impute, to accuse'36 
The priests so undermined the warrior type, with the help of the great majority, 
by condemning the virtues of the predatory elite - but only because they wanted 
to disparage the strong: `They raise themselves only to lower others' [Z 119]. In 
only be entered into after a formal training in composition and after learning a common oral 
tradition of stories, poems and moral aphorisms: the Bards. 
135 Nietzsche does not attempt to explain why the Priestly and warrior class split, as more than 
one commentator notes, see, for instance, H. Staten, Nietzsche 's Voice (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 48; see also S. Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor (London: Athelone, 
1993), 51-53. 
136 But does not everyone accuse and apportion blame? In the context of the free-will debate, it 
has been famously argued that even if we were metaphysically bereft of free will, eschewing 
emotional responses like resentment and blame would in any case be psychologically impossible: 
`A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation which that would entail, 
does not seem to be something of which human beings would be capable, even if some general 
truth were a theoretical ground for it', P. F. Strawson, `Freedom and Resentment' in Free Will ed. 
G. Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 68. Nietzsche's account of the noble's 
apparent lack of concern with the slave however (alongside some of Spinoza's remarks), might be 
thought to presuppose what Strawson and those influenced by him deny but Nietzsche might well 
answer this empirical point by suggesting that the supposed limits of our species as represented 
here are in fact merely the limits of individuals. 
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order to make their condemnation of the noble type and noble values more 
effective (in order, that is, to give it a greater degree of illocutionary force), 
Nietzsche argues that the priests and the weak who condemn the nobles 
themselves engage in a kind of wishful thinking with regard to the values by 
which they condemned that becomes downright self-deception: When faith is 
more useful, effective, convincing than conscious hypocrisy, hypocrisy 
instinctively becomes innocent' [TI 107, GM 108; VWP #806; AC #39, AC #46]. 
This mix of rancour and the consequent self-deception through which it is played 
out, Nietzsche names ressentiment, which now becomes key term in Nietzsche's 
work. It is this ressentiment based condemnation of the stronger by the weaker 
that is crucial in Nietzsche's historical explanation of the emergence of religions 
and morality: `The slave revolt in morals begins by rancour turning creative and 
giving birth to values' [GM 21 ]. Rancour and ressentiment not only give birth to 
values however, but crucially also introduce new words and concepts into the 
languages of man, concepts to underwrite the new values. `The herd instinct [... ] 
finally gets its word in (and makes words)" [GM 13]. This is why Nietzsche 
writes that the slave revolt in morals is a `workshop where ideals are. fabricated 
[GM 31]. The words, concepts and ideals in question are of course those of a 
monotheistic religious and ethical vocabulary, which are now introduced into the 
evolution of a historical humanity which hitherto had supposedly only 
entertained legal categories like `barter, contract, debt, right, duty, 
compensation' [GM 49]. It is therefore only now that the quintessentially 
religious concepts of `equality', the `immortal soul', `free-will, `guilt', 
`punishment', `responsibility' and ultimately, `God' are introduced into human 
languages. Obviously, some more will need to be said about this. 
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Religion as we modems know it (the polytheistic religion of the ancient 
Greeks is explicitly exempted), it is being suggested by Nietzsche, emerges at a 
specific point in the development of uncivilised society to mask and yet facilitate 
by its very language certain social changes - concerning the hitherto hierarchical 
structure of `heroic' society - desired by the majority of people and their `clever, 
cold, deceptively superior' [GM 98] priests. How does it bring about these 
changes? How does it make the aggressive and emotively self-loving nobility 
take their inferiors into consideration when deciding how to act? Well, the 
concepts of religion are used prescriptively to shatter the `pathos of distance' 
that the noble caste of men feel towards their subordinates and this is done by 
introducing, apparently for the first time in human social history, the concept of a 
`soul' or immaterial spirit that underlies the physiological differences and 
inequalities we see between physically distinguishable individuals. Thus are the 
noble caste persuaded that their (physical and psychological) inferiors are 
nevertheless their (spiritual) equals. As it may also be put, to facilitate the 
acceptance of a universal normative code of ethics prescribing altruistic virtues 
ostensibly based on an equality of men that their actual physical presence 
apparently contradicts, the priests invent the idea of an immortal soul: `It was 
their delusion to believe that one could carry a "beautiful soul" about in a 
cadaverous abortion' [WP #226; for an almost identical text see AC 180]. 
Admittedly, this semblance of equality might be thought to be then erased by the 
extraordinarily inegalitarian Christian distinction, to be found in versions of 
Protestant Christianity but also in St. Augustine, between the `elect' and the 
`reprobate', yet it is wholly restored by the crucial caveat to be found in such 
versions of Christianity that we can never know whether a person is the former 
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or the latter; as John Calvin himself writes: This can rarely be sensed by us (if it 
is ever possible), so it would be a more discreet plan to await the day of 
revelation, and not rashly go beyond God's judgement' 137 
To posit the idea of a spiritual soul beyond the body in this Christian way is to 
effectively suggest two extremely normatively efficacious things. First, and most 
importantly, as we have already acknowledged, it suggests - and this suggestion 
will find prime philosophical expression in Kantian ethics, of course - that all 
men are equally deserving of the same treatment because they are all truly alike, 
that therefore there should be no more hierarchy: "`Equality of souls before 
God", this falsehood, this pretext for the rucune of all the base minded... ' [AC 
#62]. Secondly, the idea of a spiritual soul further suggests that a man's own 
actions do not follow on from his specific physiology but rather from an 
incorporeal spring of free will that is capable of all kinds of activity, therefore 
allowing both punishment for criminal types to be seen as merited in terms of a 
default of responsibility and for the impotence of non-criminal types to be 
construed as voluntary asceticism or pacifism: `The reason the subject (or as we 
more colloquially say, the soul) has been, until now, the best doctrine on earth, is 
perhaps because it facilitated that sublime self-deception whereby the majority of 
the dying, the weak, and the oppressed of every kind could construe weakness 
itself as freedom, and their particular mode of existence as an accomplishment' 
[GM 29]. This point is closely related to, though ultimately more physiological 
than, a similar claim by Schopenhauer concerning the immutability of character: 
`Judaism requires that man should come into the world as a moral zero in order 
137 Calvin, Instiluies, 62. 
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to decide now, by virtue of an inconceivable liberum arbitrium ind ferentiae and 
thus in consequence of rational reflection, whether he wants to be an angel or a 
devil, or anything else that lies between the two' [PP 11 238]. Of course, some 
recent philosophers have claimed that much less turns on the question of free- 
will than Nietzsche thinks, in that we can be justified in feeling morally- 
responsible even if we are not the absolute causal starting point for our actions. 
And a rather different problem is posed by the fact that by no means the whole of 
the Christian tradition espoused the idea of free-will in the way Nietzsche seems 
to assume: so this Nietzschean observation will not worry, say, Calvin. The 
reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument against Christianity as formulated here, 
therefore, will not rely too heavily on his concerns in regard to the absence of 
free-will in humanity. 
So much for our cherished ethico-religious notions such as equality, the soul, 
guilt and altruism 138. These have been shown to be moral concepts that cloak the 
138 For important qualifications and complications, see K. Ansell-Pearson's `Introduction' to the 
Cambridge edition of Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, and his An Introduction to 
Nietzsche as Political Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially 126, 
where, for instance, it is rightly pointed out that in the second essay of the Genealogy justice is 
said to be invented by the nobility (and associated with the contractual relationship between 
creditor and debtor) [GM 45]. Nevertheless, it is important to note that by the third essay 
Nietzsche is back to linking justice with `vengeance seekers disguised as judges with the word 
justice continually in their mouths like poisonous spittle' [GM 96]. Following a line of argument 
that is largely implicit throughout Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Athelone, 
1992), 1 would tentatively suggest the nobility invented justice as a non-egalitarian virtue infer 
pares - 'Justice at this first level is the good will, between those who are roughly equal, to come 
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truth of the self interest of one specific social party: the slaves, the dejected, the 
physiological casualties. But what about the concept of God Himself? What 
crucially remains to be mentioned in this account is that the priests also 
underwrite this idea of an equality of souls and their consequent responsibility 
with the further concept of a powerful, jealous and vengeful God. The God that 
emerges from this `workshop of fabricated ideals' - itself essential to the slave 
revolt in morals - is a God who demands precisely those modes of behaviour that 
are anathema to the noble man in his original state. The priests are, as Poellner 
puts it, `glorifying a God who allegedly demands of them precisely the virtues 
which they alone are capable of exercising' 139. And as Richard Schacht has 
argued, the two specific hypotheses of God and the soul may dialectically rely 
upon each other in so far as the soul needs the theological and philosophical 
intelligibility that the further concept of God can provide and in so far as the 
concept of God too relies upon the soul for intuitive evidence and, perhaps, a 
conceptual blueprint140Nietzsche does not however, discuss why the 
monotheistic concept of God internal to the Christian tradition possesses 
precisely the attributes it does, nor - leaving aside the implicit and in any case 
ambiguous apparent reference to God's infinity in his remark about the 
`Christian God' being the `maximal god yet achieved' [GM 66] - does he 
catalogue what those attributes are (nor is he therefore in a position to discuss 
whether they are collectively coherent). Instead, Nietzsche takes what we are in a 
to terms with each other' [GM 50] - but this was then, contra the intentions of the noble 
inventors, requisitioned by the `slaves' and universalised to apply to all. 
139 Poellner, Nietzsche acrd Metaphysics, 231. 
140 R. Schacht, Nietzsche (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 198-3), 131. 
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position to call a recognisably Kantian rather than dogmatically metaphysical 
approach to the issue: our concept of God is taken to reflect the demands of 
moral obligation: `God-the-Judge, as God-the-Hangman, as the beyond, as 
eternity, as torture without end, as hell, as immeasurable punishment and guilt' 
[GM 68]. 
Far, then, from arising, as it did in Kant, from a necessary and to some extent 
beneficial tendency of the mind and as a necessary pre-condition of moral 
conduct; or as in Schopenhauer as a more or less unexplained temporary and 
local aberration of (Western) reason, the idea of God was tactically invented, 
Nietzsche suggests, by the priests as an anthropomorphic super-agent; an inflated 
judge to explain why we have equal souls and to threaten to inflict harm on those 
who chose not to follow the norms of the herd which preached respect and 
equality between responsible `souls'. According to Nietzsche, God is primarily 
the means by which the priests act at a distance upon the strong. The priests are 
said to influence the noble barbarian: `Only by arousing the belief that they have 
in their hands a higher, mightier strength - God' [WP #140]. Theology has thus 
evolved as an effective answer to certain practical problems; an ontology where 
one might have expected only an ethics. 
Nietzsche's `God' is thus primarily a Kantian God: a judge and not a creator. 
Nietzsche's `God' is concept invented by the weak, partly to help them hope for 
a redemption that would suit them more than this life by granting them salvation 
and partly to try and both restrain and also wreak vengeance on the strong and 
healthy nobility, those who have a spontaneous emotive sense of their own value. 
It does this by attempting to frighten the noble type, already psychologically 
scarred by bad conscience, and by better securing the doctrines of the soul and 
19? 
free-will. From the Nietzschean viewpoint whereby the sole measure of value is 
strength or power, monotheistic religions must therefore be found wanting: 
`What is the purpose of those lying concepts [... ] `soul', `spirit', `free-will', 
`God' if it is not the physiological ruination of mankind? ' [EH 97, see also AC 
175, WP #707}. 
Nietzsche has arguably given us in On the Genealogy of 'Morals an unnerving 
insight into the language of religion and morality, language that itself, in a non- 
descriptive - illocutionary - way, manifests rancour. In such a way can he 
condemn Christian morality by means of its speech, its words and ideals, and be 
doing more than the philosophy of language or linguistics. This second 
characterisation of monotheistic religion however, which is to say the 
characterisation of religion as a desire for revenge, also has the virtue of 
exposing the motivations of Christian feeling to be the very desires - hatefulness, 
vengeance, anger - that Christianity condemns: `The motives of this morality 
stand opposed to its principle' [GS #21]. The argument of the Genealok of 
Morals, therefore, shows Christianity to be contradictory and incoherent in 
addition to being a tool of the slavish and therefore an activity deserving of little 
merit. Before concluding our account of Nietzsche's two-pronged attack on 
Christian theism however, I would like to counter an important objection to 
Nietzsche's denunciation of Christianity that can and has been raised at this 
point. 
1/71A Socratic Objection 
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The objection that I have in mind has nothing to do with any aspect of the 
accuracy of Nietzsche's historical explanation. Although Nietzsche's narrative in 
the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals certainly seems underdefended 
qua historical account, any objection to Nietzsche along such lines as these 
probably runs the risk of being as tenuously speculative as the account it 
criticises. I have therefore eschewed such an approach in favour of raising an 
objection that might be said to be typically Socratic. Typically Socratic? By this I 
mean that it attaches itself to the conceptual analysis of a word that Nietzsche 
might be thought to be misusing. It is also literally Socratic: in the Gorgias, the 
character of Callicles suggests that moral conventions are made by the 
weaklings who form the majority of mankind [... ] in an endeavour to frighten 
those who are stronger and capable of getting the upper hand' 141 Callicles' 
historical insight appears to derive from a rigorously empirical examination of 
the processes of nature or, at least, Callicles looks to such empirical findings in 
nature to support his thesis. He sees that in nature the strong always predominate. 
Since they do not in human society, morality must be an anti-natural ruse on the 
part of the weak. Callicles asserts that `The truth of this can be seen in a variety 
of examples drawn both from the animal kingdom and the complex communities 
of human beings; right consists in the superior ruling over the inferior and having 
the upper hand'. From a necessarily limited number of examples, Callicles seems 
to have induced a descriptive law of nature, which he then contrasts with the 
kind of morality which Socrates expounds, consequently calling it mere 
convention, which is to say, unnatural. I have been arguing, as should now be 
141 Plato, The Gorgias, 484. The following citation from Callicles can be located at 483. 
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clear, that this was also very roughly Nietzsche's methodology (though their 
respective approaches are not without significant differences, particularly 
concerning the origin, as opposed to the present purpose of the concept of 
j ustice142). Socrates however, then adumbrates the view that the amoral cannot 
be termed stronger since it is precisely the moral that actually hold power: to call 
the amoral both stronger and weaker is obviously to ascribe contradictory 
predicates to them at one and the same time143. Given that Nietzsche's position is 
in some respects quite close to that of Callicles, we should at this point ask 
whether this distinctively Socratic objection to Callicles can be 
unproblematically extended so as to apply to Nietzsche. When Nietzsche writes 
that `The weaker dominate the strong again and again' [TI 87] or that `harm 
comes to the strong not from the strongest but from the weakest' [GM 94], can 
he then on this view be seen to be making a contradictory statement? Nietzsche 
seems to be aware of the objection himself, apparently raising - but not 
answering - it in the guise of an imaginary interlocutor: `Why do you talk about 
nobler ideals! Lets bow to the facts: the people have won [... ] this intoxication 
has succeeded [GM 20-21 ]. 
Others have also raised this objection. It was recently revised - though without 
reference to Socrates' argument - by Arthur Danto in his Nietzsche as 
Philosopher: `One would think that strong is as strong does and that it is virtually 
inconsistent to say of x and y that x is weaker than y, but y succumbs to x' 144 
Danto clearly takes the Socratic line of believing that strength cannot, on pain of 
142 See note 138. 
143 ibid., 488-89. 
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contradiction, be predicated of those who are obviously subjugated in society by 
stronger parties. The fact that commentators have charged Nietzsche with such 
an inconsistency in this connection means that we should, at this point, feel 
obliged to answer this charge, despite it being fairly simple to spot where the 
chief problem with the argument lies. Before examining what I believe to be the 
correct way to vitiate Danto's argument against Nietzsche however, I wish to 
take an abbreviated look at one other possible answer to this charge of 
contradiction. In the end, the answer can be seen to fail but it is nevertheless 
illuminating to see how it does so fail, especially since it is a strategy that could 
be said to rely on certain hints found in Nietzsche's own texts. 
The first answer to the charge of contradiction on Nietzsche's part that I want 
to examine is not, strictly speaking, an answer to the charge at all. For instead of 
denying the charge one could concede Danto's point about Nietzsche 
contradicting himself but then embrace it by stressing the fact that Nietzsche is 
an irrationalist, an anti-metaphysician, a deconstructionist or an existentialist 
(attempting, by contradiction, to indirectly touch upon the otherwise 
inexpressible). On all these readings, different from each other though they 
undoubtedly are, Nietzsche is fundamentally unconcerned with -mere' logical 
inconsistency, which finds support in the fact that Nietzsche indeed seems to 
have occasionally explicitly rejected the laws of logic, including that of non- 
contradiction, on the - loosely Kantian145 - grounds that beyond the world of our 
144 A. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 186-87. 
145 These grounds are only loosely Kantian because Kant of course thought that the Antinomies 
section of his first ('r"itigrie proved that reality in itself is timeless and spaceless rather than being 
temporal, spatial and contradictory. See CPR A 506 =B 534. 
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senses is a cosmos of flux, without entities to which such laws would apply [Cf. 
WP #516]. Probably the most celebrated exponent of something like this view is 
Paul de Man, who naturally makes the move of citing WP #516 as support for his 
picture of a `deconstructive' Nietzsche: for once the principle of contradiction is 
put into question our assertions are `free' from the constraints of logicl46. But 
there are in fact two fundamental flaws that can be associated with subscribing to 
such a view, one of which is exegetical and one philosophical. In the first place, 
this position is only rehearsed by the mature Nietzsche in his Nachlass and it 
would therefore be quite uncharitable of us to lay too much critical stress on a 
view that never even made it into Nietzsche's mature published works. More 
importantly, in the second place it can be pointed out that it clearly rests on a 
certain fallacy (which may explain why the position never made it into his late 
published work): the issue of whether enduring entities exist or not has no 
intrinsic bearing on the relationship between logic and reality, since even in a 
universe of ceaseless change, we should still not be able to say that the cosmos is 
both changing and acquiescent'47. Moreover, even in a world without 
substantival entities we could still intelligibly predicate types of movement or 
change to the fluctuations: they can be fast or slow, viscous or fluid or even 
sluggish but getting faster. Here the referent to which we are ascribing movement 
or change would not be an object but the event itself - as Nietzsche himself at 
one point seems to admit, stating that there are `complexes of events apparently 
durable in comparison with other complexes - e. g., through the difference in 
146 de Man, Allegories of Reading, 124-125. 
147 See Poellner, Niet. -sche and Metaphysics. 193-194. 
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tempo of the event' [WP #552]. Even in a cosmos of ceaseless flux without 
enduring entities then, the laws of contradiction would seem to still apply and 
therefore to outlaw any apparent self-contradiction on Nietzsche's part149 
The second and more promising answer to the Socratic charge of contradiction 
however, would be to question the basic conceptual premises of Danto's 
accusation. For in Danto's argument the implication appears to be that the 
concept of strength in Nietzsche is reducible to and exhausted by talk about 
empirical socio-physical superiority. Yet it can be shown that this does not seem 
to be the case at all. Nietzsche is working with a concept of strength that is 
considerably broader then Danto has been willing to allow. 
Although we do often mean by the word `strength' brute, muscular ability, 
there are also many cases in quite normal linguistic usage where we mean 
something quite different but are nevertheless still far from speaking 
metaphorically. Expressions such as `I will need you to be strong at your father's 
funeral tomorrow' demand an interpretation along very different lines, an 
interpretation that pictures strength in terms not of physical potency but of 
emotional balance, mental stability or being well-constituted. Moreover, there is 
good textual substantiation for an ascription of such non-physical view of 
strength as something like self-reliance to Nietzsche. For example, in the chapter 
`What is Noble? ' in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche explicitly states of the 
noble caste that `Their superiority lay, not in their physical strength but in their 
148 Another logically possible - but hardly very plausible - answer would be to interpret 
Nietzsche's seemingly contradictory passages as we interpret phrases like `the blind see', i. e. that 
those who were once strong are now dominated. Yet this reading seems to me not to remain true 
to the spirit of Nietzsche's writing. 
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psychical' [BGE #257]. Psychical strength is emotive self-sufficiency. On this 
interpretation then, Nietzsche's talk of nobility represents a profound 
sophistication of the Calliclean reading of conventional morality since strength is 
now defined in such a broadened way as to elude the Socratic charge that the 
immoralist of the Calliclean stamp is ascribing contrary predicates to one and the 
same subject at the same time. Nietzsche can consistently talk of the stronger - 
meaning more noble - being subordinated to the weaker and accordingly can 
consistently see religion as both socially dominating and a symptom of 
powerlessness at the same time. Arthur Danto's Socratic objection to Nietzsche's 
account of strength is therefore successfully pre-empted by Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche's second psychological characterisation of religion, this time as a 
desire for revenge against the strong, can therefore be said to be conceptually 
consistent, although its soundness of course relies upon the soundness of the 
admittedly scant inductive researches which Nietzsche conducted in the world of 
nature and human history (because it was the discovery of the will to power or 
something very like it that allowed him to assume that morality was motivated by 
drives opposed to its principle). The issue of their particular plausibility I shall 
revert to in the following chapter. 
VIII Conclusion 
It has been maintained here that Nietzsche's atheism is argued for along two 
cardinal lines. First, by not unreasonably suggesting that Christians are all 
essentially concerned with a beatific afterlife, a blissful `beyond', which then 
shows them to be ill suited to this world and, at least by Nietzsche's unmerciful 
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standards, worthless. Their weakness on this account is questionable, I found 
Poellner suggesting, since certain Christians were apparently unconcerned with 
perpetuity. Nietzsche attempted to pre-emptively counter this objection with a 
supplementary account of strong individuals converting to Christianity out of 
heroic risk. But this amendment itself seemed to fail because the social controls 
that force people into internalisation of their desires would be countered by the 
truly heroic. 
Nietzsche's second main attack on Christianity was based on an reading of 
nature and history that found these realms to be governed by strength. Since 
morality and religion claimed not to be so governed, Nietzsche claimed that they 
were unnatural, weak and therefore were without value. Nietzsche had an 
anthropological `story' which detailed exactly how the weak moralists had 
subordinated the strong: they had invented certain ideals associated with 
monotheistic religion and brought about particular social effects by means of 
speech acts. We then examined a philosophic response to this kind of account 
that had been recently raised: that the strong could not be both subordinated and 
yet still strong. We then saw that Nietzsche did not actually mean brutal physical 
strength when he used terms such as noble and strong but rather meant a kind of 
emotive self-reliance. Nietzsche's account of the origin of religion in 
ressentiment thus eludes a certain Socratic objection (voiced in recent times by 
Danto) and maintains a certain internal conceptual coherence. We must, then, 
admit in conclusion that Nietzsches analysis of religion as slavish therefore 
survives Danto's criticism largely undiminished, whilst his analysis of religion as 
escapist - thanks, in part, to Poellner's criticism - is left unconvincing. 
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Yet the question `why value strength over weakness? ' might well be asked at 
this point, especially since there remains an apparent conflict not only between 
Nietzsche's amor fati and his obvious disgust with weakness but also between his 
thoughts on the eternal recurrence needing acceptance of the world as a whole 
and this extremely negative attitude toward human deficiency. We will render 
this point more perspicuous in the following chapter. Moreover, given that 
Nietzsche advocates the overcoming of theism and of theistic morality by an 
attachment to values of unprovoked strength, health and power, it follows that 
any kind of atheism would have to be similarly healthy and strong to gain 
acceptance in Nietzsche's eyes. And this is indeed the case, as we shall also see 
in our next chapter. 
Ultimately, it is Nietzsche's own valorisation of health and nobility that are to 
be seen at the basis of his rejection of God. Nietzsche has no arguments against 
the miraculous basis of the historical religions of the type that we might associate 
with Hume nor has he any anti-theological arguments against the concept or the 
traditional proofs of God of the kind we find presented in the Transcendental 
Dialectic of Kant's first Critique. Nietzsche's objections to God would seem to 
be based entirely on value and not at all on ontology. Yet it may well be that A 
Nietzsche's most famous remark is that `God is dead', which can be read as an 
apparently, if paradoxically, ontological claim. From the viewpoint of the 
conclusions I have argued for in this chapter however, we could maintain that that 
particular phrase, like the entirety of Nietzsches philosophy of religion, can be 
taken in a sense that is other than ontological: it can be taken to mean that the 
truth of the existence of a creator is an issue marginal to the central and 
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quintessentially Socratic question of how best a man should spend his time before 
facing his inevitable demise. 
20, 
6. Nietzsche (2): Ressentiment, Truth and the Nature of Reality. 
One has unlearned the habit of conceding to this posited ideal the realm' of a 
person; one has become atheistic. But has the ideal itself been renounced? 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power [WP # 17] 
I Victory without Argument? 
Recently, M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern have argued that Nietzsche's pervasive 
fascination with the Christian religion only really seems to have soured into the 
theoretical antagonism that we systematically analysed in the previous chapter 
after the completion of his first book, The Birth of' Tragedy from the Spirit of 
Music, despite what is standardly noted both by most Nietzsche-commentators 
and - therefore misleadingly - by Nietzsche himself in his post-eventum 
reflections on that particular text. According to Silk and Stern's - to my mind, 
persuasive - reading, Nietzsche, although no longer himself a practising or 
believing Christian at this point, nevertheless retained enough sympathy for the 
religion and its values and its practices to actually identify the expression of that 
faith with the `Dionysian impulse' in The Birth of' Tragedy, associating, for 
example, the Christian celebration of the Eucharist with quasi-Dionysian 
festivity149. But whatever we may think of the merits of that particular 
association, and although it may be worth noting that the early Nietzsche might 
not therefore have been an out and out anti-Christian, this insight does not effect 
1 49 M. S. Silk and J. P Stem, Nietzsche on J agedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 121; see also 213 and 287. 
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the argument of the present thesis, as it is rightly regarded as a commonplace that 
matters stand quite differently with his later self The later Nietzsche - who is 
the Nietzsche that we are concerned with in the present study - condemned the 
Christian religious tradition again and again in his writings, to the extent that 
many authors, from varying schools of philosophy, today regard Nietzsche as the 
critic of Christianity and, in particular, Christian ethics (although at the end of 
the present chapter we shall be in a position to see whether in fact Christian 
dogmas, values and practices need necessarily be condemned from the 
standpoint of the mature Nietzsche). The broad approach of Nietzsche's 
systematic anti-religious campaign, as we saw in considerable detail in the 
previous chapter, was to diagnose traditional Judaeo-Christian theism as being 
psychologically and - since Nietzsche seems to naturalistically reduce the state 
of the mind to the state of the body - physiologically unhealthy. Three religious 
psycho-pathologies were diagnosed by the mature Nietzsche: an ascetic escapism 
sought by terrestrial discontents, a kind of resentment, which essentially involves 
self-deception, that was expressed by those who felt themselves inferior to some 
`other', and the psychological masochism which somewhat ptolemaicly 
supplemented the escapist account, with regard to those strong and dominant 
types who nevertheless embraced Christianity, such as St. Teresa of Avila. We 
have thus encountered what seemed to Nietzsche to be the three principal forms 
of religion's historic perversion of the human species: the figures of 
ressentiment. `bad conscience' and the -ascetic ideal'. These three forms of 
religious psychopathology are independently treated by Nietzsche in the three 
successive essays of On the (knL'alogy of Morals, giving that particular text a 
profoundly anti-religious organisation. 
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These specific Nietzschean diagnoses of religious impulses were intricately 
formulated. Nietzsche's account of the escapist `ascetic ideal', for instance, 
though it failed to account for the presence of (in Nietzsche's sense) `strong' 
Christians, was supplemented by an account of `bad conscience' which 
attempted to do precisely that - although this itself, we had to concede, was not a 
wholly satisfactory account because problems still remained concerning the 
precise motivation of internalisation by the `strong'. More impressive were 
Nietzsche's apparently empirical investigations into the historical and linguistic 
4 slave revolt in morals'; investigations which adequately fended off certain 
objections that we raised. The further point that I would like to make here in this 
chapter is that these psycho-physiological investigations clearly carry within 
them the axiological implication that atheism would be a belief system 
characterised by a more advantageous human relationship to terrestrial reality. 
Nietzsche, it appears fair to say, seems to make of atheism a healthy alternative 
to the escapism, bad conscience and ressentiment of theism. But what is not said 
here in Nietzsche's account in On the Genealogy of Morals and related texts is 
anything that would really guarantee - rather than simply imply without 
argument - the purported health of atheism. Yet that the onus probandi 
lies with 
the theist rather than with the atheist is of course a historical contingency and 
one that we well know has reversed over time. From which it follows that just 
because Nietzsche has arguably shown theism to be unhealthy - or has at least 
cast some doubt upon its health - by means of the physiologically reductionist 
arguments that we examined at some length in the previous chapter, it does not 
in fact necessarily follow from such a position that atheism is therefore any the 
more healthy and valuable: atheism might turn out to be adhered to by the atheist 
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for unconscious reasons just as escapist - and just as resentful - as those that 
drove the priests and adherents of theistic religion. 
In this chapter, then, I want to accomplish four main tasks. First, I want to 
establish that Nietzsche does in fact view atheism as being potentially' subject to 
ressentiment and therefore as being as unhealthy as religion. Second, I want to 
demonstrate that Nietzsche also characterises atheism as pathological in a further 
sense in so far as it is potentially in league with what he calls the `will to truth', 
which is associated with the `ascetic ideal'. Thirdly, I would then like to argue 
that there is, nevertheless, a way of interpreting Nietzsche so that there remain no 
obvious self-referential difficulties in Nietzsche's own atheism. However, in 
arguing that we can interpret Nietzsche as escaping inconsistency on these points 
I should not be taken to mean that Nietzsche's atheism thereby escapes criticism 
tout court. On the contrary, I will be maintaining, a certain charge of artificiality 
or favouritism may well afflict Nietzsche's affirmation of one mode of the will 
to power at the expense of another (this constitutes the fourth and final point that 
I wish to argue for here). In other words, even if atheism can be shown to be 
healthy and theism shown to be unhealthy by Nietzschean standards, it 
nevertheless still remains to be shown why, if everything is to be reduced to the 
will to power, one particular mode of expression of that will is any better than 
another. I will be maintaining that this problem, which is a rather different 
problem to the one of self reference, is the real downfall of Nietzsche's 
Y- 
naturalistic approach to religion. To be as fair as I can to Nietzsche however, I 
will look at a new way of reading - or reconstructing - Nietzsche's argument 
against Christianity's peculiar expression of the will to power that has recently 
been proposed by Keith Ansell-Pearson. I will be claiming that although the 
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logic of Ansell-Pearson's attentive argument will prove to be faultless, it 
nonetheless might be thought to be inconclusive because one of its empirical 
premises is open to dispute. First of all however, I would like to examine 
Nietzsche's view of atheism as being potentially subject to ressentiment and will 
do so initially by means of a heuristically instructive reference to certain of the 
psychoanalytic doctrines of Sigmund Freud. 
II Psychoanalysis and Ressentiment 
The similarity between Freud's thought and that of Nietzsche could easily be, 
and often is, exaggerated. Having said that, there are, as was mentioned in 
passing in the previous chapter, some striking structural similarities between 
Nietzsche's account of `bad conscience' as the internalisation of aggression and 
Freud's in some respects similar account of `neurosis'. I would now like to argue 
that there is a further primae facie similarity between the general structure of 
Nietzsche's and Freud's criticisms of religion. To demonstrate this I will of 
course in the first place have to give some indication of the substance of Freud's 
views concerning religion. Briefly stated, Freud argued - originally in a paper 
entitled `Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' and published in 1907 - that 
religious practice often has the ritualistic character that seemed to him to be 
typical of the obsessional neuroses he had had clinical experience of in 
psychoanalytic practice, an insight which then led him to surmise that, like 
obsessional neurosis which, on the psychoanalytic reading, attempts to expiate 
guilt for some unacceptable thought or deed by repeated rituals, religion and its 
sacraments and ceremonials might also be based on a way of assuaging guilt, an 
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argument from analogy that Freud then attempted to confirm with highly 
speculative historical and anthropological backing in texts such as Totem and 
Taboo (where this guilt was notoriously traced to a purported primitive 
parricide), Moses and Monotheism and The Future of an Illusion, where this 
highly speculative account of religion as guilt allaying is complimented by an 
analysis of religion's rather different role in fulfilling our wishes (a function of 
religion which was also sporadically explored by earlier atheists such as 
Feuerbach in The Essence of Christianity, as well as by Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche). This, in short, is the widely accepted view of Freud's reading of the 
Semitic monotheistic religions: religion is psychoanalytically interpreted as a 
reaction to guilt and an expression of wish fulfilment. Yet this is far from being 
the whole story, for on the other hand, atheism itself is not exempt from the 
investigations of Freudian psychopathology and From the History of an Infantile 
Neurosis is probably the Freudian text that goes the furthest in this regard. 
As is well known, Freud's work is broadly composed of two distinct but 
overlapping types of text: case studies of certain mental disorders and the rather 
more systematic works on psychology that are meant to illuminate them from the 
position of an overarching theoretical standpoint. From the History! of * an 
Infantile Neurosis is an example of the former type of text: a case study of a 
child who suddenly developed some socially disruptive behaviour traits. 
Alongside his restless side however, the child simultaneously developed what we 
could call a religious fixation, which manifested itself in, for example, a 
tendency for compulsive praying and for repeatedly making signs of the cross. 
Yet the child's religious obsession was, crucially, accompanied by an irreligious 
or atheistic streak: so when his mother introduced him to the lessons of Biblical 
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scripture, the child automatically responded with cynical objections and 
doubts150. Now, we might expect a thinker such as Freud, «ho considered 
religious ritual to be a psychopathological means of guilt expiation, to 
psychoanalyse the child's religious tendencies and conclude the analysis there. 
The cynical objections to religion we might expect to be seen as healthy and 
therefore disregarded as material for psychoanalysis. But what Freud also does is 
psychoanalyse this atheistic side of the young boy, thereby suggesting that 
atheism, too, is pathological in the relevant sense. It is worth citing a little of this 
Interesting passage: 
His old love for the father [... ] was therefore the source of his energy in struggling 
against God and of his acuteness in criticising religion. But on the other hand this 
hostility to the new God wasn't an original reaction either; it had its prototype in a hostile 
impulse against the father. 151 
This analysis of atheism is a remarkable though (as far as I am aware) 
overlooked illustrative point in the texts that can be taken to constitute a 
Freudian theory of religion; for here atheism is read as a fully analysable 
psychologically determined phenomenon. Irrespective of its specifics (which are 
150 S. Freud, from the History of an Ir f mntile Neurosis in Penguin f reud Library, Vol. 9 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991). 298. 
I'1 Ibid., 302.1 have used this quote from Freud's From the History of an Infantile Neurosis to 
make a similar point about atheism and psychoanalysis in my M. A. thesis, Athei. s, n and 
Agnosticism in Modern Continental Philosophy, which dealt with phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis., although I have rewritten the surrounding paragraphs for this thesis. 
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too involved to go into here), this case study well illuminates the point that with 
regard to the question of our relationship to God, whether the relationship is one 
of faith or one of disbelief, there is no, as it were, `non-pathological position' 
according to Freudian psychoanalysis: no standpoint upon the question of God 
can be taken up without a psychoanalyst being able, at least in principle, to 
determine the reasons for the psychological attractiveness of that belief to any 
given individual. Regardless, then, of the eventual truth or philosophical 
coherence of the theoretical positions concerned - the psychoanalyst qua 
psychoanalyst is simply not concerned with this question - neither atheism nor 
theism can regard itself as the psychologically healthy alternative to the other. 
The popular reading of Freud as, purportedly after the manner of Nietzsche, 
dismissing the Semitic monotheistic religions as unhealthy simpliciter is 
consequently highly misleading since, within the true framework of 
psychoanalytical theory, no `healthy' position can be looked to so as to contrast 
it with. The tangential remarks, oblique references and derisory asides that 
indicate an atheism at the heart of Freud's theoretical writing must therefore be 
taken to constitute a concerted though nonetheless a personal standpoint: a 
literature - rather than a philosophy - of atheism. 
As a philosophic description of Freud's views on religious matters, the 
summary just given above is no doubt inadequate, perhaps grossly so. But my 
oversimplified synopsis serves its present purpose if it is simply taken as an 
illustration of the fact that attacks upon the psychology of theistic religion need 
not necessarily carry within them the implication that atheism be any the more 
healthy. And this in fact appears to be the case, I now want to argue, for the 
Nietzschean genealogist as much as it is for the Freudian psychoanalyst. 
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Our look at Freud casts a certain amount of indirect light upon Nietzsche's 
theory of religion because in certain texts, which could otherwise easily be 
overlooked, Nietzsche seems to find atheism to be the outcome of not entirely 
healthy psychological tendencies. In a note from the 14'ill To Power, for example, 
Nietzsche argues against supposing atheism to be healthy tout court in the 
following way: 
The underprivileged [... ] need victims so as not to quench their thirst for destruction by 
destroying themselves (-which would perhaps be reasonable)... This scapegoat can be 
God - in Russia there is no lack of such atheists from Ressentiment [WP #765]. 
Here Nietzsche is clearly sketching a theory of atheism as unhealthy - it might be 
`reasonable' for such atheists to destroy themselves, he tells us - and his use of 
the technical term Ressentiment in this note signals that it is a theory along the 
same lines as his theory of religion as slavish, i. e. as espoused not for its own 
intrinsic merits but rather, self-deceptively, in order to denigrate some other 
party. And although this note was admittedly unprepared for publication, it 
nevertheless indicates a pattern of thought that does find expression in those of 
his writings which found their way into his published work: a passage from On 
the Genealogy of Morals, for example, tells of the so-called `English' - though I 
take it that Nietzsche actually means `Scottish' here152 - psychologist's 
152 1 take it, that is, that Nietzsche is referring primarily to Hume. Thus when Nietzsche writes in 
the Genealogy of `These English psychologists [... ] looking for what is really effective, guiding 
and decisive for our development where mans intellectual pride would least like to find it (for 
example, in the "is inertiae of habit, or in forgetfulness or in a blind and random coupling of ideas 
211 
`subterranean animosity and rancune towards Christianity' [GM 11 ]. We hay e 
every reason to suppose that what Nietzsche means in this passage by 
`subterranean rancune' is precisely unconscious Ressentiment. Also noteworthy 
in this connection is a passage from Beyond Good and Evil where Nietzsche 
disdainfully talks of an `indignant man' who is said to rage at God [BGE #26]. 
It is apparent from such passages as these that Nietzsche seems prepared to 
allow that atheism as much as theism could be fuelled by re. s. sentiment, his 
technical term for the tendency which gains pleasure from the prior criticism of 
others based upon universal criteria that are believed to be but are in fact not 
valued for their own sake, instead being self-deceptively espoused precisely to 
denigrate the other party. However, it might be thought that such remarks as 
those we have just quoted are too infrequent in Nietzsche's works for us to 
confidently interpret Nietzsche as suggesting that atheism can be ressentiment 
based. To this I reply that we could certainly hope for more elaboration on this 
topic from Nietzsche but that, few though they may be, the very existence of (at 
least the published) quotes I have just cited do constitute real evidence for 
attributing to Nietzsche such a view as aI have here propounded. 
If atheism can be based on ressentiment though, does it follow that it always 
is? Not necessarily. The atheist evidently can be subject to ressentiment but there 
is no indication from Nietzsche that he is always so subject. It should therefore 
be clarified that Nietzsche's critique of atheism is not that engaging with theistic 
or in something purely passive, automatic, reflexive and thoroughly stupid)' [GM 11 ] it may be 
remembered that Hume's account of our nature does stress both habit - in his monumentally 
philosophically influential account of causality, for example - and the mechanistic coupling of 
ideas through resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect. 
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religion, as atheism necessarily does, in some sense always perpetuates that 
theistic tradition and thereby always exhibits traces of unhealthy infatuation with 
one's supposed target. (Although I will not examine the wider implications of 
this here, Nietzsche therefore could not be said to agree with Freud's view as 
articulated in the succinct 1925 text, `Negation', where he writes that `The 
content of a repressed idea or image can make its way into consciousness on 
condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognisance of what it 
repressed' 153. On such an interpretation, the negations of theism could be 
interpreted as expressions of a repressed interest in their subject matter'54 It is 
important to note this because if this point about atheism having a suspicious 
inbuilt reference to theism was indeed the substance of Nietzsche's attack, then 
any comeback to the charge that, given that Nietzsche himself was actively 
negating Christianity he was therefore espousing an unhealthy atheism, would be 
ruled out. ) 
It might at this stage be worth summarising the conclusions reached so far in 
the present chapter: taken together and amplified in the manner that I have 
suggested, the passages from Nietzsche that we looked at earlier suggest that 
according to Nietzsche atheism can be subject to one of the dramatic arguments 
153 Freud, `Negation' in Penguin Freud Library Vol. 11,437-438. 
154 The application of the Freudian model of negation to the theoretical position of the atheist was 
first suggested to me by a reading of David Berman's paper `Disclaimers as Offence Mechanisms 
in Charles Blount and John Toland', in M. Hunter and D. Wooton, (eds. ) Atheism from the 
Reformation to the Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 255-272. Berman 
however, applies this model to the denial of atheism, suggesting that some theists are unconscious 
atheists, whilst I am applying it to the denial of theism, suggesting the reverse. 
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that he himself first brought against Christianity: namely, that it expressed an 
unconscious desire that was symptomatic of the need of a subjected humanity to 
define themselves as good (and therefore think well of themselves) in 
contradistinction to some superior, dominant and strong other who makes them 
feel inferior and whom they have already stigmatised as base. In this case, such 
subjects of re. vsentiment, by virtue of not having a natural and spontaneous good 
feeling about themselves, have to establish the conditions - which include 
conceptual conditions, formed in the `workshop where ideals, are f ibrkaied' - 
under which the semblance of such a self-righteous feeling can arise. 
In an earlier chapter, I wrote of Nietzsche's original reflections on 
res,, ventiment relying for their plausibility on how convincing we find Nietzsche's 
insights concerning human motivation. This new account of atheism from 
ressentiment also relies on such a provision. But it might also be vulnerable to a 
further objection concerning the issue of self-reference. What I mean is that this 
particular analysis of atheism as born of ressentiment that we have extracted 
from some of Nietzsche's writings might be thought to be problematic for the 
coherence of Nietzsche's thought as a whole because Nietzsche's analysis of 
Christianity could be characterised as itself subject to ressentiment, i. e. driven 
(the argument runs) by a resentful expression of the will to power and so as not a 
healthy alternative to religion at all. Such charges as this are in fact fairly 
common in some sectors of the secondary literature and are surprisingly 
consequential, since they entirely undercut Nietzsche's value critique of religion 
as unhealthy by implicating that very critique in the pathology it intends to 
expose. I shall say more about such problems of self-reference shortly. But 
before my attempt to answer such complaints, I would like to point out that 
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Nietzsche thinks that atheism can also be motivated by yet another - and no 
more healthy - drive. The will-to truth'. 
III Will the Truth Set Us Free? 
But first, a flashback to Plato. In his Republic. Plato notoriously thought it 
good that the guardians of his eponymous political state should actually be 
deceived about their ancestral origins, a standpoint in defence of deception 
which is explicitly against his own view in the Charinic/'es, where we hear that 
`the discovery of things as they truly are is a good common to all mankind''" 
For the guardians of the Republic at least, then, the discovery of the true, the 
discovery of things as they truly are, is not a good. But his position in the 
Republic seems little favoured today (except by Nietzsche): in everyday life we 
tend to believe that finding out the truth about things is intrinsically good and 
philosophers have tended to share the everyday belief captured in the Charmides. 
Nietzsche however, almost uniquely - although Max Stirrer is one other 
exception that I can think of in this regard, and I will return to briefly discuss his 
contribution to the debate - doubts precisely this. Such doubts against truth that 
Nietzsche entertains have the consequence that to argue that Nietzsche espoused 
atheism not out of ressentiment motives but simply because he genuinely - i. e. 
without self-deception - believed it to be true and assumed that the truth should 
be known is not a way out of the impasse of self-reference because it can connect 
atheism to what Nietzsche calls the 'ascetic ideal'. 
15' Plato, Republic, 389; Charmides, 166 d. 
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What is meant by the thought that wanting the truth is intimately connected 
with the `ascetic ideal'? Well, in the previous chapter we have seen that 
Nietzsche thought that the Christian search for salvation was indicative of a 
certain badly constructed physiological type, in so far as it was assumed that 
healthy people satisfied with this world would have no reason to search for 
another, ideal', one. And we saw in the chapter before that that Nietzsche 
interpreted the Schopenhauerian search for salvation as also indicating a ill- 
constituted physiological type because Schopenhauer too was suggesting that the 
contemplation of a- in Nietzschean terms - vague irreal world was better than 
engaging with our own terrestrial environment. Similarly-, here Nietzsche is 
arguing that the search for, or the acceptance of, truth as a telo. s external to the 
individual indicates that an individual is setting up an extrinsic standard of value, 
which further indicates that the individual in question is dissatisfied with his own 
autonomous evaluations. This is of course a restatement of the now rather 
familiar Nietzschean point that someone who was physiologically well set up 
would not need look outside himself for a source of value. Clearly, Nietzsche is 
not rejecting the (any) concept of truth, he is rather rejecting the all-pervasive 
value it is accorded by some people. For to seek to accept things simply because 
they are true without reference to one's own desires, might be thought to express 
a certain lack of belief in the worth of one's own desires. But might there not be 
circumstances in which this lack of belief in one's own desire is validated? 
According to one type of Christian philosophical self-understanding, for 
example, because this world of rapacious exploitation and competition, which 
we contribute to, is in itself corrupt and inherently unsatisfactory then we are 
right not to trust our desires. Nietzsche's further insight, which is aimed to 
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counter such Christian self-understanding, can be captured by the suggestion that 
since not all individuals experience this world as needing to be redeemed, then 
the feeling of corruption must itself be a symptom of something more subjective. 
This `something more subjective' Nietzsche takes to be an, in principle, 
empirically confirmable physiological weakness. As it may also be put, 
Nietzsche's contention that if such individuals as Christians were less exhausted 
they would not desire the calm contemplation of some unchanging reality is 
supported by the fact that some individuals do not in fact desire such escape. 
On such a view as Nietzsche's, even scientists and scholars in the humanities 
and elsewhere are therefore to be seen as `sufferers' searching for solace and 
comfort by an external standard by which to comport themselves and escape: 
`Science as a means of self-anaesthetic' [GM 117]. This highly unusual insight 
into the ultimately physiological nature of the search for truth clearly emerges in 
Nietzsche's discussion of Socrates in The Twilight of the Idols, where the famed 
Socratic craving for rationality and truth is caricatured as an escape from 
Socrates' own ultimately physiological disorders (his ugliness and `auditory 
hallucinations'). Of course, such a diagnostic case study of Socrates as 
undertaken in The Twilight is as highly speculative as was Nietzsche's case study 
of Christ or St. Francis in The Anti-Christ and cannot really be empirically 
checked because of a similar scarcity of historical evidence. What I would now 
like to do, therefore, is not to look at this - or any other - specific case study but 
to continue explaining and expanding Nietzsche's account of the psychological 
and physiological roots of truth seeking, to at least be prepared to check the 
consistency of this account with the rest of Nietzsche's thought. 
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The desire for truth as a goal, `the will to truth', is probably most rigorously 
subjected to a detailed psychological analysis in the third essay of On the 
Genealogy of Morals, which traces this kind of escapist psychology to a certain 
type of deficient physiology. As I have already suggested, the truth seeking man, 
much like the religious man motivated by escapism (much like St. Francis, or 
Jesus, or even like Schopenhauer, who Nietzsche took to be tortured by his own 
sexuality and seeking escape in art and the Upanishads) is stigmatised by 
Nietzsche as being physiologically degenerate and for the same kind of reasons: 
if a man was well constituted then according to Nietzsche he would not be 
inclined to search everywhere for a value that was external to his own desires 
and which to some extent judges and corrects them. Searching for the truth is, 
Nietzsche thinks, a way that some people escape from themselves, from selves 
they experience as - but will not admit to be - relatively impotent and 
unsatisfying. Following the analysis in Poellner's Niei sche and Metaphysics, we 
might say that there are in fact three specific characteristics that the desire for 
truth might be thought to share with the religious man's search for and devotion 
to God. Each of these three associations, taken separately, would warrant the 
identification that Nietzsche draws but as Poellner points out, they are often 
found concurrently156. The first key presumption of this account is that truth, like 
God, is seen by some people to be an intrinsic good; that is, that the attainment 
of a state of grasping the metaphysical or absolute truth is seen to be valuable in 
itself, whatever the character of reality turns out to be. A second assumption of 
this account of truth seeking that is shared by theism is that truth can, by certain 
156 Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, pp. 114-117. 
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individuals, be seen to be an unconditioned reality external to them that will 
function as a final place of contemplative rest. Indeed, at one point Nietzsche 
refers to salvation as `that finally achieved state of total hypnosis and tranquillity 
[... ] as `knowledge', `truth', `being', as an escape from every aim, every wish' 
[GM 103-104]. Thirdly, Nietzsche's account of the truth seeking man and the 
religious man share the view that contemplation of their desired object carries 
with it a normative guide for their actions that gives them a value that otherwise 
they would not feel they possessed, as though certain modes of life were 
necessarily legitimated by certain truths and certain other modes of life were not, 
even though we might desire them. 
If all this appears highly eccentric it might well do to further mention at this 
point that Nietzsche's sustained attack upon the absolute adherence to truth is 
not absolutely unique in the history of modern philosophy. One can think, for 
example, of Max Stirrer's text The Ego und Its Own, where precisely the same 
point is captured thus: 
When you were seeking the truth, what did your heart then long for? For your master! 
You did not aspire to your might, but to a mighty one [... ] As long as you believe in the 
truth, you do not believe in yourself and you are a- servant, a- religious man157 
Stirner came to his revolutionary insight whilst engaging with the work of his 
neo-Hegelian predecessor, Ludwig Feuerbach, an atheistic philosopher whose 
central line of argument in The Essence of Christianity did not begin with a 
demonstration of God's inexistence - it seems to accept this denial as already 
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proved - but rather examines the phenomena of religion, which it breaks down 
into various components, the most important of which for our present purposes 
being indirect self-realisation. Religion is seen by Feuerbach as being an indirect 
self-consciousness of our `species-being'. Despite his atheism, Feuerbach 
therefore retained a belief in the divinity of God's attributes: `Why is a given 
predicate a predicate of God? Because it is divine in its nature; i. e. because it 
expresses no limitation, no defect' 15R Relinquishing a belief in a transcendent 
Christian God but retaining a belief in that God's attributes as the `divine' 
attributes of our species would be, Feuerbach thought, no longer alienating but a 
liberating worship of ourselves as a species (the early Marx similarly talked of 
religion as `alienation' 159). But Stirner goes much further because the human 
species was, for Stirrer, still an idealistic abstraction as autocratic as a 
transcendent God, as contrasted with the concrete individual. Stirrer refuses to 
see why any of the divine attributes - which include truthfulness - have, in the 
absence of that divinity, an intrinsic claim on the behaviour of the individual as 
opposed to the community. For although truthfulness might be necessary for the 
continued existence of the community and therefore might be revered, with some 
157 Stirrer, The Ego and Its Own, 312. 
158 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 24. 
159 Marx said that all criticism begins with the criticism of religion but I take it that what he meant 
was that Feuerbach had already obviated the need for further discussion of it: Marx to my mind 
never engages With religion in a direct and serious manner. Alisdair Maclntyre's book. Marxism 
and Christianity (London: Duckworth, 1969), does not offer a lengthy discussion of the Marxist 
theory of religion but rather tries to show how Marxism, via Hegelianism, has theological 
conceptual roots. 
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prudential justification, as an expression of the `species being' of the 
community, it is arguably not necessary for the continued existence of the 
individual and so need not necessarily be regarded with reverence by the 
individual. Stirrer, in other words, fails to see why we have more obligation to 
the species and the virtues pertaining to the species than we do to `God': both the 
law of God and the needs of the species are abstractions, in Stirner's eyes, and 
should not be favoured over the concrete needs of the individual. Feuerbach's 
Promethean contribution to the philosophy of atheism is thus given a decisive 
egotistical twist by Stirrer, who attempts to destroy what he believes to be a 
residual idealistic illusion: that truth and values like it have a value independent 
of our concrete decision to promote them for our own partisan, individual ends. 
The similarity between Nietzsche and Stirner on this precise issue of 
abandoning an absolute attachment to truth as a goal is evidently pronounced and 
needs little in the way of further gloss. For both, propagating atheism by 
appealing to categories of truth and believing that the truth should be known is a 
left over from the religious tradition which uncritically accepts the idea of truth 
as an intrinsic good. `Honest atheism', as Nietzsche maintains: `is therefore not 
opposed to the ascetic instinct as it appears to be; instead it is only one of the 
ideal's last phases of development' [GM 126]. Thus, as Nietzsche understands it, 
the `honest' atheist can believe himself to be anti-religious but actually be 
illicitly perpetuating the religious, `ascetic', ideal: 
All these pale atheists [... ] believe they are all as liberated as possible from the ascetic 
ideal [... ] and yet I will tell them what they themselves cannot see [... ] this ideal world is 
simply their ideal as well [GM 1181. 
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Nietzsche is remarking that even the atheist can be religious in this broader, 
fugitive, sense, a fact also implicitly noted by Stirrer who, in the context of a 
discussion of why he opposes avowed Christians and free thinking atheists 
("Rationalists") alike, wrote that: 
If one buffets single traditional truths (miracles, unlimited power of princes), then the 
Rationalists buffet them too and only the old style believers wail. But if one buffets truth 
itself, he immediately has both, as believers, for opponents. 160 
Nietzsche is not absolutely unique, then, in questioning the value of truth in 
modernity. But where he is more innovative is in his emphasising the role of 
truth in the tortuous process of Christianity being strangely responsible for 
producing its own gravediggers. In his later works, Nietzsche sees Christianity as 
directly contributing to a massive crisis of values in Western civilisation. 
Christianity is so involved in this crisis by its emphasising and cultivating the 
virtue of truthfulness to the extent that we are always duty bound to tell the truth: 
whilst all the time it bases this normative doctrine on a set of interlocking beliefs 
(such as God and the soul) which themselves will not survive eventual scrutiny at 
the hands of the very `will-to-truth they support. Nietzsche therefore foresees 
the end of Christianity at the hands of its own morality and remarks that the 
sense of truthfulness, developed highly by Christianity, is nauseated by the 
falseness and mendaciousness of all Christian interpretations of the world and of 
history' [WP #1]. The process of increasing secularisation, interpreted by 
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Nietzsche as Christianity dying by its own hands by fostering the value of truth, 
is a process for which Nietzsche generally reserves the term `nihilism' -a 
subject to which I shall revert in the concluding remarks of the present chapter. 
This now brings us to the second issue of self-reference: the problem of 
Nietzsche's own atheism being seen as part of this atheistic contradiction and 
completion of Christianity and therefore as, self-defeatingly, sharing a continuity 
of moral essence with Christianity. For if Nietzsche traces atheism to the 
unhealthy maximisation of the will to truth, then a self referential strategy might 
be deployed with regard to Nietzsche's own atheism. Such a self referential 
strategy would obviously involve reducing Nietzsche's atheism to the expression 
of a badly constituted physiological. type, with the result that though Christianity 
on the Nietzschean reading might still be a symptom of terrestrial deterioration, 
the gain for atheists would be slight because anti-Christianity of the Nietzschean 
form would no longer be anything particularly healthy either. And many 
commentators on Nietzsche do only provide him with just one motive for 
espousing atheism which they then trace back to the ascetic ideal of truth for 
truth's sake that Nietzsche associated with religion. The implication to be drawn 
from such accounts is clearly that Nietzsche, in attacking the ascetic ideal, is 
once again undermining his own philosophy. According to the view under 
consideration, Alexander Nehamas was right to claim that: `In fighting the 
160 Stirrer, the Ego and Its Own, 46. 
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ascetic ideal, Nietzsche (and everyone who follows him) is actually perpetuating 
it'161 
IVAgainst Ressentiment, Against Nihilism 
Nietzsche - as we have seen at some considerable length in the previous 
chapter - attacked the Western monotheistic religious tradition for being 
unhealthy in certain specific ways (it was ascetic, subject to ressentiment and 
`bad conscience'). Yet he thought much the same of Eastern culture: unlike 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche did not consider atheistic Buddhism to be liberating in 
any way and this alone should probably have made us doubt whether Nietzsche 
was unconditional in his estimation of atheism. In this chapter it has now 
emerged that Nietzsche sometimes charges atheism with complaints similar to 
those which he brought against religion. Atheism can potentially be 
subterranean rancune' towards Christianity or it can be one of the last phases of 
the ascetic ideal: it can, in other words, be smouldering ressentiment or yearning 
escapism. But whether this surprises us or not, it should lead us to question the 
way in which atheism can be considered to be a healthy alternative to religion. 
The most plausible candidate for a healthy alternative to religion on Nietzsche's 
terms would have to be one that emerged spontaneously, as we largely analysed 
Nietzsche's idea of healthy nobility in the last chapter as the ability to 
acknowledge one's own values independently of any exterior legitimating power 
161 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, 130; see also M. Clarke, Nietzsche on Truth and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 191,23, and Kaufmann, Nietzsche: 
Philosopher. Psychologist, Anti-Christ, 100-101. 
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('God' or even `Truth'). But there are, an objector could mention at this point- 
other characteristics of nobility in addition to spontaneous emotive self 
reverence, such as the excellence of courageous imprudence (and in this regard 
we have already examined the self-endangering character of the noble type in the 
previous chapter, where we saw it could potentially lead to `bad conscience'), so 
we should not lay too much stress on spontaneity. My answer to this is that 
imprudence is a characteristic but it is nevertheless not as important a 
characteristic, of nobility as is self-reverence, as seems to be demonstrated in the 
expansive characterisation of nobility to be found in section 287 of Beyond (good 
und Evil (where we read that it is the faith which is decisive here [... ] some 
fundamental certainty which a noble soul possesses in regard to itself). We can 
therefore turn to Nietzsche's other thoughts on atheism with an already 
formulated question in mind: can atheism be associated with this spontaneity of 
the noble man as described in On the Genealogy of Morals? 
The answer to this question is: yes, there can be a spontaneously noble atheism 
and the basis for such a claim as this - alongside its very elucidation - is to be 
collected from Nietzsche's own texts. In On the Genealogy of Morals itself, the 
noble or warrior class is insurrectionary by nature, and it is therefore by 
implication non-religious (at least prior to the advance of `bad conscience'). By 
means of illustration, after his description of the emergence of the organisation 
of the early Christian church, Nietzsche remarks that in stark contradistinction to 
this emergence, The instinct of the born `masters' (I mean here the solitary 
predatory species of man) is basically irritated and unsettled by organisation' 
[GM 107]. Spontaneous aggression against Christianity is invoked in the first 
person in Ecce Homo: `If I wage war on Christianity I have a right to do so, 
-, -) 5 
because I have never experienced anything disagreeable or frustrating in that 
direction' [EH 48, see also EH 51, EH 85]. In such self-characterisations, which 
are repeated throughout his philosophical autobiography, Nietzsche is not taking 
revenge on Christianity by condemning it on the basis of an exterior legitimating 
(moral) standard, nor is he trying to establish certain facts about the universe. 
Rather, he instinctively desires the destruction of Christianity and he 
acknowledges this desire for what it is without trying to self-deceptively mask 
that desire with an appeal to `higher', more moral motives. Nietzsche in Lcce 
Homo is obviously accommodating himself to his own sketches of the noble man 
in On the Genealogy of Morals as instinctively aggressive toward priestly 
religion. And it follows that if we take such remarks seriously then there could in 
principle be an atheistic type who is naturally aggressive but not unhealthy by 
Nietzschean standards. But is there any further reason why we should take these 
remarks seriously? 
It is true that the simple intelligibility of the concept of an instinctively 
destructive type within Nietzsche's philosophy does not secure its existence, not 
without making explicit further assumptions at any rate. Up to a point however, 
Nietzsche's assumption that there are human types who act aggressively to 
power that is not their own can be defended as something more than a merely 
speculative and internally coherent hypothesis (but only up to a point). Briefly 
stated, this is because any plausibility that such remarks may have derives from 
Nietzsche's aforementioned empirical researches in nature and history which 
found an essentially aggressive impulse at the heart of human motivation and 
nature. I shall not make further study of the plausibility of these researches in 
this study, for reasons that will become obvious in the concluding section of the 
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present chapter but it is enough for present purposes to point out that if w ve 
accept the postulate of the will to power then we can in principle also accept the 
existence of atheists who destroy out of spontaneous aggression. 
Yet few philosophers have seriously analysed Nietzsche's remarks upon 
atheism itself, with the result that Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment or his 
theory of the will to truth are often referred back upon themselves, supposedly 
subjecting Nietzsche's account of religion to a critique which is basically taken 
to be a natural extension of Nietzsche's own philosophy. Yet these attempts are 
not only all bound to fail from my standpoint in this chapter but it is also worth 
noting that they further arguably cast doubt on their own plausibility by claiming 
with one voice that Nietzsche's motives in this regard are all of a certain kind, 
whilst differing amongst themselves as to whether they should derive Nietzsche's 
atheism from either the motive of ressentiment or that of the will to truth. In any 
case, either attempt fails. The attempt to portray Nietzsche as himself weak and 
riddled with re. ssentiment because he is simply responding to theism - as 
exemplified in Paul Ricoeur's remark that Nietzsches `aggression against 
Christianity is too full of resentment' 162 - fails because Nietzsche's striving to be 
seen as spontaneously and self-consciously attacking Christianity - without 
recourse to any exterior legitimating power - strongly suggests that Nietzsche's 
attack was part of a noble style of life that is destructive but not necessarily self- 
deceptive. Nietzsche fully accepts that he is `waging war' on Christianity and 
does not try to mask that war by subordinating it to another cause (the true, the 
162 P. Ricoeur, `Religion, Atheism and Faith' in A. Maclntyre and P. Ricoeur, The Religious 
Sigiiificaiice of : -1 theism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 59-98,68. 
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good). Ricoeur therefore, fails to prove the specifically self deceptive, rather than 
merely reactive, character of Nietzsche's own atheism. Ressentiment as we have 
- following Scheler and Poellner - more precisely defined it here necessarily 
involves self-deception with regard to values that are in reality not held for their 
own sake, and so is therefore to be distinguished from what continental 
philosophers influenced by Deleuze and analytic philosophers influenced by 
Strawson have often called the `reactive' attitudes (resentment being taken to be 
the emblematic reactive attitude in both cases). Simple reaction (a riposte, for 
example), which is certainly involved in Nietzsche's attack on Christianity, could 
arguably be taken to indicate the potential presence of fully blown self-deceptive 
ressentiment and might perhaps be taken to be grounds for the further 
examination of that re-action against Christianity to see if any self-deception is 
in fact involved somewhere on Nietzsche's part. But by itself however, reaction 
per se is not sufficient to prove the presence of ressentilnent and Ricoeur has 
done nothing to provide any further argumentative and investigative support to 
connect Nietzsche's obvious reaction with the further presence of self-deceptive 
ressentiment with regard to values. 
The attempt to portray Nietzsche as subject to the will to truth, on the other 
hand, also fails. This fails because we can say that Nietzsche does reject truth as 
a goal for his philosophy but that he sometimes, as in this particular case, uses 
the truth as an expedient (and in any case, would not the avoidance of truth at all 
costs, regardless of our own aspirations, be just as much of an `ascetic ideal'? ). 
The following statements would seem to be quite unequivocal in abandoning the 
reverence of truth qua truth with regard specifically to the falseness of 
Christianity: `Ultimately the point is to what end a lie is told. That 'holy" ends 
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are lacking in Christianity is my objection to its means' [AC 56, see also EH 132: 
It is not error as error which horrifies me at the sight of this... '; WP #251; GS 
#123]. In all such passages as these, only one of which was not prepared for 
publication by Nietzsche, the issue of the truth of the Christian religion is wholly 
subordinated - though seemingly not identified, in the manner of pragmatism - 
to that of its value. But if it does also happen to be untrue as well as worthless - 
and Nietzsche explicitly states that it does - then we have little reason to blame 
Nietzsche for sometimes exploiting this expedient for polemical purposes (a 
specific application of Stirrer's more general principle, `Truths are material, like 
vegetables and weeds; as to whether vegetable or weed, the decision lies in 
me' 163). After all, the `critic of Christianity cannot be spared the task of making 
Christianity contemptible' [AC #57]. 
Nietzsche, we might say, identifies not one atheism which is unhealthy but 
rather three kinds of atheism. All are identified by their motivational 
background: an unhealthy and self-deceptive atheism born out of ressentiment 
which aims primarily to disturb theists; an apparently more detached but in fact 
just as unhealthy atheism that aims at the straitforward goal of establishing the 
facts about the universe but thereby inflates one of the traditional attributes of 
God - truth - into an object of respect and worship 
itself; and finally, an 
insurrectionary atheism born not out of a self-deceptive reaction to others who 
have been experienced as better nor from thankful servility to an external value 
such as truth but out of an insurrectionary disposition itself standing in a closer 
relationship to the will to power. 
163 Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, 313. 
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V Secularisation, History, Inexorability 
At the outset of the present chapter I set myself four tasks to accomplish. So 
far in this chapter I have tried to defend three out of the four proposals which 
were initially mentioned. Firstly, that Nietzsche sees atheism as well as theism as 
potentially being based on ressentiment; secondly, that he also sees it as being 
potentially subject to the ascetic `will to truth' and thirdly, that Nietzsche's 
atheistic philosophy could nevertheless escape those common charges of self- 
reference, at least in principle. This naturally now leads us to my fourth aim and 
what is without doubt an unresolved problem, perhaps the unresolved problem, 
of Nietzsche's theoretical work on religion: namely, that even if an examination 
- be it metaphysical or empirical - of Nietzsche's views concerning human 
motivation and the will to power was to authoritatively conclude positively in 
Nietzsche's favour, this would still not obviously support a philosophically 
sustainable non-partisan basis for preferring the discharge of power characteristic 
of nobles over the discharge of power that we find in Christianity. From the third 
person standpoint - i. e. from a standpoint which does not merely reflect 
Nietzsche's own subjective opinions or preferences, be they aesthetic, political 
or even unconsciously or physiologically determined - there is no obvious way to 
normatively discriminate between them in a non-arbitrary manner. Nietzsche 
might, it is true, be reconstructed on non-naturalistic lines, as, say. a 
phenomenologist of value, but whilst this may go some way towards dignifying 
Nietzsche's own valorisations, such phenomenology's limits are such as to 
prohibit any reasonable attempt to accept those values as our owN n. In this spirit, 
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Keith Ansell-Pearson has stated that the coherence of evaluating the relative 
merits of a strong, abundant will to power over a weak impoverished one on the 
principle of the will to power must seriously be questioned: 
Can the will to power serve the role of principle in the critique when, for example. 
Nietzsche discovers in the first essay of the Genealogy that the slave revolt in morals 
which reflects a degenerating life shows itself, when viewed historically and in the wider 
context of culture, to have played an important role in the cultivation and discipline of 
the human animal and has even served to deepen it? Is it not the case that such a 
distinction between ascending life and descending life - what we may call Nietzsche's 
discrimination of will to power - stands in contradiction to a standpoint which strives to 
be beyond good and evil? Does not such a standpoint affirm life in its totality-? ýýý 
It is certainly the case that other well-known elements of Nietzsche's thought - 
such as his doctrine of the eternal recurrence, the idea of amor fati and the 
magnanimous notion of the `innocence of becoming' - do not `discriminate' life 
in this sense and do indeed appear to serve to affirm life in its totality, yet 
Nietzschean `genealogical critique' seems not to do this, leading us to suspect 
that the partisan valorisation it contains at its heart is incompatible with the 
wider framework of Nietzsche's often coldly impersonal and detached thought. 
So, even if Nietzsche's initial assumptions about the will to power are granted it 
still therefore does not follow from his genealogical analysis that religion is 
valueless and that it should be abandoned. At times Nietzsche seems to recognise 
164 K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
1991) 107. 
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this: even leaving aside those aspects of Nietzsche's work such as the eternal 
recurrence, Umur fat, and the notion of the `innocence of becoming", there is an 
observable tendency in Nietzsche's genealogical investigation itself which does 
lead him in this direction. Indeed, we might say that Nietzsche is so far from 
unambiguously and unconditionally accepting the hypothesis of the 
worthlessness of religion that he habitually admits that the phenomena that he at 
once condemns as slavish, ignoble and base also actually fascinate him with their 
profundity, intelligence, interest and danger. So it is that in the same place as he 
exposes the depravity of the priestly type, Nietzsche also writes that man `first 
became an interesting animal on the foundation of this essentially dangerous 
form of human existence, the priest' [GM 18]. And in the second essay of the 
Genealogy, after giving expression to his own theory of `bad conscience' 
Nietzsche remarks: `Let us immediately add that, on the other hand, the prospect 
of an animal soul turning in upon itself, taking a part against itself, was 
something so new, profound, unheard of, puzzling, contradictory and momentous 
on earth that the whole character of the world changed in an essential way' 
thereby arousing `interest, tension, hope' [GM 62]; and elsewhere, and perhaps 
most importantly, Nietzsche states that one of the enormous advantages of 
Christianity is that it `granted man an absolute value' [WP #4]. Given, then, that 
Nietzsche's rejection of God and religion is based on precisely such 
considerations of value - rather than on the more usual ontological 
considerations - there would seem to be some 
justice in the claim that there are 
no objective grounds for a rejection of religion in Nietzsche. 
This, and not the problem of self reference, is the real downfall of Nietzsche's 
criticism of religion. For even if we follow Nietzsche as far as postulating a will 
, ý, 
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to power, this is still not justification enough for overthrowing Christianity. By 
his own lights, Nietzsche should accept - as he arguably occasionally does - 
Christianity as another valuable expression of the will to power. Any further 
choice on our part subsequent to a genealogy of Christianity as to whether we are 
to commit ourselves to identifying with the Christian tradition or whether 
alternatively we are committed to attacking that tradition, would then seem to be 
a dilemma resolved by individual decision alone - Kierkegaard or Nietzsche? 
Before leaving Nietzsche however, I want to be as fair to his powerful and 
influential attack on religion as I can and so would like to mention, although only 
rather schematically, one recent attempted solution to this problem of artificial 
valorisation and point out why it seems to me to not to be conclusive. 
Keith Ansell-Pearson appears to have espoused the view that Nietzsche sides 
with a strong affirmation of the will such as that of the noble man over a weak 
one such as that which we find in Christianity, not out of prejudice or 
favouritism but ultimately in order to overcome a long term suicidal nihilism of 
the will. As it may also be put, Nietzsche chooses, given the alternatives of 
religious ressentiment and noble affirmation, to affirm and he chooses this way, 
not because of considerations about strength being better than weakness but 
rather as part of a counter-movement against `the possibility of a crippling 
nihilism' that attends `the advent of the death of God' 165" That is to say, on the 
Nietzschean account; because Christianity leads to its own death and so 
ultimately to nihilism and the cessation of willing; the choice is not between two 
expressions of willing (strong and weak) after all but rather between willing as 
165 Ibid., 151; see also 107,122. 
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against denying the will. This historical and cultural slide from monotheism to 
nihilism by means of the will to truth is indeed a significant strand within 
Nietzschean thought (and Ansell Pearson describes Nietzsche's account of the 
internal deterioration of monotheism in much more detailed terms than I can do 
justice to here). But in response to it, I would like to point out that because such 
nihilism could also potentially be overcome by siding ever more vehemently 
with a return to the traditional forms of religion that staved off the devaluation of 
all values for so long, then what becomes crucially important here is the validity 
of Nietzsche's recognition, already foreshadowed in Schopenhauer (but hardly 
vouchsafed on that account), of the `fact' of the demise of Christianity. Because 
if Nietzsche is wrong about the inexorability of the decline of the Christian faith 
- if, that is, the process of nihilism can be stopped, reversed or avoided - then it 
follows that Christian values themselves might successfully stave off the nihilism 
that threatens to engulf us; which again makes the Nietzschean critique of 
religion arbitrary: a subjective choice between two expressions of the will. 
Nietzsche's failure in the matter of discrediting religion might thus be above all 
his failure to feel the pressure of the resistance to secularisation. History, not 
Nietzsche, will definitively resolve the question of the inexorability of Christian 
decline. But given that there are at least some indications to the contrary 
(including the partial renaissances of religion that I mentioned in my very brief 
sociological digression at the beginning of the previous chapter) then it seems to 
me far from being certain that Christianity is absolutely doomed to the 
dissolution that would prevent it from providing humanity as a species with the 
values and existential strategies that Nietzsche insists it requires. And 
if 
Nietzsche has made such an unnecessary concession to secularisation in the way 
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that I have suggested, then whilst it has always been fairly uncontroversial to 
maintain that the problems which Nietzsche addresses are predominantly 
Christian ones, it would now also be equally valid to argue that a return to 
Christianity and its practises and values should be seen as a natural extension of 
those views about our species and our culture for which Nietzsche was, and still 
is, notorious. 
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Conclusion 
A reversion, a turning back in any sense is quite impossible - but all pricst and 
moralists have believed it was possible - they have wanted to take man back, 
fürce it back to an earlier virtue... 
Fredrich Nietzsche 
When everything is moving at once, nothing appears to be moving, as on board 
ship. When everyone is moving toward depravity, no one seems to he moving, but 
if someone stops... 
Blaise Pascal 
A solitary person cannot help or save an age, he can only give expression to the 
fact it is going under 
Soren Kierkegaard 
I: Concluding Remarks On Kant and Schopenhauer 
Although many of the problems addressed by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche 
could not themselves be considered Kantian problems, they are nevertheless 
problems initially confronted from Within a broadly Kantian framework, and this 
remains true even if subsequent argumentation on the part of either 
Schopenhauer or Nietzsche greatly deforms that framework. To take one 
236 
example, although Schopenhauer clearly owes a massive debt to Kants 
understanding of the ideality of space and time, he suspected an incompatibility 
between this ideality and the notion of a pluralistic world of the thin;, in itself 
and in his attempt to resolve this issue with initially phenomenological 
considerations concerning what he called `the will', he radically transformed 
Kant's critical philosophy into a vast panoramic vision of metaphysical agitation 
partly concerned, in its normative mode, with questions of ethical asceticism. 
And to point to another instance, when Nietzsche encountered Schopenhauer's 
philosophical pessimism, although a prominent feature of his eventual response 
would turn out to be a violent rejection of Schopenhauerian `quietism' and 
despair, this would be a rejection that did not radically question many of the 
aspects of the Schopenhauerian universe. What this might be taken to suggest is 
that Schopenhauer's arguments can best be understood through their opposition 
to those of Kant and that Nietzsche's arguments can similarly best be understood 
through their opposition to those of both Kant and Schopenhauer. Such was 
indeed one of the guiding assumptions of the present study. As a result, 
Schopenhauer was not criticised at any great length for his initial acceptance of 
transcendental idealism, nor was Nietzsche criticised unduly for himself 
criticising what might be regarded to be an essentially a Kantian God at the 
expense of the living Christian God. Rather, what I provided in this study might 
be said to be an account of the internal development and criticism of a certain 
Kantian tradition; not the only one to be initiated by Kant, to be sure; nor one 
whose continuities are wholly free from links with other traditions 
but 
nonetheless surely one whose arguments at certain key points of 
internal conflict 
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were both intriguing enough and powerful enough to merit study. What were 
these key arguments? 
Among the arguments and positions I have examined in this study, the 
following in particular seemed to me to be especially worthy of highlighting. In 
the first place, Kant's critical philosophy, which - to re-emphasise - 
unquestionably provides the principal philosophical framework within which 
both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's work is to be understood. shifted God out of 
ontological consideration on wholly epistemological terms by characterising God 
negatively as existing outside of space and time and then by construing human 
knowledge on partly empiricist terms which demanded that objects of knowledge 
appear only within space and time. It was also impossible, Kant maintained, for 
God to unambiguously reveal Himself to us through scripture. Nevertheless, Kant 
also argued that the mind was naturally lead to posit a God. I took it that the 
combination of these factors permitted us to call Kant a deist. Kant also argued 
that our commitment to morality naturally lead us to postulate God. I however, 
argued that there were serious objections to Kant's moral proof of the being of 
God. More specifically, I argued that even if Kant was correct in suggesting that, 
as sensible finite beings or `beings of the world' as he himself put it, we needed 
motivation to act morally and that we were compelled to act in such a moral 
fashion, that motivation could in fact be supplied by entirely earthly ends - such 
as those suggested to me by Maclntyre's neo-Aristotelian account of morals - 
and need not necessarily be those wholly otherworldly theological ends 
summoned by Kant. This left the Kantian metaphysic, certainly agnostic but also 
arguably liable to be read in atheistic terms. Such theologically negativ e 
consequences of the Kantian project were devastatingly exposed by Arthur 
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Schopenhauer in the elaborate re-working of Kantian idealism that is The World 
as Will and Represenlution. 
I argued that Schopenhauer never argued directly for atheism in his 
metaphysics but that his acceptance of such an atheism was obviously implicit in 
the very structure of the metaphysics with which Schopenhauer intended to 
replace Kantian epistemology. I also suggested that Schopenhauer's main 
philosophical achievement might have been to demonstrate that there were deep 
problems with the very idea of differentiation outside of space and time. Couple 
this claim, which is perhaps true, with the argument that since self-knowledge is 
outside space it is nearer to the thing in itself and we are fairly straightforwardly 
led to the conclusion that what lies behind experience is impersonal `will' 
(however we may choose to cash out that word, exactly) and not God. However, 
there were unresolved difficulties with Schopenhauer's metaphysical project to 
exclude the Kantian God - primarily with the claim that experience outside 
space is closer to the thing in itself. Schopenhauer's ultimate ontological 
standpoint, I concluded, left the noumenal world as `empty' as it was in Kant's 
critical philosophy. 
Schopenhauer also attempted to show that the Judaeo-Christian creator God as 
described in the first chapter of Genesis was an incoherent idea (thus his ethics, 
if not his metaphysics, seemed to argue quite directly for atheism). In this 
connection, we saw that Schopenhauer's specific `argument from evil', which 
importantly included animal suffering, was ineffectual. This was because if 
Schopenhauer's own empirically based moral theory -a theory which in certain 
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respects owed strong debts to British empiricism in ethics' 66- was to escape 
crippling problems concerned with moral disagreement, then it must include a 
metaphysical component but that if it does so include this component, then it 
already presupposes atheism. In the final stage of The If orld as Will 
Schopenhauer also attempted to argue that a form of mortal redemption 
supposedly free of any theological commitment was still possible for us as 
humans and one of the main ways in which this redemption could be achieved 
was, he suggested, by the disinterested appreciation of art. Yet his case for this 
specific position sharply exposed what Nietzsche would call Christianity's and 
Schopenhauer's common `life denying' undercurrents. Indeed, for Nietzsche the 
salvations which are espoused by the Schopenhauerian philosophy and the 
Christian religion were two of the purest representatives of what, in a series of 
polemics bordering on the obsessional, he termed the `ascetic ideal'. 
II: Concluding Remarks On Nietzsche 
However else they may be differentiated from each other, Kant and 
Schopenhauer's reflections on the human predicament certainly have this much 
in common: Nietzsche rejects them both. Nietzsche approaches religion not as a 
necessary practical presupposition nor as a metaphysical aberration but rather as 
a psychological and even physiological fact. This marked shift toward such 
characterisation that we discern in the move from Kant and Schopenhauer to 
Nietzsche means that, in contrast to the Kantio-Schopenhauerian metaphysical 
166 The British empiricism, that is, of Hutcheson and Hume, and not that empirical theory of 
egoism discussed by Hobbes and Mandeville. 
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world of shadowy noumenal entities and unobserved extentionless subjects, we 
find in Nietzsche a theoretical landscape populated by a seemingly far more 
concrete cast of characters. The two main psychological types into which 
Nietzsche characterises religious people are the `escapist' and the `slave', both of 
which types are taken not to benefit the terrestrial cultivation of human 
excellence. In the first place, Nietzsche reads the human desire for a spiritual 
heaven as a decadent symptom of subnormal physical life, demonstrating that the 
celestial notion of salvation, which is unquestionably and explicitly central to at 
least one strand of Christian belief (and also, as we saw in the earlier chapter, to 
a central element of Schopenhauerian philosophy, and to much else besides) is 
related to the concept of terrestrial dissatisfaction. These psychologically- 
disaffected types, it is Nietzsche's novelty to then suggest, are disaffected 
physiologically. This is an empirical claim, of course, and we accordingly 
evaluated it according to empirical criteria, finding it provisionally upheld (or at 
any rate not unquestionably overthrown). However, Nietzsche conceded that not 
all such types are physiologically problematic and he suggested that these 
exceptions were strong but masochistic types affected by `bad conscience'. But 
this claim seemed to run aground on the problem of why supposedly masochistic 
types would embrace Christianity when the greater heroism would appear to lay 
in ignoring it. 
Nietzsche's second concrete psychological analysis, an analysis of the very 
first `slave revolt in morals' as what in contemporary philosophy of language is 
called an illocutionary act was seen to be central to Nietzsche's whole 
endeavour, particularly as it is presented in On the Genealogy of Morals, insofar 
as this particular construal of the ontological status of religious language allowed 
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him to escape the objection that he was just looking at and attacking the 
language of morality rather than the actual morality itself. Nietzsche's exposure 
of the language of morality and religion in the first essay of On the Genealogy - 
an exposure that I detailed with an Austinian conceptual specificity that 
Nietzsche did not have at his disposal - is not, then, a contribution to linguistics 
but is rather a contribution to ethics, a contribution taking the form of a history 
of morals that views morality largely as a mixture of emotivism and 
prescriptivism. 
Admittedly, it might be argued that my reading of Nietzsche in this particular 
chapter failed to do sufficient justice to Nietzsche's epistemological 
relativisation of his own work, which is given particularly forceful expression 
not in On the Genealogy of Moral s but rather in certain sections of Beyond Good 
and Evil. In mitigation of this apparent omission however, it might be said that 
prior to querying whether Nietzsche's strongly expressed views specifically on 
religion manage to fit in with his more sporadic adventurous claims concerning 
assertions in general, it would not be such a bad idea to see whether those views 
concerning religion are, in fact, coherent. I have argued that when suitably 
interpreted, at least some of them are. In particular, I have argued that 
Nietzsche's investigations into the slave revolt in morals fended off certain 
objections we might be tempted to raise. Does this then mean that Nietzsche has 
articulated a compelling case for the rejection of religion? Such was the question 
that I addressed in the subsequent chapter. 
We saw there that one reason for doubting that Nietzsche has indeed given us 
a reason for rejecting religion is that he gave ample justification for supposing 
that certain types of atheistic motivation were themselves unhealthy; reasons 
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strongly connected with the method of psychological characterisation into 
escapist and ressenliment-based types that Nietzsche deployed with regard to the 
motivation of religion itself. One of the arguments against Nietzsche most often 
insisted upon by his recent critics therefore, is that this characterisation of 
atheists is in fact incompatible with his own atheism. I argued that Nietzsche's 
work was however, quite safe from the anxieties that such commentators 
entertained on the subject of Nietzsches own atheism being motivated either by 
ressentiment or the desire for truth. Yet this is not, of course, to say Nietzsche's 
overall critique of religion can therefore be regarded as sound. One reason for 
doubting the force of Nietzsche's attack, quite apart from the problematic issue 
of explaining the conversion of strong types to Christianity, is that questions can 
be raised about his characterisation of Christianity as driven by ressentiment, 
questions about the soundness of Nietzsche's researches into nature which found 
a `will to power' at its heart, as it is this latter claim alone that seems to bear the 
justificatory weight of the idea of morality always being driven by its antipodes: 
i. e. by immoral and aggressive drives. I did not emphasise this particular 
criticism at any great length however, because more importantly, even if proved, 
the assumption of the will to power in any case fails to provide a satisfactory 
account of why the noble expression of the will to power is, from the third 
person perspective, an inherently more valuable form than the priestly 
expression. And if Nietzsche leaves this problem untouched or at least 
unresolved then he has also failed to show why religion and its theistic concepts 
should in fact be abandoned as valueless by our species at this stage in its 
history. In conclusion, I considered a way in which Nietzsche has been 
reconstructed so as to bypass this problem. I found there however, that this 
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reflective reconstruction implicitly relied upon a speculative hypothesis about 
the direction of the history of secularisation. Yet this history; as far as I can see, 
must remain unpredictable. 
So, not one of the three philosophers that I have examined in this study are, on 
my interpretation, on absolutely solid ground. Kant's epistemological 
agnosticism was relatively self-consistent but his associated and quasi-existential 
moral proof of God turned out not to be successful. Likewise, Schopenhauer's 
metaphysical system, though it can arguably count amongst its achievements an 
exposure of the problems of noumenal differentiation, was really too limited to 
satisfactorily uphold either his overwhelming exclusion argument or his related 
moral argument against God. Nietzsche's intention was, in a sense, rather more 
complex than Schopenhauer's and even could be said to resemble Kant's: not to 
tell us anything about heaven but rather to inform us more fully about how we 
humans should live our lives out on earth. Yet as an account of religion as escape 
from the corporeal world, it fails to properly account for the phenomena of 
strong Christians. And as an account of religion as always being driven by 
egotistic motives and as an explanation of the possibility of there being an 
aggressive atheism, it itself depends upon a postulate which even if proved would 
not itself supply an axiomatic principle that condemned the priestly or religious 
expression of the will to power as valueless and therefore to be avoided. We end, 
then, on a note of some scepticism, unsurprisingly acknowledging the negligible 
contemporary viability of both Kantian moral deism and Schopenhauer's 
ontological atheism but also of Nietzsche's relatively culturally influential 
atheism. We might therefore finally reply to the unsettling doubts collectively 
raised by the work of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche by saying that in this 
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area answers are still singularly lacking and that, despite the efforts of these three 
particular philosophers, the problem of religious faith still afflicts us. It will 
doubtless continue to do so to the measure that the silence of God still atTects us. 
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